

RELATIONS BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1963-1975

Evolution of Adjustment
to a Multi-polar International System

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China have taken a most remarkable transformation during the past few years. This important qualitative and quantitative change in the relations between these two countries was brought about by two main factors: (1) a profound transformation of the international political order from a bi-polar system, dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union, to a tri-polar system, dominated by the dynamic interplay of these two powers with the People's Republic of China; (2) the dialectics of internal and domestic developments within the People's Republic of China and Malaysia touched off by the impact and consequence of this transformation of the bi-polar to a tri-polar world order.

It was the transformation of the system, both domestic and international, which necessitated a policy of adjustment in Kuala Lumpur and in Peking. As for China, internally, after the end of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Lin Biao in 1971, the moderates were then able to further consolidate and control their power base which enabled them to initiate a new "smiling diplomacy". Externally, the growing Sino-Soviet conflict since the 1950's and Brezhnev's proposal of a "collective security scheme" for Asia, convinced the PRC that it was imperative to counter the Soviet Union's diplomatic advances in Southeast Asia. Also during the period under review the PRC has been admitted into the United Nations, and Peking has entered into a "détente" with the United States, which was initiated by the Nixon administration in 1972. These major events set off a chain reaction of new and dramatic developments which, as a consequence, transformed most of the international sub-systems and forced the leaders of many countries to

reassess their foreign policies and embark upon new initiatives unthinkable only a few years before. One of the most affected sub-systems was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia with the result that Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have entered into full diplomatic relations with China, while Indonesia and Singapore might follow soon. As Malaysia was the first country in Southeast Asia to attune herself rapidly to the realities of the new international balance of power, taking new and bold initiatives and entering into diplomatic relations with Peking; it is the objective of this thesis to undertake a study of relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China so as to better understand their evolution of adjustment from a bi-polar to a multi-polar international system.

As for Malaysia, she shows her adaptability to adjust and sensitivity towards major world changes by taking the lead to recognize the PRC. The factors that help her to arrive at this decision can be listed as follows: (1) Externally, the change of the world order and the need for Malaysia to materialize her proposal of making Southeast Asia become a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality". (2) Internally, Tun Abdul Razak hoped that by winning China's support for his government, the appeal of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) could be lessened in such a way that their communist revolutionary struggle would become meaningless. (3) Tun Abdul Razak also hoped to solve the problem of the 220,000 stateless Chinese in Malaysia. (4) Economic consideration was an important factor too, as Malaysia hoped that the PRC would increase her rubber purchases, which, in turn, would raise the price of rubber in the international market. (5) Finally, Tun Abdul Razak also wanted to acquire prestige and thus strengthen his leadership position among the

ASEAN states.

While several scholarly studies do exist on the relations of Southeast Asia with the People's Republic of China, none of them deals specifically with the topic of the thesis.¹ In this way, the study hopes to contribute to the closing of the gap in the existing literature on the area.

¹The literature focussing on relations of Malaysia with the People's Republic of China includes Stephen Chee, "Malaysia and Singapore: Separate Identities, Different Priorities," in Asian Survey, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (February 1973), pp. 151-161; Marvin Rogers, "Malaysia/Singapore: Problems and Challenges of the Seventies," in Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 2 (February 1971), pp. 121-129; R.S. Milne, "Malaysia and Singapore in 1974," in Asian Survey, Vol. XV, No. 2 (February 1974), pp. 166-173; R.S. Milne, "The Influence of Foreign Policy of Ethnic Minorities with External Ties," in Mark W. Zacher & R.S. Milne eds., Conflict and Stability in South-east Asia, Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1974, pp. 81-120; Robert Lincoln Rau, Singapore's Foreign Relations 1965-1972 with Emphasis on the Five Power Commonwealth Group, University of Michigan, 1974; Lau Teik-soon, Singapore-Malaysia Relations (1962-1970), Australia: Australian National University Press, 1973; Lau Teik-soon ed., New Directions in the International Relations of Great Powers and Southeast Asia, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973; C.P. Fitzgerald, Changing Directions of Chinese Foreign Policy, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1971; C.P. Fitzgerald, Geoffrey Fairbairn & Sir Allan Watt, China and the Future of Southeast Asia, Australia: Australia Institute of International Affairs, and the Townsville University College, 1968; C.P. Fitzgerald, China and Southeast Asia Since 1945, Camberwell, Vic.: Longman, 1973; Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972; Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Reactions with Revolutionary Movements, New York: Praeger, 1974; Daniel Tretiak, "China and Southeast Asia: Changes in the Overall Pattern of Interaction, 1966-70," in Asian Studies: Occasional Paper Series, No. 3, Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University, 1972; Peter Boyce, Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy, Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968.

The scope of the study focuses upon the relations between the two countries during the period from 1963 to 1975. While a survey of the initial years of this period will provide the necessary background, the major thrust of the study has concentrated upon the rapid pace of development of their relations as accelerated by the transformation of the international political order in the period from 1970 to 1975.

In this study, Chapter II and III examine the underlying characteristics of foreign policy of Malaysia and the People's Republic of China.

Chapter IV deals with the internal and external environment which influenced the evolution of foreign policy of Malaysia towards China. Emphasis is placed on the following factors: (1) the problem of nation-building; (2) the problem of the Communist Party; (3) economic factors and foreign trade; (4) the personality structure of the Malay leaders; (5) the Nixon Doctrine; (6) transformation of the international political order; (7) need for neutralization of Southeast Asia.

Chapter V is devoted to the domestic and external environment which influenced the evolution of foreign policy of China towards Malaysia. The factors emphasized are: (1) the impact of the Cultural Revolution; (2) the personalities of the Chinese leaders; (3) the struggles for power and alignments within the top leadership; (4) the confrontation with Moscow; (5) the Shanghai Declaration in 1972; (6) the Geneva Conference on

Vietnam in 1973 and American disengagement in Vietnam; (7)
Support for neutralization of Southeast Asia.

Chapter VI describes the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China. The political, economic, trade, cultural and other aspects of this event are examined in this chapter.

Chapter VII deals with the aftermath of recognition.

Chapter VIII is the conclusion of the study. In this chapter, the main problems involved are summed up, and a perspective of the diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China in the years ahead are examined.

The study uses the historical-analytical method and is based upon analysis of primary source material such as "Foreign Affairs Malaysia",² "The Straits Times.",³ "Nanyang Siang

²"Malaysia's Foreign Policy," in Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1971), p. 25; "Malaysian Foreign Policy with Special Reference to Japan — Questions and Answers," in Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 1972), p. 97; "Neutralization of Southeast Asia," in Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 1971), p. 52; "Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore, February 22-24," in Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1974), pp. 10-17.

³"Razak's Hope on Eve of Trip to China," The Straits Times (Singapore), May 28, 1974; "Tun: The Long Journey Ahead to Forge Friendship Links," The Straits Times (Singapore), May 28, 1974; "Ship to Load \$2 Million Rubber For China," The Straits Times (Singapore), May 30, 1974; "Kuala Lumpur Cuts Official Ties with Taipeh," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 1, 1974; "Where China Backs Us: Razak," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 3, 1974; "Chou Wants to See Malaysia for Himself," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 7, 1974; "Multi-Million Palm Oil Sales to China," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 15, 1974; "Terror Plan Foiled," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 28, 1974; "Easier China Visits Pledge by Razak," The Straits Times (Singapore), July 18, 1974.

Pau", ⁴ "Sin Chew Jit Poh", ⁵ "New Nation", ⁶ "Peking Review", ⁷

⁴"Razak's visit to China Would Lay A Strong Foundation for Friendship and Promote Peace in the Region," Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), May 28, 1974; "Bilateral Trade Relations between Malaysia and China," Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), May 30, 1974; "Joint Announcement of Malaysia and China on the Normalization of Relations," Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), May 31, 1974; "Razak Calls: MCP Give Up Your Weapons," Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), June 6, 1974; "Normalization of Sino-Malaysian Relations Would Promote Racial Harmony and Strengthen Unity," Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), June 6, 1974.

⁵"Michael Chen: China Could Assist Malaysia in Science and Agriculture," Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), June 4, 1974; "The problem of Stateless Chinese Would be continually Discussed After the Sino-Malaysian Normalization," Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), June 3, 1974.

⁶Pang Cheng-Lian, "Malaysian Chinese Are Cautious," New Nation, June 15, 1974; "Razak Has A Frank Talk with Mao," New Nation, May 5, 1974; "Razak Addresses Huge Rally After Triumphant Tour," New Nation, June 3, 1974; "China Ties No Gamble, Says Ghazali," New Nation, June 3, 1974; "Increasing Trade with China," New Nation, June 7, 1974; "Chou Plays Host to Tun Razak," New Nation, May 29, 1974.

⁷See "Chairman Mao Meets Malaysian Prime Minister Razak," in Peking Review, Vol. 17, No. 23 (June 7, 1974), pp. 3-5; "Speech by Comrade Chou En-lai at Hanoi People's Rally to Welcome Chinese Party and Government Delegation," in Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 11 (March 12, 1971), pp. 15-17; "Advance Victoriously Along Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line — 1971 New Year's Day Editorial By Renmin Ribao, 'Honggi' and 'Jiefangjun Bao'," in Peking Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 1, 1971), pp. 8-10.

"Red Flag" (Hung-chi), ⁸ "Pictorial", ⁹ "China Re-constructs", ¹⁰ "People's Daily", ¹¹ "New China News

⁸ An editorial article on "The Deepening Efforts in the Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius," in Red Flag, No. 2 (February 1, 1974), pp. 5-7.

⁹ "The New Development of Sino-Malaysian Relations," in Pictorial, (August 1974), pp. 4-5.

¹⁰ "Speech by Teng Hsiao-ping, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly," in China Reconstructs, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (June 1974), pp. 2-6; Li Chiang, "New Developments in China's Foreign Trade," in China Reconstructs, Vol. XXIII, No. 7 (June 1974), pp. 14-15, 43.

¹¹ An editorial article on "New Development of Friendly Relations between China and Malaysia" People's Daily, May 28, 1974; "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia," People's Daily, June 1, 1974.

Agency", ¹² "Wen Wei Po" ¹³.

The author assumes partial responsibility for the translation of some Chinese newspapers and magazines. Other than this the author has had to rely heavily on the translations compiled by the American Consular-General in Hong Kong. This included the "Survey of China Mainland Press" (SCMP), "Survey of China Mainland

¹²"Malaysian Prime Minister Razak Arrives in Peking to Rousing Welcome," in NCNA, May 29, 1974; Chou En-lai, Chiang Ching, Li Hsien-nien, Hua Kuo-feng, Wu Teh, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme Meet Prime Minister Razak," in NCNA, May 29, 1974; "Premier Chou En-lai Gives Grand Banquet Warmly Welcoming Malaysian Prime Minister Razak and His Party," in NCNA, May 29, 1974; "Premier Chou En-lai's Speech," in NCNA, May 29, 1974; "Prime Minister Razak's Speech," in NCNA, May 29, 1974; "Chairman Mao Meets Malaysian Prime Minister Razak," in NCNA, May 30, 1974; "Premier Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien Hold Talks with Malaysian Prime Minister Razak," in NCNA, May 30, 1974; "Joint Communiqué of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Malaysia," in NCNA, June 1, 1974; "Joint Communiqué of Government of People's Republic of China and Government of Malaysia Signed in Peking," in NCNA, June 1, 1974; "Prime Minister Razak Gives Grand Return Banquet in Peking," in NCNA, June 1, 1974; "Prime Minister Razak's Speech," in NCNA, June 1, 1974; "Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien's Speech," in NCNA, June 1, 1974.

¹³Jen Wen, "Friendly Relations between the People's Republic of China and Malaysia," in Wen Wei Po, May 30, 1974; A review of the article on "The New Page of Sino-Malaysian Relations," in Wen Wei Po, June 1, 1974.

Magazine" (SCMM), and "Current Background" (CB). The study is also based on data gathered from interviews with the principal policy makers in Malaysia.

The secondary source materials are mainly the publications or articles by scholars specializing in Chinese and Malaysian affairs. Other magazines and newspapers found to be very useful include "The South China Daily" from Hong Kong, "The London Times", "The New York Times", "The Times", "The Far Eastern Economic Review", "The Newsweek", "The American News", "The World Reports" and "China Quarterly".

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF MALAYSIA

Foreign policy is not only a response to international stimuli but also a manifestation of the domestic environment surrounding the decision-makers. Before proceeding to examine the characteristics of Malaysian foreign policy during the period of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak, it is necessary to explore first the environmental base of foreign policy formulation and application in Malaysia.

(A) The Social Fabric

Being usually cited as the classic case of a "plural society", the peninsula has a roughly even balance between Malays and non-Malays, with the Chinese comprising the great majority of the latter. Although the policy of the Malaysian Government has been to create "Malaysians" out of the diverse communities, the fact has remained that each community is inclined to identifying itself with its national and cultural homeland to some extent. Because of the relatively small size of the Indian community, its "primordial sentiments" are not viewed by the government as a serious problem. Moreover, although the attachments of the Malay community to Java and Sumatra are sometimes troublesome to some of the elite, they are not viewed with any real alarm. The "Chinese problem," however, is an entirely different matter in the view of Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Abdul Razak. More detailed analysis of this problem is offered in Chapter IV and Chapter VII.

(B) The Emergency

The historical experience of the Malayan Emergency also

left its mark on the course of Malaysian foreign policy. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was created in Singapore in 1930. By World War II the MCP had many sympathizers. The Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), who had operated against the Japanese during World War II, had returned to the jungles to fight the Commonwealth forces in 1948. The MPAJA was regarded by the Chinese of Malaya as the resistance force. There was little doubt that in 1948, the MPAJA had communist backing and leadership, and that it had also considerable support from many sectors of the Chinese community.

Thus, two facts regarding the insurgency have always been taken into consideration by the Malaysian leaders in formulating the foreign policy of the country. Firstly, it was communist-directed and communist supported; secondly, it was predominantly Chinese in composition. Taken together, these facts shed considerable light on the striking anti-communist and anti-Communist China posture adopted by the Malaysian political leaders during that time. The problem of the communist insurgency is one of the factors influencing Malaysian foreign policy towards the People's Republic of China and it is analysed further in Chapter IV and Chapter VII.

(C) The Economic Setting

The dependence of Malaysia on the export of rubber and tin has made the country prosperous but her economy vulnerable. Although Malaysia has encouraged the establishment of non-agricultural industries through various schemes, she still remained a primary producer that must export raw materials to survive. Moreover, as

the prices of rubber and/or tin fall, Malaysia has to produce more and at the same time look for new markets to sell this increased production. In most situations, Malaysia therefore would be expected to react in a manner least likely to disrupt her rubber trade. This domestic root of Malaysian foreign policy is analysed further in Chapter IV and Chapter VII.

(D) The Historical Conditioning

During 1957 - 1963, the years of her independent existence prior to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, Malaya had maintained a low-priority attitude in foreign affairs and followed a foreign policy which was distinctively modest. Foreign policy and foreign affairs were not considered of vital importance, and there was very little public or parliamentary debate regarding general principles on specific issues. The Federation government's position was that it was more in Malaya's interest to first consolidate her domestic position and then her international one, and therefore internal matters such as economic development were given first priority. The Ministry of External Affairs in Kuala Lumpur had a staff of only about forty offices in 1964, and on a total annual budget of only about M\$ 8 million it maintained eighteen overseas missions.¹

¹Marvin C. Ott, "The Sources and Content of Malaysian Foreign Policy Toward Indonesia and the Philippines, 1957-1965." (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, John Hopkins University, 1970), pp. 44-45.

Malaya was apparently content to follow policies largely determined by her British connection. Among the established procedures which retained the most important was that of close co-operation in political, economic, and military matters with the United Kingdom. As corollary to this policy, Malaya remained within the British Commonwealth and maintained good relations with the older established members — Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Although she established diplomatic relations with the more important countries of Europe, Asia and North America and with most of her closest neighbours, Malaya still refrained from establishing formal relations with the Soviet Union, Communist China, Nationalist China, other Communist countries, the Middle East nations, Latin America and the new nations of Africa.

In discussing the relations between the People's Republic of China and Malaysia, it is necessary to outline the fundamental characteristics of Malaysia's foreign relations which may be classified into two periods: the period of Tunku Abdul Rahman (1963-1970) and that of Tun Abdul Razak (1970-1975).

(A) The Period of Tunku Abdul Rahman (1963-1970): Malaysia's Expanding Diplomatic Ties with the Afro-Asian World

Under the Tunku, Malaysia's overseas representation expanded at a commendable pace. Historical, political and economic ties were the prime considerations for initiating diplomatic relations; these covered a wide field, with a special emphasis upon the Afro-Asian world. The importance of economic factors in the foreign policy formulation of Malaysia is well recognized. The vulnerability of

exporting the raw materials and the need for development of the "infra-structure" of the economy has made Malaysia to encourage foreign investments and capture new markets for her products. Also under active consideration were Malaysia's proposals to establish missions in both Eastern and Western countries. However, ideological differences were a factor preventing Malaysia from implementing cordial diplomatic relations with some of them. The cardinal principle of her foreign policy was to reciprocate goodwill and friendship while completely recognising her obligations in the promoting of international peace, stability and understanding.²

With limited available resources to project a proper Afro-Asian image, Malaysia had made arrangements for concurrent accreditation of Malaysian High Commissioners and Ambassadors assigned at strategic posts. The High Commissioners in Australia, Britain and India are at present concurrently accredited to New Zealand, Ireland and Nepal; and the Ambassadors in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Arab Republic were concurrently accredited to Switzerland, Holland and Sudan.³

Since independence, frequent State visits had been made by the Malaysian Majesties. Personal diplomatic contact at the highest level to promote international goodwill and fellowship was demonstrated by the Malaysian Majesties' visits to India, Pakistan, Brunei,

²Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: The Government Printing Office, 1967), Vol. 1 & 2, pp. 1-2.

³Loc. cit.

Thailand, Japan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Kuwait. Visits were also made by the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and Cabinet Ministers to all friendly nations of the world.

International Co-operation: Malaysia in the United Nations

Since Malaysia became a member of the United Nations, she has always reiterated her full support for and faithfulness to the principles, purposes and functions of the United Nations as an instrument for the promotion and maintenance of world peace and security, the protection of freedom and fundamental human rights and the stimulation of international co-operation in all fields of human endeavour for economic, scientific and social progress for the benefit of mankind. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman once stated:

"As a small nation whose desire it is to maintain its independent status in co-operation with all nations, big and small, Malaysia naturally looks forward to the United Nations as the protective shield behind which nations like her may work out their own destinies and be left in peace to develop their economies so as to fulfil the concept of political independence within the context of economic well-being."⁴

The foreign policy of Malaysia was thus clearly stated. Malaysia is to maintain her friendship and undertakings with all nations under the United Nations Charter. She pursues her own

⁴Loc. cit.

independent policy and refuses dictation or persuasion from any quarter on her own judgment on every external problem. On the other hand, she does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of any state.

Non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and respect for sovereign equality and territorial integrity of every member state of the United Nations is the very basis of this organization; it is specifically referred to in the Charter. This concept of peaceful co-existence is the basic tenet of Malaysia's foreign policy. To Malaysia, the United Nations has manifested itself as the most important force for peace. As a reflection of her faith in the United Nations and in upholding her principles, Malaysia has contributed towards the United Nations peace efforts, such as in Cyprus and the Congo, where Malaysia gave military assistance in addition to her political and moral support in seeking a solution to the existing problems. Malaysia was represented in the Committee set up to advise the Secretary-General on the Congo ~~division~~ and then in the Conciliation Commission in which her representative was appointed one of its Vice-Chairmen.⁵

Malaysia, as a newly independent state, shows sympathy to the needs and aspirations of the peoples in the non-independent territories. She participates actively in the United Nations to

⁵Ibid., p. 7

bring about development towards early independence for these remaining dependent territories. The most urgent problems in decolonization are the restoration to the four million Africans in Southern Rhodesia of their right to a government of their own choice, and the liberation of the reactionary pockets of Portuguese colonies in Africa and in Asia where colonialism masquerades as an extension of the metropolitan State. The total and vigorous position of the Government of Malaysia in opposition to the colonial policies of Portugal has been made clear on numerous occasions. In the Security Council, of which Malaysia was a Member in 1965 and its Chairman in May of that year, and the General Assembly, Malaysia has been among the most active and articulate in the Afro-Asian Group in the United Nations' fight against Portuguese colonialism in Africa.* Malaysia was one of the five members of the Special Committee on Angola. Colonialism in another form, as in the case of Tibet, has also drawn Malaysia's attention.⁶

Tied to the problems of colonialism and related to each other as cause and effect is the problem of racialism. In its political manifestation it has given rise to the notorious creed of Apartheid in South Africa which has tried to extend it into South West Africa, and of white domination in Southern Rhodesia. Malaysia had imposed a complete trade embargo on South Africa in spite of the fact that she was then losing some M\$70 million in

⁶Ibid., pp. 8-9.

* Portuguese colonialism has been defunct since 1975.

foreign exchange a year. She had also responded with an initial contribution of US \$5,000 to the Anti-Apartheid Movement Relief Fund to aid refugees from South Africa and families of victims of Apartheid. Regarding the Africans' wish to have South Africa expelled from the United Nations, Malaysia maintained the view that by having South Africa continue to be a member of the Organization, South Africa could be brought under constant pressure of the moral authority of the United Nations. Expulsion would lead South Africa to consider herself as being outside the moral authority of the Organization and might lead her to commit new and flagrant violations of human rights and the tenets of the Charter.⁷

The question of Chinese representation at the United Nations has been the major problem that faced the Malaysian delegation to that organization. Malaysia recognized neither the Government of China in Taiwan nor the Peking Government. She took the realistic view that Communist China is a power the world has to reckon with and said that she would vote to seat the Communist China provided that Taiwan be regarded as a separate state with her own rights to be a member of the United Nations.⁸

Tunku Abdul Rahman described Communist China as the one country in Asia that has the ambition to dominate the rest of the continent. During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference,

⁷Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁸Nanyang Siang Pau, (Singapore), December 4, 1965.

which was held in September 1966, he pointed out that:

"China is a country with a 700 million ever-expanding population. The brand of Communism which she is now upholding and the population explosion which continually embarrasses her domestic programmes dictate a policy of adventurism and expansionism aimed at fulfilling her ideological crusade in order to find fertile ground in potentially rich Asian countries so as to make China the most powerful nation in Asia."⁹

In view of this, Tunku Abdul Rahman strongly emphasized that Malaysia would not establish diplomatic relations with China, except under the following conditions: (1) she should give up her aspiration to control the small countries of Southeast Asia; (2) she should give up her anti-religious attitude.¹⁰

Attitude Towards the Vietnam War and Relations
with Eastern Europe

Malaysia's commitment to the American effort in Vietnam has been unequivocal, at least in her pronouncements. After the fall of Diem in November 1963, Malaysia was visited by a six-man Vietnamese goodwill mission led by Tran Thiem Khiem, and the communiqué issued during the visit indicated that the removal of Diem had not altered Malaysia's policy towards the Vietnamese

⁹ Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), 1967, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 48.

¹⁰ Nanyang Siang Pau, (Singapore), June 21, 1967.

conflict.¹¹

After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 the Prime Minister cabled a message of support to President Johnson. The cable concluded:

"A small nation like Malaysia which is bent on peace greatly encouraged by the fitting action of the United States Government. It is my earnest hope that the freeworld will give the United States Government all support for its action which is not only justified but also necessary if peace is to be restored in Southeast Asia."¹²

Considerable evidence could be cited to demonstrate the extent to which Malaysia has endorsed American policy in Vietnam. The American resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam in January 1966 was described by Malaysia as "not surprising or unexpected in view of the negative reaction from Hanoi and the aggressive pro-paganda from Peking."¹³ The Prime Minister and others have defended the United States before their own party,¹⁴ before Parliament, at personal news conferences,¹⁵ and before the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference which was held on September 21, 1966 in London.¹⁶ For example, the Tunku spoke before the

¹¹Malaysian Information Service, press release, August 1964.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Agence France Presse (AFP), Singapore, January 31, 1966.

¹⁴Malaysian Information Service, press release, April 19, 1965.

¹⁵Reuters, Singapore, August 22, 1966.

¹⁶Malaysia Bulletin, October 1966, pp. 4-5. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), op.cit., pp. 43-49.

Dewan Ra'ayat on January 20, 1967:

"The Viet Cong are supported by many communist countries, otherwise they would not be able to carry on the war for so long. But if South Vietnam is handed over as a peace offer to the North is there any guarantee that the people will be safe from the Communists. Will it stop the Communists from carrying out their plan to dominate Southeast Asia? The intention of the Communists is not just to take over Vietnam. They will not stop there. They will carry on until they succeed in dominating every country in the world. Once South Vietnam is taken over by the Communists it will be only a matter of time before Malaysia goes under."¹⁷

Much stronger words of support were uttered at the time of President Lyndon B. Johnson's visit of less than 24 hours in Kuala Lumpur in late October 1966. Speaking at Subang Airport at the time of the President's arrival, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia said:

"The part which America is playing has won the highest esteem of small nations, such as ours, which look to your support for their security, in fact for their survival. Your stand as a champion of democracy is an inspiration to us all.

Mr. President, despite the corrosive campaign of hate and lies by the enemies of peace, Malaysia understands and welcomes the difficult but vital role your great country is playing to defend South Vietnam for peace in Asia. For, unless that peace is made secure, the hopes of hundreds of millions in our region of Asia who stand for freedom, prosperity and progress will be lost."¹⁸

¹⁷ Straits Budget, January 25, 1967, p. 17.

¹⁸ Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), op.cit., p. 97.

Finally, at the state banquet in the President's honour on October 30, 1966, the Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman again indicated the interests that Malaysia had in the course of the Vietnam war. The Tunku said:

"We still face the threat by the same forces today that threaten the existence and survival of our neighbour South Vietnam. We are determined to resist the Communist expansionist movement from gaining a foothold in this country I have never failed to give solid backing to what America is doing in South Vietnam and to help explain to the rest of the world the great sacrifices made by America in assisting freedom-loving people defend their rights and sovereignty The trouble we had with Indonesia was caused by the same enemy The Communists and their sycophants try to besmear your good name but the world knows that what you are doing is to try and bring an end to aggression. We all pray that the end will come soon with no honour lost to both sides"¹⁹

Although there is evidence of policy differences among political leaders on the subject of Malaysia's Vietnam stance, the general picture is one of a unified verbal commitment to the American presence in Vietnam. When the analysis is shifted from words to deeds, however, Malaysian policy becomes less crystal clear. Although Malaysia supplied a contingent of troops for the Congo, she **had** firmly resisted all suggestions that she should commit any forces to Vietnam.²⁰

It is true that on the other hand, for many years Malaysia

¹⁹Malaysian Information Service, press release, November 1, 1966.

²⁰AFP, (Paris), June 20, 1967.

had been helping South Vietnam to train her police officers. On this the Tunku said:

"This contribution of Malaysia is to help South Vietnam in defeating the attack of North Vietnam. The purpose of North Vietnam's attack is to control South Vietnam. We believed that this kind of attack should be defeated by force. South Vietnam is a democratic and liberal country, but the Communist party does not allow this kind of system.

Our aid to South Vietnam is to help prevent the war from escalating further. Although many people consider that too many lives and properties are destroyed or damaged during the war, we think that this war is a war to maintain democracy and liberty. The Americans in South Vietnam are only there to help the Vietnamese fulfill this purpose."²¹

Malaysia also permitted American forces to visit Malaysia on rest and recuperation leave from Vietnam and expressed an interest in trying to do something in Vietnam to aid in rural development and rehabilitation.²² This, however, was the extent of Malaysia's commitment so far as action was concerned which made clear that Malaysia's actions were not commensurate with her statements on the issue.

Since India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Indonesia had adopted a policy of neutrality towards the Vietnam War, the Tunku said

²¹Nanyang Siang Pau, (Singapore), November 15, 1967.

²²AFP, (Paris), June 20, 1967.

that these countries were safeguarding their own interests. Malaysia should not support the West one day and support the East another day. He said that since the Communists were still participating in subversion in Malaysia, it was difficult for her to maintain neutrality in the Vietnamese conflict.

The American policy was anti-Communist. The Tunku said that the Malaysian policy was not anti-Communist and she was willing to establish relations with the Communist countries provided they change their attitude and were friendly to her.²³

Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia

It is Malaysia's view that economic progress is the foundation of political stability, which in turn is the best guarantee of political independence. In order to attain economic and social progress and maintain political stability in the whole region of Southeast Asia, the countries in the region should co-ordinate their efforts, work and co-operate with one another. The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was thus formed in July 1961 by Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines to make constructive efforts in regional co-operation. Malaysia believed that it was her duty to strengthen the ASA and welcome other friendly countries dedicated to peace and progress to the association.

In his participation in the discussion on the situation

²³Op.cit., December 4, 1965.

in Asia during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference which was held on September 21, 1966 in London, Tunku Abdul Rahman pointed out that the threat from the north — the Communist China — remained a constant danger. This gave rise to a host of other problems, such as the Vietnam question which continued to defy solution, and the persistent threat of Communist subversion on the northern border of Thailand and Laos, in Central Philippine and on the border of Malaysia. He also pointed out that the Indonesian Confrontation of Malaysia (1963 - 66) was engineered by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and inspired by China. The Tunku emphasized that Malaysia's trading with China was in the hope that the mutual benefits would in some way alleviate the internal economic difficulties of China so that she might be less prone to foreign adventures and interfere in the affairs of other countries.

In the Tunku's view, the most effective and sure method of meeting the threat to Southeast Asia from Communist China in her expansionist designs was to stabilise and strengthen the economy of every country in the region. It was for this reason that Malaysia, together with Thailand and the Philippines, had formed the ASA and had hoped to develop it into a wider organization for economic and social co-operation in the region even on a larger scale to include Indonesia and other countries. It was also for this reason that Malaysia had participated actively in other regional co-operative efforts, such as the Colombo Plan and the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC).²⁴

²⁴Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), op.cit., p. 48.

In 1967, Malaysia with four other countries in the region, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, came together and formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)* with the objective of accelerating their economic growth, social progress and cultural development.²⁵

(B) The Period of Tun Abdul Razak (1970 - 1975)

In August 1970 the Tunku announced his resignation. In the following month, the Tunku's nephew, the new King, the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong, appointed the Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein as the second Prime Minister of Malaysia. Although it was apparent that Tun Razak was not in complete agreement with the foreign policies of the Tunku, he was also a dedicated and well-trained civil servant who had learned not to question the policies of his superiors in public. Even had he been in complete agreement with his Prime Minister, it is apparent that the international and domestic situation in 1970 differed considerably from that of the Tunku's period. The new situation called for new policies. As a new Prime Minister, Tun Razak was in a position to lead Malaysia in a different direction.

Evidence showed that Tun Razak, in his brief tenure as Prime Minister, was seldom in complete agreement with the foreign policies of his predecessor.²⁶ Tun Razak increased contacts with

²⁵Ibid., Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 24.

²⁶For a discussion of some possible differences between the two Malay leaders based on observations made up to July 1967, see Malaysian Foreign Policy, (McLean, Va., 1969), pp. 56-7. Also see Anthony Polisky, "A Twilight Gathering", Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), May 1, 1971, p. 51.

* Refer to Appendix 4.

the Eastern European Communists, took part in the Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Nations at Lusaka on September 9, 1970 and announced there the Malaysian scheme for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, and reversed Malaysian policy towards the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. He also made the decision to replace the decaying Malaysia-United Kingdom Mutual Defence Treaty with a five-power defence agreement (United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore) in 1971 which is significantly different from the one previously negotiated by the Tunku.

Contact with the Communist Bloc

Although Malaysia began to increase contacts with the Communist Bloc, starting with the recognition of the USSR in 1967, she maintained a cool posture towards the status of Eastern Europe. Later, however, these relations grew more intimate and frequent. Aeroflot now operates its flights between Kuala Lumpur and Moscow and trade agreements have been signed with Hungary.²⁷ Tun Razak visited Yugoslavia²⁸ and the Socialist Republic of Rumania in September, 1970; and with the latter Malaysia signed her first agreement with a Communist state for economic and technical co-

²⁷In May 1968 Tun Abdul Razak paid an official visit to the Soviet Union which brought the two countries closer. Soon after, the establishment of diplomatic relations with countries in Eastern Europe followed, with Yugoslavia in 1969, with Rumania and Hungary in 1969 and with Czechoslovakia and Poland in early 1971.

²⁸Tun Razak paid an official visit to Yugoslavia from 13th to 16th September, 1970 and a joint statement was issued at the end of his official visit. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 29-30.

operation.²⁹

New Approaches to Non-Alignment

The twenty years following the Second World War were an era of decolonisation which saw the emergence of new Asian and African states as independent political entities in the international arena. These countries, faced with the urgent tasks of consolidating their independence and developing their economies, were confronted with three basic alternatives in their foreign policy: to join the Western bloc, the Communist bloc or remain non-aligned. Many countries chose the last alternative.

The neutralism of the non-aligned nations had no rigid form. Rather it was a spectrum of positions adopted by different countries, according to each country's own gravitational pull from the two massive blocs, as well as domestic contingencies. But the non-aligned countries were united in the realization that their strength lay in some kind of unity among themselves, and in the role which they played in the United Nations and other international forums in reducing the dangers of a conflict, especially a big power conflict.

Malaysia also adopted the non-aligned policy since her independence in 1957 but she has clearly clung to the West during the Tunku's period. But Tun Razak gave new approaches to non-

²⁹Ibid., pp. 32-33.

alignment. In his speech delivered to the Malaysian Parliament on July 26, 1971, Tun Razak said:

"I have affirmed that our foreign policy is based on the principles of non-alignment. This is not intended to be a moralistic statement of principle only. It is based also on considerations of realism and our national interest. Following from this basic conviction therefore, we have advocated a policy of neutralization of South-east Asia."³⁰

At the Lusaka Summit Conference in September 1970, and again at the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in Singapore in February 1971, Tun Abdul Razak also stated clearly that Malaysia had "no wish to be made a pawn in any game big powers play".³¹

The Neutralization of Southeast Asia

Tun Razak particularly emphasized the importance of the concept of neutralization of Southeast Asia,* when he stated that:

"The proposal for the Neutralization of Southeast Asia was first made as early as 1968. On becoming Prime Minister in 1970, I directed that the Neutralization proposal as an important part of Malaysia's

³⁰Ibid., Vol. 4, No. 3, Sept. 1971, p. 25. "Malaysia's Foreign Policy", statement on Foreign Affairs by the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein in Parliament on July 26, 1971.

³¹Wayne Wilcox, op.cit., p. 208.

* Refer to Appendix 7.

foreign policy."³²

This concept is stated in explicit terms in an article by Tan Sri. M. Ghazali bin Shafie, Minister with Special Functions and Minister of Information:

"The concept of neutralization for the region may be viewed at two levels. On the first level, the countries of South-east Asia should get together and clearly view their present situations and agree upon the following: Individual countries in the region must respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and not participate in activities likely to directly or indirectly threaten the security of another. This is an essential requirement. Non-interference and non-aggression are basic principles which Southeast Asian countries must unequivocally accept before any further steps can be taken. All foreign powers should be excluded from the region. The region should not be allowed to be used as a theatre of conflict in the international power struggle. They should devise ways and means of, and undertake the responsibility for, ensuring peace among member states. They should present a collective view before the major powers on vital issues of security. They should promote regional co-operation. On the next level, the major powers (the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and China), must agree on the following: Southeast Asia should be an area of neutrality. The powers undertake to exclude countries in the region from the power struggle among themselves. The powers should devise the supervisory means of guaranteeing Southeast Asia's neutrality in the international

³²"Malaysian Foreign Policy with Special Reference to Japan — Questions and Answers". Foreign Affairs Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 5, No. 4, Dec. 1972, p. 97. Tun Abdul Razak, Prime Minister of Malaysia, gave his answers to questions submitted by Mr. Takahiro Okada, Special Affairs writer of Nihon Kaizai Shimbun (Japan) on Malaysian Foreign Policy, the security of Malaysia, Japan's aid policy, the future of neutralization and ASREAN. This set of questions and answers was released for publication on November 27, 1972.

power struggle."³³

It is clear that this policy of neutralization can only be successful if it receives the understanding, support and the guarantee of the great powers themselves, namely China, the Soviet Union and the United States. This requires, first of all, that states in the region should work to bring about the conditions which are necessary for the realization of the neutralization proposed and show that a neutralised Southeast Asia meets with the basic legitimate interests of the great powers themselves.

The reason why Tun Razak emphasized the concept of neutralization as the best permanent solution to ensure security and stability in Southeast Asia may be due to his consciousness of the history of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia has not enjoyed peace and security for the last three decades following the end of the Second World War. This region has been convulsed by war essentially because of the involvement of major powers in its affairs. With its vast mineral potential, lush tropical wealth, and population exceeding 200 million, Southeast Asia is a focus of strategic importance. Its strategic value is underlined by the fact that it occupies the compact maritime and aerial crossroads linking the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific Ocean. Consisting of continental coastlines and islands, Southeast Asia is eminently accessible by sea and air for trade and development. Two hundred major shipping lines from 53 countries pass through Southeast

³³Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), op.cit., p. 51.

Asian waters. Ninety percent of Japan's oil, coming from the Persian Gulf, together with her exports to Asia, Africa and Europe, pass through this sea lane. Southeast Asia's strategic value, economic potential and the fact that it is politically fragmented, is a natural target for exploitation and an arena for big power struggle. Thailand is the only nation in the region that has not been controlled by any foreign country in the past. Foreign interference is primarily a matter of global strategy and power balance and secondly of economic exploitation. Therefore, despite the conciliatory atmosphere of the new mood, the major powers will tend to probe areas and markets and sources of raw materials and seek to extend their respective influence in order to gain an advantageous position in relation to other powers.

Southeast Asia is a factor in the calculations of the major powers. The Russian naval presence in the region shows her interest in the South China Sea. China will be increasingly concerned with the situation among the southern Asian neighbours. And Japan will surely not allow the trade routes to be adversely affected. All these add up to a potentially dangerous situation.

It is easy to see that compromises and bargains might be struck which might draw Southeast Asian countries as pawns into yet another round of great power conflict. The experiences of the past have seen Southeast Asia become a cock-pit of the struggle between the competitive ambitions and interests of foreign powers. In the interest of peace in the region as well as on the international stage, Malaysia believes that the Southeast Asian region as a whole

should be neutralized. As Tun Razak stated:

"It is clear, therefore, that peace and stability can only be safeguarded by a policy of neutralization which will ensure that this region will no longer be a theatre of conflict for the competing interests of the major powers."³⁴

and Tan Sri Ghazali said:

"The countries are acutely conscious of the changing mood in the international scene. They realise that the United States and the Soviet Union must come to terms with China as a major power in the region."³⁵

The countries in the region should get together and, as a group, serve notice to the world that the region should no longer serve as a theatre for international power struggle. Each major power should be given the assurances that its withdrawal and non-involvement in the area will not benefit its competitors at its own expense. The three powers, the United States, the Soviet Union and China must agree on an effective supervisory method in order to enforce the neutralization arrangement.³⁶

Tun Razak believed that in order to have the entire Southeast Asian region neutralized, the Southeast Asian countries

³⁴Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 4, No. 3, Sept., 1971, p. 25.

³⁵"Neutralization of Southeast Asia." Text of an article by Tan Sri M. Ghazali bin Shafie, Minister with Special Functions and Minister of Information, to the Pacific Community, an Asian Quarterly Review, (October 1971 issue). Ibid., p. 52.

³⁶Loc. cit.

should take the initiative and embark upon a complex diplomatic exercise. This exercise should include, as a matter of priority, the settlement of the Vietnam problem.

A Vietnam solution is the necessary pre-requisite for a neutralized Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian countries themselves should meet with Saigon and Hanoi to seek a settlement, without the interference of any external powers. Only when the Vietnam anguish is ended, could neighbouring countries be assured that the subversion will not spread and infect the whole region. A more detailed analysis on the needs which prompted Malaysia to suggest the proposal will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The People's Republic of China and the United Nations

In Tun Razak's view, the exclusion of China from the international community is unhealthy, unrealistic and short-sighted. He thus emphasized the need to bring China back into the United Nations where she could play her rightful role.

Malaysia's policy on China under Tun Razak was a one-China policy, on the understanding that the right of the people of Taiwan to decide their own future for themselves should not be denied. Tun Razak at the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on October 1, 1971, stated:

"Malaysia will oppose any resolution which proposes 'dual representation' for the China seat because in our view, there is one China and one seat for China in the United Nations.

It is beyond doubt that the Government of the People's Republic of China is de jure and de facto the Government of China. We will also oppose any resolution which puts forward the view that the seating of the People's Republic of China involves the expulsion of an existing member, as we consider that the question of expulsion does not arise."³⁷

On the bilateral level, Malaysia's relations with China were thus confined only to unofficial dealing with trade matters, and the question of establishing diplomatic relations was to be considered as a separate matter.

However, realism which was a characteristic of Malaysian foreign policy in Razak's period, suggests that foreign policy-making have to take into consideration the legitimate interests of the outsiders, especially the great powers. The decision-makers in the region have to respect the basic requirements of the world balance of power upon which the peace and the security of all depend. The entry of China into the United Nations^{*} and President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972 have made China a power of global importance. Since China has at present a nuclear strategic striking capability in Asia, the United States, Japan and a host of other countries have made their adjustment and accommodation to this new factor in international life.^{*} It is also in Malaysia's national interest for her to reckon with the new position of the People's Republic of China.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements

³⁷ Ibid., Vol. 4, No. 4, Dec., 1971, pp. 13-14.

* Refer to Appendix 15 & 16.

* Refer to Appendix 17.

The Five Power Defence Arrangements³⁸ were formalised at the meeting in London on April 16, 1971, which in Tun Razak's words, "would enable us to seek the assistance of our allies in the event of any form of external threat or aggression." Malaysia considered that the Five Power Defence Arrangements are in no way incompatible with her neutralization proposal or her non-aligned policy. The Neutralization proposal is a long-term objective towards which she is working and the Five Power Defence Arrangements are for the purpose of meeting her present defence needs. Tun Razak said:

"These arrangements are entirely defensive in nature, they are not directed against anyone or any ideology and they are not concluded in the context of great power rivalries. Non-aligned countries are fully aware of the character of these arrangements and have accepted that they are not at variance with our non-aligned foreign policy."³⁹

Malaysia seems to regard the Five Power Defence Arrangements as a pact of considerably less importance than the treaty it replaced and from at least two perspectives this seems to be an accurate appraisal. The countries have agreed only to "consult" in the event of an actual or perceived threat and the forces readily available to repel an attack will be minimal, unless the two countries being

³⁸Ministers of the Government of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom met in London on 15th & 16th April, 1971, in order to consider matters of common interest to all five Governments relating to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1971, p. 7.

³⁹"Malaysia's Foreign Policy", statement on foreign affairs by the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein in Parliament on July 26, *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, No. 3, Sept. 1971, p. 28.

protected (Malaysia and Singapore) supply the manpower and equipment themselves.

The May 13th incident in 1969 in Malaysia seemed to have shown that the major threat to the country derived from internal more than external sources. Therefore, the Malaysian Government envisages that after the concept of neutralization has been accepted by all the countries of Southeast Asia, the Five Power Defence Arrangement will be phased out. It is envisaged that by the time Neutralization comes fully into effect, the Five Power Defence Arrangement will have ceased to exist.⁴⁰

⁴⁰Ibid., Vol. 5, No. 4, Dec. 1972, p. 111.

CHAPTER III

CHARACTERISTICS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF CHINA

Since the Chinese Communist Party's military triumph over the entire mainland China and the subsequent establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, national security and support for national liberation movements in other countries have been the two objectives in the making of China's foreign policy. In order to achieve a clearer understanding of China's policy towards Malaysia in the discussion of the following chapters, it is necessary to analyse the ends and means of China's policy and see what means she uses to achieve her ends.

China's foreign policy can be discussed under the three following headings:

- (A) Before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: 1949-1965
- (B) During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: 1966-1969
- (C) After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: 1970-1975

(A) Before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

In this stage, we can also divide China's foreign policy into three periods: (1) 1949-1954: National security and Communist internationalism; (2) 1955-1958: Peaceful co-existence; (3) 1959-1965: Anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism.

It is obvious that after thirty years of civil war and the long period of foreign exploitation, when the Chinese Communists established the People's Republic of China (PRC), their most important task was to recover the collapsed economy and to institute a new social order. This task of reconstruction required that a favourable inter-

national position be maintained and China's national security be fully guaranteed. Thus, in this crucial period the Chinese leaders sought protection from the Socialist camp in order to resist the possible intervention and invasion of the Western countries. The Chinese believed that "the Western imperialists" led by the U.S. would not let Socialist China exist and develop her economy peacefully. Therefore, the best method was to "lean to one side". Mao Tse-tung believed this was the biggest break-through for the Chinese since the death of Sun Yat-sun¹.

You lean to one side. Precisely so ... Chinese People either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not exist ... Internationally we belong to the anti-imperialist front headed by the U.S.S.R. and we can look for genuine friendly aid only from that front, and not from the imperialist front.²

Mao's view obviously influenced Chinese foreign policy making deeply in this first and critical period of the People's Republic of China. The following documents reproduced here strongly reflect Mao's view:

The foreign policy of the PRC is based on the principle of protection of the independence, freedom, integrity of territory and sovereignty of the country, upholding lasting international

¹ Sun Yat-sun: The founder of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the leader who overthrew the Ching Dynasty in the 1911 revolution.

² Mao Tse-tung, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", July 1, 1949; translated in C. Brandt, B. Schwartz and J.K. Fairbank (Ed.), A Documentary History of Chinese Communism. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952).

peace and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and opposing the imperialist policy of aggression and war.³

China has already built an indestructible friendship with the great USSR and the People's Democracies, and the friendship between our people and peace-loving people in all other countries is growing day by day. Such friendship will be constantly strengthened and broadened. China's policy of establishing and extending diplomatic relations with all countries on the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which has already yielded success, will continue to be carried out. In international affairs our firm and consistent policy is to strive for the notable cause of world peace and progress of humanity.⁴

Thus, the most important goal of the Chinese regime in its first four years was the unity of the nation and her sovereignty. The Tibet incident in 1950 and the Korean War in 1951-3 had clearly shown the determination of the Chinese in defending their national security and sovereignty.

From 1955 to 1958 is the second period in the evolution of China's foreign policy. The spirit of "Bandung" created by Premier Chou En-lai dominated this period. Under this spirit the Chinese emphasized their willingness to co-exist with the non-Communist nations. They adopted a policy of alliance with other Asian nations to resist "exploitation" and "invasion" of Western imperialists, and

³Art. 54, Common Program of the CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, September 29, 1949).

⁴Preamble to the Constitution of the PRC, September 20, 1954.

a policy of moderate conciliation.

The CPC advocates a foreign policy directed towards the safeguarding of world peace and the achievement of peaceful coexistence between countries with different systems. The Party stands for the establishment and development of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between China and other countries of the world, and for the broadening and strengthening of friendly relations between the Chinese people and the peoples of all other countries of the world. The Party is resolutely opposed to any act of aggression against China by imperialist plan for a new war. It supports all efforts made by the peoples and governments of other countries to uphold peace and promote friendly relations between nations, and expressed its sympathy for all struggles in the world against imperialism and colonialism. The Party endeavors to develop and strengthen China's friendship with all other countries in the camp of peace, democracy, and socialism, headed by the Soviet Union; to strengthen the internationalist solidarity of the proletariat; and to learn from the experiences of the world communist movement. It supports the struggle of the whole world for the progress of mankind, and educates its members and the Chinese people in the spirit of internationalism, as expressed in the slogan "Proletarians of all lands, unite!".⁵

At the Bandung Conference which was held from April 18-24, 1955, Premier Chou headed the Chinese delegation and played a very active role. In the main, he set a tone of moderation and conciliation, a position aimed at attaining the widest possible unity and support from the Afro-Asian world.

In his major speech, Chou talked about the common desire of the people of Asia and Africa to safeguard world peace, to win and

⁵Preamble to the Constitution of the CPC, September 26, 1956.

preserve national independence and to promote friendly co-operation among other nations. Against these desires was, as the Chinese saw it, the threat of a "new colonialism more insidious than the old", because of the establishment of an increasing number of military bases in Africa and Asia by outside powers. The United States, of course, was Chou's primary target. Towards all Afro-Asian countries, however, he extended the olive branch:

By following the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, the peaceful co-existence of countries with different social systems can be realized. When these principles are ensured of implementation, there is no reason why international dispute cannot be settled through negotiation.⁶

These were Chou's famous "Five Principles",^{*} and he asserted that they had already become the guiding principles in the mutual relations of India, Burma and China. He noted that China and Indonesia were making good progress in discussing the problem of the Overseas Chinese, that China was prepared to develop friendly relations with the states of Indo-China, and that there was no reason "why the relations between China and Thailand, the Philippines and other neighbouring countries cannot be improved on the basis of these Five Principles". He further proposed that governments, parliaments and people's organizations of the Asian and African countries make friendly visits

⁶"Main Speech by Chou En-lai", China and the Asian-African Conference, (Documents), (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), p. 61.

^{*} Refer to Appendix 2.

to each other's countries, launching a program of "people's diplomacy".

After the Bandung Conference, the Chinese continued to regard the Soviet Bloc as their primary alliance. They set down their policy line as follow:

To strengthen our solidarity with the Soviet Union, to strengthen our solidarity with all the socialist countries - that is our fundamental policy, this is where our basic interest lies. Then there are the Asian and African countries and all the peace-loving countries and peoples - we must strengthen and develop our solidarity with them. United with these two forces, we shall not stand alone. As for the imperialist countries, we should unite with their peoples and strive to co-exist peacefully with those countries do business with them and prevent any possible war, but under no circumstances should we harbour any unrealistic notions about them.⁷

From 1960 to 1965 is the third period in the evolution of China's foreign policy. During this period, China tried to speed up her domestic economy in order to achieve a greater advancement in a very short time. This policy decision was set in motion with the inauguration of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. The Chinese leaders tried to achieve more independence in their national economy and to steer their military policy away from the Soviet model which they had followed in the previous years. This was necessary because of the increasing ideological conflict with the Soviet Union. As the distrust of the Soviet Union mounted the determination to seek an independent foreign policy became stronger. Reflecting this aim was

⁷ Mao Tse-tung, Four Essays on Philosophy, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1968), pp. 131-2.

her reconciliation with the Communist and non-Communist nations of Asia, and the attempt to increase her role as a leader of the Third World and the world Communist movement. The Chinese believed that the Soviet Union no more represented a genuine Communism and had become more and more "revisionist" in nature. Therefore, the Soviet Union was now no longer qualified to lead either the Third World or the International Communist Movement. The obvious result in this period was the achievement of closer economic relationships with Western Europe and Japan.

(B) During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

From 1966 to 1969 was the period of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution". It was a period of great uncertainty both on the domestic and foreign fronts. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the escalation of the Vietnamese war, and the deepening of the Sino-Soviet conflict opened a new phase in China's policy towards Southeast Asia. The radical upsurge in Chinese domestic politics made Peking's foreign policy more "revolutionary", particularly in mid-1967. The situation in Southeast Asia was more unstable than in the preceding period owing to the Vietnamese war. Under the circumstances, the image which China had of the world was turned to a "tight bi-polar" type, the two poles being China as a centre of world revolution, and the imperialist, both capitalist and socialist. These three determinants provided the basis for a "revolutionary" policy. It is true that some of the Chinese decision makers were trying to implement a "revolutionary" policy similar to Lenin's prototype. But the "revolutionary actions" were short-lived

and were considered "the handiwork of certain ideological fanatics in Chinese embassies"⁸ rather than a well-prepared policy line of the central decision makers. Thus, as a result, a retreat was in the making and friendly relations with Pakistan were revived and the trouble with Cambodia was hastily repaired by Premier Chou himself.

(C) After the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

From 1970 to the present time is the fifth period, the most important period since the emergence of the People's Republic of China from the point of view of our study. The Chinese Foreign Ministry recovered from the chaotic, disrupted administration existing when the Red Guards had taken over the Ministry during the Cultural Revolution. Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chen-yi succeeded in regaining control of the Ministry. Furthermore, Premier Chou was authorised by Chairman Mao to re-organise the Ministry and remap Communist China's new foreign policy. Under his delicate and skillful design, China entered the pragmatic period of her foreign relations with other nations. An increasing number of nations extended their recognition to Communist China. Under Premier Chou's manoeuvres, Communist China also repaired her relations with many countries damaged during the Cultural Revolution.

⁸ Melvin Gurtov. 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution', in Thomas Robinson (Ed.), The Cultural Revolution in China, (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1971, p. 348.

He finally successfully led China into the United Nations in the autumn of 1971. Following this breakthrough President Nixon visited China in early 1972, and thus a step to establish a détente was started between China and the United States. This Sino-American détente then enabled Peking to reiterate the "five principles of peaceful co-existence" initiated at the Bandung Conference, as is evident from the following declaration:

The foreign policy of our Party and Government is consistent. It is: to develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation with socialist countries on the principles of proletarian internationalism; to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations; and to strive for peaceful co-existence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war. Our proletarian foreign policy is not based on temporary expediency; it is a policy in which we have long persisted. This is what we did in the past and we will persist in doing the same in the future.⁹

Although Chairman Mao made a statement on 20th May, 1969, calling for war against "U.S. imperialism and its running dogs" and urging "People of the world to unite and defeat American imperialism", in practice the Peking Government acted contrary to this statement and showed little enthusiasm in fighting "U.S. imperialism" and supporting the national liberation movements. Let us look now at the reasons which made the policy makers in Peking change the course of

⁹"On Relations with Foreign countries", April 1969, official report made by CCP Vice Chairman Lin Biao on April 1, 1969 at the party's post Cultural Revolution's Ninth Congress which was adopted by the CCP as the "Program of Action" for the 1970s, Peking Review, Special issue, April 28, 1969, p. 29. For report refer to Appendix (6).

China's foreign relations so abruptly.

Since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, China faced an increasing military pressure from the Soviet Union. The Soviet troops stationed along the Chinese and Russian borders had increased through the years to more than 40 divisions, all equipped with advanced nuclear weapons. As a result, from the summer of 1970 the Chinese began to speak of a possibility of nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. This fear was reflected by the massive digging of underground tunnels in Peking and other cities in China.¹⁰ Obviously, facing a possibility of a two-sided nuclear blockade from the north and the south, from the Soviet Union in the north-west and the U.S.A. from Japan in the south, the Chinese leaders felt a need to break through one of these nuclear containments. Realising that their ideological conflicts with the Soviet Union would not be solved in the near future, indeed Chairman Mao is reported to have said that this conflict would last for another nine thousand years,¹¹ the possibility of a détente with the United States became increasingly more attractive and thus more seriously considered, especially by Premier Chou En-lai. Obviously, the decision to start the process of rapprochement with America and invite President Nixon to visit Peking was made by

¹⁰ Premier Chou En-lai told visitors in 1971 that China not only built tunnels in Peking but also in the main cities of all the provinces. See Topping, Seymour, "Air Raid Shelters in City and Village", New York Times Report from Red China, New York Times Press, 1972, p. 32.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 27.

Chairman Mao himself.¹²

Mao Tse-tung's military thinking opposes facing too many enemies at the same time.¹³ The Russian and American Nuclear encirclement, and the threat of Japan's new "militarism", were putting China in a precarious strategic position. With the internal political atmosphere in the United States becoming more advantageous to the Chinese, Mao apparently perceived a good opportunity to break through the encirclement to play the game of balancing his adversaries against each other.

Negotiations with the United States thus became a necessary diplomatic move. This is the pragmatic and practical side of Mao's strategic theory. In fact, one of the major operational guides of Mao's theory is the importance of practising negotiations, "talk talk, fight fight". In his work "On peace negotiations with the Kuomintang (August, 1955)" Mao set forth the principles under which the Chinese Communists may find it necessary to negotiate with its enemy.¹⁴

¹²Chairman Mao told the well-known American reporter Edgar Snow in early 1971 that China would like to talk to the American President, Mr Nixon, on the relations between China and the United States.

¹³Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), pp. 154, 163, 231-32.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 47-51.

Franklin W. Houn, in his study of Mao's strategy, maintained that there are five conditions under which the Chinese Communists will resort to negotiations;

(1) They will negotiate when they have fallen "into strong argument of an indecisive struggle, armed or otherwise."

(2) They will negotiate when confronted with "so strong an enemy that a combative posture would surely invite catastrophe, yet a strategic retreat or truce might enable them to conserve strength and wait for a more favourable change in the balance of power."

(3) They will negotiate when "negotiation appears to be a promising way of resolving a specific conflict, whereas struggle would entail a cost incommensurate with the anticipated gain."

(4) They will negotiate when they "wish to devote their attention and resources to a more important or urgent project, or problem at home or abroad."

(5) They will negotiate when they can "win the sympathy of the concerned public (public opinion) and to expose the 'plots, hypocrisy, and other evil acts' of the opponent (in other words, a propaganda victory)".¹⁵

In fact, in some aspects, Mao's conditions for negotiation

¹⁵Houn, Franklin W., "The Principles and Operational Code of Communist China's International Conduct", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, November 1967, pp. 36-37.

are similar to Hans Morgenthau's classic "fundamental rules of diplomacy", such as "nationals must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them", and "the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest and must be supported with adequate power."¹⁶

Although it is most likely that Mao had never heard of Hans Morgenthau, he nevertheless wrote that "we on our side are prepared to make concessions as are necessary and as do not damage the fundamental interest of the people", and "You must definitely not rely on negotiations, must definitely not hope that the Kuomintang (opponent) will be kind-hearted, you must rely on your own strength."¹⁷

Considering China's position on her defence and her national security and understanding Mao's strategy, it would seem that the détente between China and America is not that inconsistent with the Maoists' views and philosophy. In addition, President Nixon's visit to China opened the way for the normalization of relations between China and Japan.


With the détente with the United States and normalised relations with Japan, China succeeded in breaking through the triangular encirclement and was thus able to concentrate her attention

¹⁶ Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Press), 1960, p. 185.

¹⁷ Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. IV, (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965) pp. 49-50.

on her new primary enemy - the Soviet Union.

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* Cited from Winberg Chai: The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, New York, Putnam Press; 1972, p. 403.

CHAPTER IV

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY OF MALAYSIA TOWARDS CHINA

The foreign policy of Malaysia towards China has been determined by factors related to the internal as well as the external environment.

(A) Internal Environment

(1) The Problem of Nation-Building

As Lucian W. Pye wrote in his article, "The Politics of Southeast Asia":

"... as through most of history, the phenomenon that dominates the life of Southeast Asia is the process of cultural diffusion. On the one hand, this process has given the region a richness of cultural heritage and a wealth of social and political practices, but on the other it has produced serious problems for the building of viable state in the modern world. The process of cultural change has fragmented and divided the various societies in the region to such an extent that significant barriers have been raised to the integration of these societies into new national identities."¹

The problem of nation-building, indeed, has been the crucial problem of Malaysia,² and is evident in the internal policies of the government. In Malaysia, the lack of cohesiveness among the diverse communities was a restraining factor in the implementation of government policies.

¹Gabriel A. Almond & James S. Coleman, (Ed.), The Politics of the Developing Areas, (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 149.

²Willard A. Beling and George O. Totten, Developing Nations: Quest For A Model, (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970), pp. 173-4.

Since the British encouraged the immigration of Chinese labour from the treaty ports of southern China, many Chinese gravitated to Malayan cities rather than settling on the land. The Malays at one time found themselves a minority in their own country, but because of higher birth rates and slight manipulations of census categories, they can claim the majority status. In West Malaysia, the Malays formed fifty percent of the population, the Chinese thirty-seven percent, the Indians including Pakistanis eleven percent, and people of other origins made up the rest. Islam is the national religion with Malay the national language. Since Malaysia is a heterogeneous state her governmental policies attempt to reflect and accommodate these diversities.

In external relations the leaders of Malaysia were aware of the cultural and political ties that some sectors of her population had with certain countries, such as Indonesia, China and India. It was thought especially that the emergence of China as an unified and powerful nation with nuclear capacity had emotional pulls on the Chinese population in Malaysia.

In fact, the political activities of the Chinese in Malaysia were connected with the nationalist movements in China. The Chinese revolution of 1911 gave birth to a branch of the Kuomintang in Malaysia and later the Malayan Communist Party was formed.³ China has also used the Overseas Chinese financial

³Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, (N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p. 402.

resources through remittances to relatives in China, which were a source of needed foreign currency. The Malaysian Government was aware of these links and considered them of significance for its foreign policy.

In the calculations of China's own national interests, the Overseas Chinese or Huachiao, are marginal and perhaps even an embarrassment. She could have adopted the policy of Taiwan but instead she abandoned, in effect, the jus sanguinis doctrine in favour of the concept of jus soli. First, there was the Dual Nationality of 1955 with Indonesia, subsequently abrogated by the latter in 1969. In 1956 in an address to Overseas Chinese in Rangoon, Chou En-lai advised them to acquire local citizenship, adapt to the local environment and refrain from political activity. This message was restated at the 1957 National People's Congress in Peking:

The broad masses of overseas Chinese residents abroad must now put aside any reservations, and, on the principle of free choice, choose local nationality. They must live and work in peace in the countries of residence, actively co-operate and co-exist with the local people, and strive for the peace, happiness, and prosperity of the countries in which they live. This will be of assistance in promoting friendly relations between China and the countries of residence.⁴

The Cultural Revolution saw a Red Guard criticism of this "anti-ideological" policy with regard to the Huachiao but since then

⁴Quoted in Stephen Fitzgerald, China and The Overseas Chinese, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 142.

Chou En-lai had repeatedly reasserted that China treats them as Southeast Asians. On October 1, 1973, Teng Hsiao-ping, China's Deputy Premier, underlined this policy towards the Overseas Chinese when he said that "Many of them have acquired the citizenship of the countries where they are residing and we approve of their choice."⁵

At present there are about 220,000 stateless Chinese in Malaysia and the question is whether they are loyal to China or Malaysia. Malaysia wants assurances that would go beyond the slogans of peaceful co-existence to the effect that Peking would respect her territorial integrity and national sovereignty and not interfere in local politics, i.e., inter-racial relations. Malaysia would want Peking to declare and observe a hands-off policy and not to destabilize the domestic communal pattern, so that the Chinese in Malaysia can work in harmony with the Malays and make the integration proceed beyond the mere level of "working together" or living "side by side".

(2) The Problem of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP)

The Malayan Communist Party has been a serious menace to Malaysia's national unity. As Lucian W. Pye in his article "The Politics of Southeast Asia" also emphasized, "The alternative to the development of receptive and integrating political process is

⁵Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), October 8, 1973, p. 14.

the growth of various authoritarian movements and particularly Communism. Already the Communist parties in the region pose various problems for national integration ... the Communists constitute ... a serious menace to national unity".⁶ It is indeed another crucial problem that the leaders of Malaysia eagerly sought to solve.

It was believed by the Malaysian Government that the Chinese Communist Party was responsible for the formation of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), that China provided material aid to the MCP and that this was all part of a long term strategy of China to overrun Southeast Asia. According to the Malaysian Government, the MCP gave its loyalty solely to China and, encouraged by it, the MCP was trying to win over the Chinese population in Malaysia.⁷ As for the Sarawak Communist Party⁸, a white paper tabled in Parliament in 1966 stated that:

"It should be studied in conjunction with events elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Militant communism in Sarawak is very much part of Peking's strategy and is closely tied in with Communist guerilla warfare in South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Indo-

⁶Lucian W. Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia", in Gabriel A. Almond & James S. Coleman, (Ed.) The Politics of the Developing Areas, (N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 152.

⁷The Straits Times (Singapore), December 17, 1968.

⁸Robert A. Scalapino (Ed.) The Communist Revolution in Asia: Tactics, Goals, and Achievements, (N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1965), pp. 227-229.

nesia and in West Malaysia."⁹

Peking's hostility towards Malaysia was evident through its own mouthpiece, the New China News Agency (NCNA) and through the clandestine radio, "Voice of Malayan Revolution" (VMR). Not infrequently, the NCNA would resort to extra-ordinary semantics in order to convey its own message without official responsibility. An important Peking objective seemed to be the creation of an atmosphere conducive to insurgency.

According to the NCNA, "The Revolutionary People of Malaya" which, in Peking's parlance, includes Singapore had been engaged in serious studies of Mao Tse-tung's thoughts and had learned several important lessons. These were that political power "grows out of the barrel of a gun", that all reactionaries are "paper tigers", and that it is only right for the people to rebel against their reactionary oppressors. On June 12, 1969 the NCNA quoted the People's Tribune, identified as a Singapore paper, as saying that the "Rahman-Razak regime" was inciting racist sentiments in order to "prop up" its counter-revolutionary rule.

On November 8, 1969, a new clandestine radio began broadcasting from South China under the name of the "Voice of

⁹ Malaysia, The Communist Threat to Sarawak (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printing Office, 1966). P.V. Lau Teik Soon, Singapore-Malaysia Relations 1965-1970, (Australia: Australian National University Ph.D dissertation, 1971), p. 322.

Malayan Revolution" (VMR).¹⁰ Its adoption of the term "Malayan" was indicative of the official line of Peking which had never recognized the Federation of Malaysia — with or without Singapore — as an independent state. The identity of its sponsorship was further revealed by the style of its writers and the contents of its message. For instance, to quote from its first day of broadcasting:

"Salute to the revolutionary people of all nationalities; salute to the heroic Malayan National Liberation Army. Long Live the glorious Communist Party of Malaya. Long live and a long life to Chairman Mao, the great teacher and the great leader of the world's people."¹¹

The VMR claimed that its arrival on the scene broke the monopoly of its adversaries in radio broadcasting. Its objectives were to propagate the ideas of Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung; to eulogize the Malayan National Liberation Army; to "expose" and "crush" enemy plots and to prepare public opinion for the launching of an extensive "people's war" in Malaya. The purpose of this "people's war" was to defeat imperialism (meaning the United States and Britain), modern revisionism (meaning the Soviet Union), and all reactionaries at home (meaning the governments of Malaysia and

¹⁰ According to Bin Dato Abu Samah, Malaysian Minister of Information and Culture, the VMR broadcasts originated from South China. The Straits Times (Singapore), October 3, 1970.

¹¹ This first day broadcast was in Mandarin Chinese.

Singapore), in order to establish a "People's Republic" in all Malaya. Under this general guidance, a number of specific themes were subsequently developed by the VMR and were faithfully followed through all of 1970-71 and most of the time thereafter.

China's verbal attacks and exhortations to revolution probably would not have seemed so threatening to Malaysian authorities if internal security had been stable. Unfortunately, deep seated problems were revealed by the NCNA reports, VMR broadcasts — the latter given wider circulation by the NCNA — and announcements from Kuala Lumpur itself. The government frequently reported during 1969 discovery of deserted guerilla camps on the Malaysian-Thai border, clashes between terrorists and Malaysian and Thai security forces, guerrilla crossing of the Malaysian-Thai border in both directions, use of artillery, jet fighters and helicopters by Malaysian Government forces, and cooperative efforts by Malaysia and Thailand to "mop up" the guerrillas.¹² In the same period, after the establishment of the VMR, frequent reports came from Communist sources on successful, hit and run raids on police stations and government outposts, and claims of guerrilla success in eluding

¹² Such cases were reported by Kuala Lumpur Radio on January 18, April 1 and 7, July 29, August 26, September 17, October 14, 27, 31 and November 18, 19, 20. Regarding Malaysian-Thai cooperation, agreement between the two sides were reached by Tun Razak and the Thai Chief of Staff in October 1969. The report stated that Malaysia promised to take firm measures against every Malaysian who supported or cooperated with the separatist movement in southern Thailand. Jakarta Radio, October 19, 1969.

the encircling government forces.¹³ One estimate given by a Malaysian police spokesman in early April 1969 put the strength of the terrorists on the Thai border at nine hundred men.¹⁴ According to this source, half of this force was made up of new recruits; this would indicate a substantial growth at the beginning of this period. Ten thousand Malaysian and Thai security troops were reported by early September to be operating along the border against these insurgents.¹⁵ The guerrillas were not rooted out, however, as subsequent developments clearly demonstrated.

In eastern Malaysia, both guerrilla and counter-insurgency operations were reported in 1969.¹⁶ These occurred principally in parts of Sarawak bordering Kalimantan or Indonesian West Borneo. Terrorist attacks — mostly small-scale operations — were attributed to the North Borneo People's Army (Pasukan Raayat Kalimantan Utara). To the extent that these operations resulted

¹³During 1969, guerrilla activities on both the Thai and Indonesian borders of Malaysia were reported by the NCNA; for instance, on February 11, March 23, July 31, August 11, September 6, October 26, 28, 31 and November 4, 1969. These announcements increased in frequency in 1970.

¹⁴Kuala Lumpur Radio, April 7, 1969.

¹⁵The figure was given by the Thai Air Marshall who regarded a ten-to-one ratio of ground strength in favour of government forces as approaching the minimum necessary to eliminate the guerrillas. Melbourne Overseas Service, Kuala Lumpur, September 6, 1969.

¹⁶For example, reports of guerrilla activities in Sarawak were given by Kuala Lumpur Radio on April 3, August 7, 26, September 6, November 20, 1969.

in government success, aid made available by the Indonesian Government was said to be an important contributing factor.

The year of 1970 was replete with the same kind of guerrilla attacks, counter-insurgency operations of VMR and NCNA exhortations to armed revolution and verbal attacks against the existing authorities. An analysis of the themes adopted by the Malayan Communists in attacking both the Malaysian and Singapore Governments, especially through the VMR, revealed a determined effort to undermine economic development by scaring foreign investment and to block the development of alternative foreign policy and defense options toward which both Malaysia and Singapore were groping at that time. The principal themes were nationalism, including economic nationalism, and racial suspicion. Exploitation of issues in these areas was to become more and more important while armed revolution continued.

Regarding the constant theme of armed revolution and the role of Peking, the NCNA cited the 1970 New Year's Day editorial of the VMR and stated that the Malayan Communists had "called on the people of various nationalities of Malaya to unite closely around the Communist Party of Malaya ... using the country-side to encircle the cities and seizing political power through armed struggle". The VMR then claimed to have "shaken ... violently the reactionary rule of the Rahman-Razak clique and the Lee Kuan Yew clique" through tremendous Communist victories.¹⁷ Both the NCNA

¹⁷NCNA, Peking, January 4, 1970.

and the VMR asserted that the latter's task was to propagate Mao Tse-tung's ideas and to create revolutionary opinion for further expansion of the continuing armed struggle.¹⁸

In a statement marking its 40th Anniversary, the Malayan Communist Party acknowledged that it had made mistakes twice in the past, each time by actually, or nearly giving up armed struggle.¹⁹ The last time it did this was under the influence of Liu Shao-ch'i and Khrushchev. The correct party line of persisting in armed struggle finally prevailed after 1961. The VMR also advocated a "new democratic revolution" for Malaysia and Singapore. Echoing Mao Tse-tung's May 1970 call for world revolution, the VMR promised to respond to the master's appeal for continuing struggle to defeat "U.S. - led imperialism and all its running dogs."²⁰

Emulation of the Chinese model was emphatically reaffirmed in middle of 1971 when the VMR pledged the "profound militant friendship" of the Malayan Communist Party and the Chinese Communists. Paying tribute to both Mao and Lin Piao, the VMR assured its audience in Malaysia and Singapore that the Chinese Communists' experience in

¹⁸Ibid., March 4, 1970.

¹⁹VMR broadcast in Mandarin Chinese to Malaysia and Singapore, April 26, 1970.

²⁰NCNA, May 23, 1970, quoting VMR of the previous day. During 1971 similar reports were contained in the NCNA releases of May 20, 22, 27 June 10, 20, 21 July 6, 22, 28 August 13, and September 4.

armed struggle was a historical model to be followed and that Peking was the faithful ally of revolutionaries everywhere.²¹

Frequently throughout 1970, reports of guerrilla activities in Sarawak and on the Malaysian-Thai border emanated from Kuala Lumpur as well as from Communist sources — the latter again including both Peking's official news agency and the Peking sponsored VMR.²² As before, the official announcements spoke of "terrorist sightings," discovery of guerrilla training centers, camps, and storage areas, and redoubled Government efforts to wipe out the insurgents. The late Tun Ismail played an important role in a renewed Malaysian effort to increase co-operation with Thailand, including the handling of "hot pursuit" of guerrillas operating on the Malaysian-Thai border. From the Communist side, there were the usual counterclaims of successful ambushes, success in eluding Government forces, "mine warfare", and other exploits by the "Malayan National Liberation Army" and the "North Kalimantan people's armed forces". These reports continued during 1971.

²¹ Broadcast in Mandarin Chinese to Malaysia and Singapore, June 30, 1971.

²² The NCNA releases reporting insurgent activities in East Malaysia and on the Malaysian-Thai border were issued on January 6, 7, 14, February 12, 19, 25, March 5, 15, 25, April 6, 20, 23, May 22, 27, June 1, 8, 10, 20, 21, July 6, 20, 22 August 13, 30 September 4, October 25 and November 5, 1970.

As Government forces began to gain on the guerrillas during 1971, other anti-government themes became more clearly defined and were expanded. Beside the habitual calls for continued armed revolution, we can at least distinguish the following topics of long standing:

First, the Malaysian authorities were accused of fanning a Malay chauvinism which wrecked national industrial and commercial enterprises. According to the VMR, whose alleged views in this case were given wide circulation by the NCNA, the "People's Board of Trust" was one of the means designed to accelerate the growth of "Malay bureaucratic capital" at the expense of all other nationalities.²³ The VMR and NCNA claimed that Malaysian authorities deliberately deprived the "Chinese, Indian, and other nationalities of their citizenship and their right to work" on the ground that the latter's work permits had expired.²⁴ "The Rahman-Razak clique" was held responsible for "spreading national hatred ... by saying that Malaya belongs to the Malays and not to the various nationalities, and that the Malay language is the only official language." All this was said to be a Malaysian Government's attempt

²³NCNA, Peking, March 1, 1970, quoting a VMR article. The People's Board of Trust, of course, was a kind of mutual fund which provides the necessary funds for the Malays to enable them to enter into joint ventures with foreign investors to engage in modern undertakings.

²⁴Ibid., April 15, 1970.

to prepare public opinion for a major racial outbreak and massacre.²⁵ While deliberately baiting both Malays and non-Malays in this manner, the VMR was quick to turn its wrath upon leaders of Malayan Chinese Association who appealed for Chinese unity as a basis of national unity and loyalty to Malaysia.²⁶ Both Peking and the local Communists had been consistently opposed to the emergence of a new Malaysian identity and were doing their best to exploit the latent racial animosities.

A second traditional object of attack during this period was the American and British "imperialism" and "monopoly capital". Japan, however, was being increasingly linked to these as the "vanguard of U.S. imperialism", and Japanese capitalists were said to have infiltrated more and more into Malaya — meaning Malaysia as well as Singapore — with the co-operation of the Governments of these two countries. The theme of exploitation of the poor by "bureaucratic capital" was linked in this manner to sentiments of economic nationalism. All this was, of course, a rather natural development from the point of view of Marxist ideology, redefined by Mao's teaching. The shifting emphasis on Japan anticipated future attacks based on the alleged resurgence of Japanese militarism.

²⁵VMR broadcast in Mandarin Chinese to Malaysia and Singapore, May 30, 1970.

²⁶Ibid., Mandarin Chinese, March 3, 1971. The attack was aimed at the Chinese leaders' symposium meeting in Kuala Lumpur at that time. In the past, Peking had defended the interests of Chinese businessmen in Indonesia who had no communist ties. The latter were not, however, **open** advocates of integration and identification with the host country.

A third target of attacks was "Soviet revisionism"; this not only was a part of the broader Sino-Soviet conflict, but with special reference to Malaysia and Singapore. "Politically" said the VMR, "Soviet revisionist social-imperialism strongly supports the Rahman-Razak and the Lee Kuan-Yew cliques by tactically advising them and encouraging them in further suppression of the Communists, opposing China, and opposing the people."²⁷ As a result of Tun Razak's visit to Moscow in 1968, speculated the VMR while referring to "Western Press" reports, "the Soviet revisionists ... promised to provide more than 100 million U.S. dollars worth of military equipment to the Rahman-Razak clique to oppress the armed struggle of the Malayan and the North Kalimantan peoples."²⁸ Razak was said to be willing to discuss arms aid with Russia.

Economically, the Soviet Union - which had a trade deficit with Malaysia - was accused of despoiling the country by buying tin, rubber and other raw materials while its exports to the area were much smaller. The establishment of air services linking Kuala Lumpur and Singapore with Moscow, Soviet offers of low-interest loans, and the formation of a joint shipping company between the Soviet Union and Singapore were indicated as evidence of Soviet

²⁷ Broadcast in Malay to Malaysia, January 19, 1970.

²⁸ Loc. cit.

infiltration.²⁹

Subsequent events showed that either the degree of change in Malaysian policy towards China was insufficient from Peking's point of view, or that Peking was unwilling and/or unable to put a stop to its standing policy of support for insurgency in Malaysia. At any rate, the VMR, broadcasting in Malay to Singapore and Malaysia, again spoke of the "towering crimes of the Razak and Lee Kuan Yew cliques" perpetrated during 1971, including their "military offences against the people in rural areas, in central Perak, northern Perak, southern Kedah, and northern Kelantan". It commended the determination of the Malayan National Liberation Army "to wipe out the enemy's effectiveness, expand the army and militia organization, and, constantly develop the base and guerrilla areas."³⁰ It also described the Razak Government as having "flirted with the U.S. running dogs in other Asian countries." To quote a later broadcast, "the Thanom - Praphat traitorous clique, the Suharto fascist regime, and the Pak Chong-hee clique are all closely colluding with the Razak clique to serve the U.S. imperialists' war policies."³¹ If there was any faint indication of a change in attitude, one could point to the following sentences in the same

²⁹Loc. cit.

³⁰February 2, 1972, commemorating the 23rd Anniversary of the founding of the "Malayan National Liberation Army".

³¹Broadcast in Malay to Singapore and Malaysia, February 12, 1972.

broadcast: "The criminal activities of the Razak clique in supporting the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak clique politically ... are regarded by them as in line with Malaysia's independent foreign policy."³² At least the VMR used the term "Malaysia".

Three months later, this time speaking out specifically against Singapore, the VMR accused Prime Minister Lee Kuan-Yew of being "active in selling out state sovereignty and national interests."³³ It pointed to Singapore's economic policy of inviting foreign investments and its general use of the English language in education. If the Nixon-Chou Communiqué issued on February 27, 1972 indicated Peking's agreement against the attainment of regional hegemony by any power in Asia, the understanding obviously did not extend to "indigenous revolutionary movements" whose objective, if attained, would result in the establishment of a Malayan — or Malaysian — regime sympathetic to Peking.

A new Constitution of the Communist Party of Malaya was made public towards the end of May 1972.³⁴ It spoke of "Marxist-

³²Loc. cit.

³³VMR broadcast in Malay, May 10, 1972.

³⁴Ibid., May 31, 1972.

Leninist-Mao Tse-tung thought as the guide for its ideology", and of its own experiences as proof that "the path of encircling cities from the countryside and seizing political power by armed forces" was "the only correct line." Although reports of insurgent activities had become less frequent, they were by no means totally absent. In East Malaysia there were some joint counter insurgency operations by Malaysia and Indonesia.³⁵ By the end of the year, however, Tun Ismail, Deputy Prime Minister, was reported to have stated in Parliament that the Communists were "no longer a threat to the state" and that they had been contained in Sarawak.³⁶

In the midst of continuing VMR propaganda attacks and apparently reduced guerrilla activities — probably a result of reduced capability — Peking's NCNA continued its reports on revolutionary successes in various Asian countries and, albeit less frequently, on successful exploits of insurgents in Malaysia.³⁷ Nor did it entirely abandon its use of the term Malaya in referring to Malaysia and Singapore. Peking also reported the visits to Peking of Malaysian doctors and delegates from the Malaysian Table Tennis Association, each time referring

³⁵ Kuala Lumpur Radio, May 31, June 14, 19, August 28, September 5, October 3, December 5, 1972.

³⁶ Ibid., December 5, 1972. The statement was made in answer to a question by Dr. Tan Chee Khoon of the Justice Party.

³⁷ NCNA, Peking, January 5, February 16, March 29, April 22, May 4, 20, July 5, August 23, October 5, 1972.

to Malaysia.³⁸ China was thus prepared even to cite the Malaysian Government's stand, using the proper term, short of open endorsement of the policies. This occurred when a Soviet proposal to internationalize the Straits of Malacca met with Malaysian opposition. "Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak ... stressed it was up to Malaysia and Indonesia," reported the NCNA, "to decide whether or not the narrow waterway should be internationalized."³⁹

And with regard to the possibility of the involvement of China, the Malaysian Government itself denied in a statement that China was involved and admitted that there had been no evidence that arms and ammunition from China were reaching the MCP since the May Thirteen disturbance of 1969.⁴⁰

From Malaysia's point of view, one of the conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with Malaysia was that China should stop her support to the MCP and not intervene in Malaysia's internal politics.⁴¹ Malaysia explicitly expressed her viewpoint that if China did not adopt a hostile attitude towards Malaysia and stopped her radio propaganda in support of the Communists in

³⁸Ibid., May 4, 10, 28, 30, September 3, 1972.

³⁹Ibid., March 13, 1972.

⁴⁰Malaysia Digest (Malaysia), Vol. 1 No. 5, September 1, 1969 p. 4.

⁴¹Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), November 14, 1970.

Malaysia, she would be prepared to establish diplomatic relations with China.⁴²

Since the Malayan Communist Party had posed a threat to Malaysia's policy of nation-building and national consolidation, it had always been the major task of the Malaysian Government to eliminate such a threat from the Malayan Communist Party relying on China's support. Thus, Tun Razak's visit to Peking must be seen as an act in the psychological war between the Malaysian Government and the MCP. The Malaysian leaders thought that in gaining China's recognition for the Malaysian Government they would downgrade the relationship between Peking and the Malayan Communist Party to such an extent that the latter's struggle would become meaningless.⁴³

Besides, with regard to the May Thirteen Incident of 1969, when racial riots broke out in Malaysia immediately after the General Elections, it was evident that the MCP was caught unaware, as were indeed all parties, as to the intensity of the racial antagonism between the Malays and Chinese in Malaysia. It

⁴²Ibid., November 15, 1970. Also Lau Teik-Soon (Ed.) New Directions in the International relations of South-east Asia: The Great Powers and Southeast Asia (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973) p. 68.

⁴³New Nation (Singapore), May 11, 1974.

could be that the MCP was hardly involved in the disturbances.⁴⁴

(3) The Economic Factor

The importance of economic factors in the foreign policy formulation of any state is well recognized. For example, Legg and Morrison say that:

"It is important to emphasize that economic needs are fundamental sources of a state's foreign policy ... the economy of a state is fundamental to a state's capabilities and therefore to its power vis-à-vis other states, i.e. its ability to get other state to do what it desires. No top decision-maker in any state can be rational and ignore the problem of maintaining and, if possible, increasing capabilities to the point where they are adequate to achieve the state's objectives."⁴⁵

And this statement is also true for Malaysia.

⁴⁴The Malayan Communist Party was scarcely involved for these reasons: Firstly, they had been espousing a multi-racial policy for Malaysia because its pro-Chinese image had been the major factor in the failure of their insurgency, and because they were active in recruiting Malays in the Malaysia-Thailand area; secondly, the racial clashes occurred almost exclusively in the capital, Kuala Lumpur, where the MCP was weakest and far from its sanctuary along the Malaysia-Thailand border; thirdly, immediately after the outbreak of the racial conflict, the government in anticipating response from the MCP despatched security forces to cordon off Northern Malaysia in order to prevent any moves by the MCP towards the South. Refer to Lau Teik-soon, Malaysia-Singapore Relations 1965-1970. p. 331.

⁴⁵Keith R. Legg & James F. Morrison, Politics and the International System: An Introduction, (Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), p. 143.

The economy of Malaysia has been strong, partly due to her natural resources and partly due to the British. Nature endowed her with vast deposits of easily accessible tin ore, while the British encouraged the development of extensive plantation agriculture of cultivated rubber and oil palm. After the post-war reconstruction, Malaysia has produced between a third and a half of the world's supply of tin ore concentrate and natural rubber. But Malaysia's economic achievements are also her vulnerability. Malaysia's economic development was generally based on the export of her primary commodities. Rubber accounts for approximately half of her foreign trade, and rubber and tin together for more than eighty percent.* Besides this vulnerability of exporting the raw materials and the need for development of the "infra-structure" of the economy, she also needs to encourage foreign investments and capture new markets for her products.⁴⁶

Perhaps the most crucial trade fact so far, as far as foreign policy is concerned, is that Malaysia's traditional customers, British and the United States, are declining in importance, while the importance of trade with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China has been rapidly increasing. In 1973, China replaced the United States as the biggest buyer of Malaysian rubber. Her purchases of rubber from Malaysia in October 1973, edged the United States to the second place.⁴⁷ From China's standpoint

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷The Straits Times (Singapore), December 5, 1973.

* Interview with Mr. Michael Chen, then Malaysian Minister with Special Functions, (September 20, 1976, Malaysia).

Malaysia has become China's principal source of supply of natural rubber.* China's total import of natural rubber grew from about 20,000 tons in the late 1940's to 200,000 tons in the late 1960's - a tenfold increase within two decades. At present, only a third of her total import can be supplied by Ceylon through rubber - rice barter arrangements. Together with Hong Kong and Singapore, Malaysia has also become an important source of foreign exchange reserve for China. The Sino-Malaysian trade balance over the past two decades has been consistently in China's favour* (with the single exception of 1958), the size of the surplus for China fluctuation each year according to China's rubber purchase. From Malaysia's standpoint, the economic interests of China in trading with her do not appear to be in conflict with Malaysia's own basic economic interests.⁴⁸ Although the past Chinese purchases of Malaysian rubber were moderate compared with those of big buyers such as the United States of America, China often "appears to be a buyer prepared to step in at useful moments from Malaysia's point of view."⁴⁹ In 1972 China's total import of natural rubber was estimated to be 190,000 tons, of which 130,000 tons were imported from Malaysian sources, making China Malaysia's fourth largest buyer with purchases surpassing those of Britain.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Interview with Mr. Michael Chen Wen-sam, Minister for Environmental Development, Malaysia, (September 20, 1976, Malaysia).

⁴⁹ Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong) October 3, 1970. p. 34.

⁵⁰ Rubber Statistical Bulletin (London), Vol. 27, No. 10., July, 1973.

* Refer to Appendix 20.

* Refer to Appendix 27.

Trade between Malaysia and China fluctuated with political developments in the area during the 1960's. Before 1965 China's close ties with Indonesia and opposition to Malaysia were reflected in the trade figures. A major reason for the declining trade of Malaysia with China was the shift of China from Malaysia to Indonesia and Ceylon for supplies of rubber. Consequently, Malaysia's trade imbalance with China grew wider, providing the Malaysian Government with an excuse for attempting another round of curbs on Chinese goods which now included not only textiles, but also iron and steel goods and paper products. After the failure of the Gestapu in 1965 in Indonesia, destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, China stopped purchasing from Indonesia and returned to Malaysia. Both China and Malaysia learnt a lesson from confrontation in that there was much in the trade that would benefit both parties mutually - more than each had ever realized. This realization helped to build a foundation for eventual trade normalization, which came about pretty rapidly after 1971 once the international atmosphere became conducive.

A major problem in Malaysia's economic relations with China was the balance of trade in favour of the latter. The goods imported from China include rice, sugar, honey, fabrics, clothing, woven cotton, steel bars, miscellaneous manufactured articles and vegetable materials.* The price of these commodities was cheap and their quality was comparable to Japanese goods at a similar stage of industrialization. The "Malaysian import bill would be considerably larger with the wide range of goods now bought from China

* Refer to Appendix 22 & 24.

instead of from Japan, Britain or other developed countries."⁵¹

Even though some manufactured items among the Chinese imports might have been a problem to small producers in Malaysia, other imports were simply considered essential by the low-income segments of the population.⁵² Rice is a case in point. Malaysia is not self-sufficient in rice and ever since 1956 China has been a substantial rice exporter to Malaysia, supplying, in 1971, 33% of Malaysia's total rice imports.⁵³ The rice supply crisis in early 1973 in many Southeast Asian countries brings home the importance of dependable rice imports from China. In an attempt to achieve a better trade balance, Malaysia banned the imports of Chinese textile, iron and steel products and paper goods^{*} in October 1965 but this action was later revised as a result of higher purchases of Malaysia's rubber.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Harvey Stockwin, "Into the Red," Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), April 15, 1965, p. 111.

⁵² Anthony Polsky, "Stakes in Singapore - Malaysia," Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), October 2, 1969, p. 53. Similarly for Singapore, "a member of Singapore's influential Chinese Chamber of Commerce estimated that the cost of living on the island republic would go up as much as 15% - 20% if trade with China were to cease."

⁵³ When China agreed to export rice to Singapore and Malaysia for the first time, a considerable alarm was caused in Thailand which has been traditionally Malaysia's major rice supplier. See Malayan Mirror, (Kuala Lumpur), October 10, 1956. See also Cheng Siok-Hwa, The Rice Trade of Malaya, (Singapore: University Education Press, 1973).

⁵⁴ Lau Teik-Soon, Singapore-Malaysia Relations, 1965-1970, Ph. D Dissertation, 1971, p. 350.

* Refer to Appendix 24 & 25.

From 1966, the trade relations between Malaysia and China improved considerably. In April 1972 Malaysia imposed restrictions on the re-export of Chinese goods from Singapore in a move to eliminate the latter's role as a middleman. China had indicated her support for Malaysia's policy of direct trade, which would eventually bring about a sharp climb in total trade between the two countries, since as much as 60% - 80% of Singapore's imports from China had been re-exported to Malaysia for many years.

Indirect contacts between various national trading bodies, such as the Malaysian Rubber Exchange, and China were made through Hong Kong.⁵⁵ Any formal trade relations between Malaysia and China would have to await the developments of diplomatic relations between both countries. Diplomatic relations with China not only could help to expand Malaysia's markets, promote direct trade⁵⁶ and provide sources of foreign assistance, they also could be used to counteract Western influence upon Malaysia and encourage assistance to her from the Great Powers.

(4) The Personalities of the Malaysian Leaders

The formulation of Malaysian foreign policy has been dominated by Malaysia's leaders and their perceptions of the

⁵⁵Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), June 3, 1974.

⁵⁶Loc. Cit.

Table 1: Malaysia's Trade with China, 1950-71 (in M\$ million)

Year	Imports			Exports			Trade Balance
	\$	% of Total Imports	Index	\$	% of Total Exports	Index	
1950	18.9	2.5	42	18.0	1.4	100	- 0.9
1951	28.2	2.1	63	16.0	0.8	89	- 12.2
1952	27.2	2.8	60	*	-	-	- 27.2
1953	23.4	2.6	52	1.6	0.2	9	- 21.8
1954	19.1	2.4	42	5.6	0.6	31	- 13.5
1955	24.5	2.6	54	2.0	0.2	11	- 22.5
1956	29.3	2.8	65	8.5	0.6	47	- 20.8
1957	36.0	3.3	80	28.5	1.2	158	- 7.5
1958	45.2	4.5	100	51.6	4.1	286	+ 6.4
1959	25.1	2.5	56	5.7	0.3	32	- 19.4
1960	35.0	2.7	78	*	-	-	- 35.0
1961	42.4	3.2	94	*	-	-	- 42.4
1962	45.5	3.0	101	0.2	*	1	- 45.3
1963	75.9	5.0	235	0.2	*	1	- 75.7
1964	106.00	6.7	235	*	-	-	-106.0
1965	101.2	6.1	225	0.1	*	-	-101.1
1966	173.3	6.6	385	2.5	0.8	14	-170.8
1967	192.7	7.4	428	19.7	0.7	109	-173.0
1968	175.3	6.3	389	73.1	2.3	406	-102.2
1969	174.9	6.2	388	136.4	3.3	755	- 38.5
1970	164.8	4.9	366	66.2	1.6	366	- 98.6
1971	137.9	4.1	306	53.4	1.4	296	- 84.5

* : statistically insignificant

Sources : Malayan Statistics: External Trade and West Malaysia Monthly Statistics of External Trade, various years.

Table 2: Commodity Composition of Sino-Malaysian Trade (%)

Commodity	1971	1967	1958	1952
(1) <u>Food</u>	<u>39.4</u>	<u>43.7</u>	<u>45.3</u>	<u>64.2</u>
Meat	1.4	2.7	1.1	1.4
Cereals	12.7	23.2	6.3	12.0
(Rice)	(9.8)	(20.7)	(4.3)	(-)
Fruits & Vegetables	16.0	14.6	14.6	46.0
(2) <u>Manufactured Goods</u>	<u>27.2</u>	<u>27.7</u>	<u>30.1</u>	<u>27.4</u>
Paper	4.8	2.7	5.6	3.5
Textiles	9.5	7.6	14.7	3.3
Iron & Steel	2.8	9.0	1.5	-
(3) <u>Machinery & Transport Equipment</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>8.6</u>
(4) <u>Miscellaneous Manufactures</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.4</u>	-
Clothing	2.3	2.3	1.9	-
Scientific instruments	0.4	0.3	-	-
(5) <u>Others</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>14.9</u>	<u>14.8</u>	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* : 1952 refers to Pan-Malayan trade, i.e., Malaya and Singapore, under old classifications.

Sources: Malayan Statistics: External Trade, and West Malaysia Monthly Statistics of External Trade.

external environment.⁵⁷ Thus, it is necessary to indicate these crucial determinants affecting policy decision making in Malaysia. The core of political leaders in Malaysia included Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Tun Tan Siew Sin, Minister of Finance and the late Tun (Dr.) Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Minister of Home Affairs. These Malaysian leaders were concerned with evolving the overall political, economic, defense and foreign affairs policies of the state, and thus their perceptions which were based on their personal attitude, belief, and experiences towards the whole world are of great significance.

In Malaysia, the top political leaders decided on all central issues of the foreign policy while the Foreign Ministry officials and the representatives overseas performed the function of collecting information, negotiations and representation, administration and executing these policies. Though the parliamentary political parties in Malaysia had voiced opposition against the Government, particularly relating to foreign bases and relations with the Communist countries, they were unheeded until the leaders themselves were faced with the new circumstances and felt the need of changing their foreign policy orientation.

⁵⁷Lennox A. Mills, Southeast Asia: Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics, (Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1964), p. 168.

The influence upon Malaysian foreign policy of pressure groups such as the trade unions and the Chambers of Commerce, were of little significance. Public opinion was another ineffective factor in deciding the crucial issues involved. The issues involved were only explained to the public after the policies had been decided upon by the leaders, in order to gain public support.

There was also no parliamentary foreign foreign affairs committee which could influence the leaders in formulating and making decisions in the area of foreign policies. Thus, it is clear that the Malaysian leaders were dominant in defining the objectives and goals as well as designing their foreign policies strategies, enunciating them and initiating them as a response mainly to the external environment.⁵⁸

Since the formulation of Malaysian foreign policy is dominated by the political leaders, a shift in top level leadership will thus bring a change in orientation in the foreign policy. Therefore, the change in Malaysia's attitude towards China may be partly due to the personality of the Malaysian Leadership.

Certainly the anti-Communist Tunku and non-Communist Razak represent two different attitude sets. The Tunku has been

⁵⁸Robert O. Tilman, Malaysian Foreign Policy, (McLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation, 1969), pp. 43-45.

characterized as intuitive, personalistic, and impulsive in approach to problems. Given his own view of Malaysia as a small power which should concentrate her attention on home affairs rather than dissipating her resources on building up an elaborate foreign office, it was inevitable that Malaysia's foreign relations would be limited. But whatever foreign policy there was shaped by his predilection for an anti-Communist, pro-Western, and regional direction, the tone established was one of moral rectitude in international or state-to-state relations. This might be traced to his royal upbringing and largely anglicized socialization. His style was paternal and arbitrary, often prompting him to make off-the-cuff policy utterances which the bureaucracy had to reconcile. Seeing the world in black and white terms, he was quick to attribute blame in highly complicated international situations.

Policy-making in Malaysia, as indeed in most developing countries, has always been an elitist affair; foreign policy-making was exclusive in Malaysia because the Malaysian Prime Minister was at the same time his own Foreign Minister. During the Tunku's period it was difficult to discover any other person, besides the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, who had much influence on foreign policy. Ghazali Shafie had just become Permanent Secretary in 1959 but his real politik interpretation of international and regional relations probably buttressed the Tunku's own Machiavellian views of the external environment.

The foreign service was a relatively young branch of the Government, hence the low level of representation overseas. As

a result of the poor communication network and a weak advocacy structure in the establishment, the leadership often seemed to resort to stereotypes in interpreting the behaviour of other states, especially the Communist states. Tunku's attitude towards China was one of non-recognition and no contact. He held that contact or recognition of Peking Government would retard Malaysia's nation-building in the area of national solidarity. It seemed to be a practice of the Tunku to blame the Maoist agents and China for most of the political disturbances in the country, such as the case of the May 13th incident when racial riots broke out in Malaysia immediately after the General Elections in 1969. According to the Tunku, the Communists were partly responsible for causing the bloody clashes in the Federal capital.⁵⁹

However, Tun Razak was more analytical, dedicated to details and pragmatic. He seems more autochthonously Southeast Asian, while the Tunku was more oriented to the West. Beyond the personality differences, Razak's style of leadership placed more emphasis on functional autonomy. Encouraging a greater flow of information from the foreign service bureaucracy, he promoted more frequent and more vigorous advocacy within the ministry and among departments. As one official observed, "we discuss the inside and outside of a policy issue, regularly among ourselves and often with the Prime Minister present". If the channels of

⁵⁹Refer to Tun Abdul Rahman, May 13, Before and After, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press Ltd., 1969).

communication are more effective, the policy making is also more rational and mission-oriented. With the increase in the establishment has come a new-found confidence and professionalism.

Foreign policy formulation and articulation have been influenced by the quality of the interaction between Rahman, Razak and Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie. Undoubtedly, the first two have provided strong and political support for the reorientation of Malaysian policy.

In his perception of the foreign policy towards Peking, Tun Razak saw that the People's Republic of China had a foreign policy which played "People's wars", stressed diplomacy, peaceful co-existence, and government-to-government contacts. Tun Razak had clearly stated Malaysia's new China policy at the United Nations 1971 General Assembly.⁶⁰ This led to a shift of Malaysia's attitude towards China from the "One China - One Taiwan" policy previously held. Tun Razak advocated that the new policy of Malaysia was one of non-alignment and neutrality. He said that Southeast Asian powers should avoid entangling alliances and be equidistant from the Soviet Union, the United States, and Mainland China. Since Malaysia already had ties with the United States and

⁶⁰ Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1973, p. 13. Tun Abdul Razak stated Malaysia's new China policy at the U. N. 1971 General Assembly: "The People's Republic of China is now the de jure and de facto ruling power in China."

Soviet Union,⁶¹ it seemed timely now to establish diplomatic relations with China. Tun Razak also said that Malaysia's "end-goal" was to create a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" in Southeast Asia.

Tun Razak's visit to China may have been due to his own desire for prestige, but above all, to make Malaysia the leader among the ASEAN countries. It is also evident that Malaysia's participation in the Non-aligned Nations Summit Conference in Algiers in 1973 and the Muslim Summit in Lahore in 1974⁶² had boosted Malaysia's image overseas.

(B) External Environment

(1) The Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine brought an end to the doctrine of "containment", which stood for American political and military involvement anywhere in the world where the threat of Communist expansion was perceived.

⁶¹ Malaysia had established her diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1968. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 1, No. 9 & 10, 19, p. 118.

⁶² Tun Abdul Razak headed a 9-man Malaysian delegation to the Fourth Non-aligned Summit Conference in Algiers on September 5-8, 1973. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 6, No. 3, September 1973, p. 15, 49. See also "Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore, February 22-24," Speech by Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Hussein, Prime Minister of Malaysia, at the Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore, Pakistan, February 24, 1974. Foreign Affairs Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 7, No. 1, March 1974, pp. 10-17. Also The Straits Times (Singapore), June 6, 1974.

The American elections in November 1968 transferred power to President Richard Nixon who laid bare an outline of his foreign policy in an interview with the press in Guam in July 26, 1969.⁶³ Next, he presented the blueprint of his policy on February 15, 1971 in the "U.S. Foreign Policy For the 1970s: A Report To The Congress by Richard Nixon."⁶⁴ The guidelines and principles defining the new American role in world affairs came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine,* which among other things, stated:

"We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; We have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."

Yet the doctrine emphasized support of all treaty commitments. It further asserted that the U.S.A. would not permit the Saigon regime to be overthrown once the American forces departed from the scene.⁶⁵ As the President perceived it, American credibility was at stake:

"If the United States withdraws quickly, the events it had fought to prevent might well occur; if South Vietnam collapsed and Hanoi unified Vietnam under its control ... the credibility of the imperial center's commitments and power would be

⁶³Text in The New York Times, July 26, 1969, p. 8. The interview is a close paraphrase of Nixon's remarks, not a verbatim transcript.

⁶⁴Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, February 25, 1971), pp. 10-21.

⁶⁵Townsend Hoopes, "Legacy of the Cold War in Indochina," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 4 (July 1970): 604.

* Refer to Appendix 8.

weakened, perhaps gravely so. For the stability of the state system and deterrence depended ... not only on American arms but upon the country's reputation in Moscow, Peking, and other capitals."⁶⁶

Therefore, a speedy withdrawal of American forces at a time when South Vietnamese forces could not yet cope with Hanoi's forces and the National Liberation Front (NLF) by themselves was not considered the most advisable course of action of the new President.

President Nixon did introduce a different approach to deal with the Vietnam issue: an approach that would pacify the public at home and would keep the enemy engaged abroad. American ground troops were to be gradually withdrawn, thus cutting the cost of war and making the continuation of hostilities more palatable for the American public. Vietnamization of the war, or shifting the major burden of the battle to Vietnamese shoulders, was to proceed only with such speed that would neither jeopardize the welfare of the retreating American soldiers nor undermine the Saigon regime. At the same time the U.S. air bombardment and naval support would continue both to prevent the enemy from overwhelming the South Vietnamese forces, and to remind North Vietnam that the matter had to be settled at the negotiation table. President Nixon and his chief foreign policy adviser

⁶⁶ John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, (New York: Prager Publishers, 1973), p. 253.

Henry Kissinger thus made it clear that under their guidance the United States was in no haste to extricate itself from Vietnam. Moreover, they felt certain that their approach would be acceptable to the large number of Americans who would not tolerate unconditional withdrawal.

Renewed turmoil on the domestic scene, which the President had successfully arrested by his policy of troop withdrawals, was a warning, however, that while America was prepared to wait in search of a reasonable settlement, the people and the Congress had no intention of giving the new Administration the blank check that had been misused by the previous Administration.

As the 1972 elections approached, the situation reached a point where President Nixon offered "the complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months"⁶⁷ if all prisoners of war were returned and an internationally supervised cease-fire was imposed. Hanoi rejected the offer, suggesting that unless a change of government in Saigon was a part of the settlement no agreement could be reached. As the contest to see whose will would prevail dragged on, certain developments beyond the control of both parties appeared on the international horizon, which

⁶⁷Ibid.

influenced the conduct of both the United States and North Vietnam — leading finally to a cease-fire in January 1973.

Signs of a rift between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union had surfaced as early as 1959. Rivalry between the two reached a new peak in the sixties. By 1970, the Sino-Soviet split had become an undeniable fact. Cracks in the Communist Bloc reflected the emergence of an outline of a new world order. This not only influenced the course of the Vietnam War, but led to major shifts in American foreign policy, as Kissinger put it in August 1970:

"The deepest international conflict in the world today is not between us and the Soviet Union but between the Soviet Union and the Communist China Therefore, one of the positive prospects in the current situation is that whatever the basic intentions of Soviet leaders, confronted with the prospect of a China growing in strength and not lessening in hostility, they may want a period of détente in the West, not because they necessarily have changed ideologic ally, but because they do not want to be in a position in which they have to confront major crisis on both sides of this huge country over an indefinite period of time."⁶⁸

This was a historical pronouncement, which set a pattern for new relationships among nations all over the globe, including Malaysia.

(2) Transformation of the International Political Order

The achievement of independence by the countries of Southeast Asia after the Second World War brought an end to the old

⁶⁸Text of background briefing, San Clemente, August 24, 1970 as quoted by David Landau in Kissinger: The Uses of Power, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 106.

political order in this part of the world. But it did not, however, end the involvement of external powers in the area. Indeed, it could be said that the situation in Southeast Asia mirrored and reflected to a considerable degree the characteristics of confrontation and containment that marked the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁶⁹

After Kissinger's statement, the global pattern of power was in the process of change. The struggle for power has changed from a "tight bi-polar", to use Kaplan's famous typology of the international system, into a "multi-polar system".⁷⁰ New centres of power in the shape of the People's Republic of China, Japan and Western Europe were emerging or being recognized and acknowledged as such by at least one if not the two powers that have hitherto held sway. Malaysia had to contend with these new constellations of forces in trying to achieve a degree of security and stability in these changing times.⁷¹ She had to respond with dynamism and imagination to this changing situation.⁷²

⁶⁹Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur),
Op.Cit., Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1973, p. 51.

⁷⁰Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 21-53; See also Lau Teik-Soon (Ed.), New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia: The Great Powers and Southeast Asia, (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973), p. 39.

⁷¹Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Op. Cit., p. 51.

⁷²Ibid., Vol. 6, No. 4, December 1973, p. 29.

Familiar features that have marked the Southeast Asian scene in the past decades were fast fading away. Britain, once a dominant power in Southeast Asia, is playing a diminishing role as expressed in the flexibility of her present, as opposed to her past, military commitment. The United States, as enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, had declared her determination to fashion a new role for herself and to participate in a new form in the affairs of Asia. In the Malaysian leaders' view, Southeast Asian countries will have to reckon with a reduction of the American presence in Asia.

As an emerging centre of power dependent on the raw materials from Southeast Asia for her industries and on oil from West Asia, China's Economic and strategic interest in Southeast Asia is bound to increase. She is now one of the major trading partners with a significant number of countries in Southeast Asia.

As regards the Soviet Union, her interest in Southeast Asia was to compete with the United States for power and influence. It was part of the Soviet Unions's global interest to encourage the emergence of governments socialist or communist in inclination if not in fact, and, in the context of the Cold War rivalry. Following the Soviet accession to the superpower status with the urge and impulse which such a status creates and, perhaps more immediately as a result of her ideological dispute with the People's Republic of China, which may be above all a conflict of national interests between the two powers, it would appear that the region of Southeast Asia will loom large in the calculations of the leaders in the region.

Malaysia had to reckon with the People's Republic of China which had recently re-emerged on the international stage. None of the Asian countries, except China, was at the time a nuclear strategic striking power.⁷³ The United States of America,⁷⁴ Japan and a host of other countries have made their adjustment and accommodation to this new factor in international life. The entry of China into the United Nations and President Nixon's visit to Peking have made China a power of global importance.⁷⁵

Facing this situation, the Malaysian leaders perceived that it would be an anomalous attitude indeed for the countries in the region to continue not to have diplomatic relations with China when the rest of the world is doing so. This realism was a characteristic of Malaysian foreign policy in Razak's period as explained by Tan Sri Ghazali, Malaysian Minister with Special

⁷³Japan has the economic, industrial and technological potential to develop herself into a nuclear power if she chooses to do so. India has the technical know how to become a member of the nuclear club but will, for a long time to come, lack the economic resources to go nuclear. Thus, the dominant nuclear powers in the area for a long time to come will be only China and potentially Japan and the external powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Lau Teik-soon edited, New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia: The Great Powers and Southeast Asia, Op. cit., p. 11.

⁷⁴President Nixon visited Peking in February 1972 to normalize diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. Ibid., p. 71.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 55.

Functions and Minister of Information, in his speech at the Malaysian Investment Conference in Zurich, Switzerland on March 5, 1973:

"Realism has been, I think, a characteristic of Malaysian foreign policy ... whether it is in terms of our China policy or the re-orientation of our foreign policy priorities or the inculcation of a spirit of increasing self-reliance in defence matters. There is enough evidence in the development of Malaysian policy in the last two years which reflects this positive and imaginative, but at the same time realistic approach to current developments in our part of the world."⁷⁶

However, realism suggested that although policies had to be decided by the Southeast Asians themselves without foreign interference, their policies to be successfully implemented must be acceptable to others, that is the outsiders. In other words, they have to take into account the legitimate interests of the outsiders, and especially those of the great powers. They must also respect the basic requirements of the world balance of power upon which the peace and the security of all depend.

As this realistic approach is to be adapted to the external environment, it can be understood that Malaysian leaders insisted that Southeast Asian countries have to plan ahead and formulate a framework within which countries in the region could establish mutually beneficial relations with the People's Republic

⁷⁶ Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1973, p. 53.

of China on the basis of equality and friendship. For Malaysia these changes — this flux in the external power factors operating in the region — present a tremendous challenge, and Malaysian leaders believed that a time of challenge is also a time of opportunity. The question is whether they can surmount the challenge and turn it into an opportunity — an opportunity to reach out and fashion for themselves an arrangement that would not only regulate relationship between countries of Southeast Asia and external powers having an interest in the region but would also reinforce the drive towards regional cooperation.⁷⁷

(3) Need for Neutralization of Southeast Asia

The emergence of Southeast Asia as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers," was advocated by Tun Razak since his Lusaka speech of September 9, 1970.⁷⁸ The reason why Tun Razak emphasized the concept of neutralization as the best permanent solution to ensure the security and stability of Southeast Asia was due to his consciousness of the past history, discussed in Chapter Two. In further analysis, Malaysia's emphasis on the importance of security

⁷⁷Loc. Cit.

⁷⁸The proposal for a neutralized Southeast Asia was first broached by Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie, then Permanent Secretary in the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, at the Preparatory Conference of Non-aligned Countries at Dares-Salaam on April 17, 1970, and later restated by Tun Abdul Razak, then the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, at the Lusaka Conference of Non-aligned Nations on September 9, 1970.

and stability in a neutralized Southeast Asia was due to the fact that her desire to develop and moderate the country would become impossible without security and stability in the area.

As we know, Malaysia is a developing country and her Government gives top priority to her development, modernization and welfare. She has a lot of problems to be solved. In the economic and social fields, the problems confronting her continue to cry out for attention. She is beset with problems of inequalities in the distribution of income which coincide with racial divisions. Healthy and steady development, however, require some basic conditions and, first of all, peace. It is clear that the development and modernization process will be deeply affected by the character and intensity of the rivalry among foreign powers in the region.⁷⁹ Also, as a developing country, Malaysia is most likely to put more emphasis on her economic and industrial development rather than political and military aspiration.⁸⁰ To achieve these goals she must devote more attention to her internal political and economic stability.⁸¹

The prospect of major power rivalries with possible world conflagration and regional conflicts will surely affect development.

⁷⁹Lau Teik-soon (ed.), New Directions In the International Relations of Southeast Asia: The Great Powers and Southeast Asia, p. 120.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 17.

⁸¹Loc.Cit.

Moreover, Malaysia is limited by her circumstances in pursuing a limited initiative in foreign policy. Militarily, she is a weak state and is vulnerable to external attack and thus dependent on outside powers for her external defence.⁸² But defence arrangements with big powers can only be short-term expedients which will last only for so long as it serves the interests of the parties involved.⁸³

The "way of development" should be chosen freely, decided upon on a national basis in full freedom by the people and their elected leaders; however, this is not attainable if violence and tensions persist. It is only when tension has subsided or vanished, when the seemingly uncompromising alignments are no longer necessary, and when the great powers accept a balance of opposite forces in the region, that prerequisites for real independence are laid.⁸⁴

This is why neutralization of Southeast Asia is a condition of national independence of the countries making up this region. Without neutrality, a country will unavoidably have to rely more and more upon one great power or other to insure its defence, and its armed-forces would easily become a foreign lobby.⁸⁵

⁸²Lau Teik-soon, Singapore-Malaysia Relations, 1965-1970, ANU Ph.D dissertation, 1970, p. 39.

⁸³Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 6, No. 1, March 1973, p. 35.

⁸⁴Lau Teik-soon (Ed.), op.cit., p. 121.

⁸⁵Loc.cit.

It is easy to understand why the choice between neutrality and alignment would affect the most essential issues in any state, such as decision-making process within the government, the choice of development strategy, the political, economic, and social priorities, the role of the army, police and intelligence services within the state, the independence of foreign policy and of foreign trade.

As Tun (Dr.) Ismail, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, said at the Plenary Session of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Conference held in Kuala Lumpur on September 13, 1971:

"Countries of Southeast Asia themselves should by a conscious effort condition themselves to being natural This means that (they) will have consciously and openly to adhere to non-aligned policies showing favour neither to the East nor West nor taking any part in the international ideological conflict. We in the region would have to provide assurance by our actions and our policies that we will not consciously or unconsciously allow our countries to be used as a threat to anyone."⁸⁶

However, the realization of the concept of neutralization of Southeast Asia should first have the guarantee of the three big powers — the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. As Tun (Dr.) Ismail put it in his October 15, 1970 speech at the United Nations:

"There is the need to demonstrate that our activities and policies do not adversely affect the basic legitimate interest of the major powers. It is only then that the countries

⁸⁶ Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 4, No. 3, September 1971, p. 72.

of the region would be in a position to seek an undertaking from the three super-powers to guarantee their independence, integrity and neutrality."⁸⁷

Without the super powers' guarantee, the proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia cannot be realized. Therefore, one of the purposes of Tun Razak's visit to Peking was to seek the Chinese support for this proposal so as to help it to materialize.⁸⁸

⁸⁷Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 2, December 1970, p. 59.

⁸⁸Interview with **Mr.** Michael Chen, then Malaysian Minister with Special Functions, (September 20, 1976, Malaysia).

CHAPTER V

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY
OF CHINA TOWARDS MALAYSIA

The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China has also been determined by factors related to the internal as well as the external environment.

(A) Internal Environment

(1) Impact of the Cultural Revolution

The Maoists suffered certain temporary economic setbacks during the Cultural Revolution when many of the authorities in power were purged, including specialists in the industrial sector. In the long run, however, we may assume that even in their failures, the Maoists did much to prepare the Chinese people for further economic development. This is because the "thought of Mao Tse-tung has functioned to transform the perception of the Chinese and to infuse them with a spirit of commitment sufficient to break the barriers of inertia and stagnation identified with tradition."¹

As the curtain rose on China's Five Year Plan on the National Day celebrated on October 1, 1970, Premier Chou En-lai said that "the successful fulfillment of China's national economic plan for 1970 would lay the foundation for the Fourth Five-Year Plan"; and that agriculture had been identified as the key sector of the plan, along with rural industrialization, to provide the

¹Dennis M. Ray, "Transitionalism and the Idea of Progress: A Case for Ideological Mobilization" (Paper delivered at Western Conference of Association of Asian Studies, San Diego, October 29, 1971).

inputs for agricultural expansion.² The intent was for a wide range of rural reforms to generate a significant increase in farm production, and spur overall economic development.

China entered a new phase of industrial development in January 1971, with the start of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. The basic guideline called for agriculture as the base, simultaneous development of both large and small industries, and the creation of self-sufficient industrial and farming communities across the nation. Industry must now provide the inputs for agricultural expansion: chemical fertilizers, electric power, agricultural tools and machinery, irrigation and drainage facilities, etc.³

Since China had embarked on a massive programme emphasizing decentralized agricultural and industrial development, a departure from the earlier centralized system, and this programme would require great expense and time, the country urgently needed a long period of peace so that scarce resources were not diverted from the modernization effort, which oriented China's national objectives into a more moderate direction. Peace in Southeast Asia and in China's other neighbouring regions was a requirement for her

²"Peking's Fourth Five Year Plan," Current Scene, No. 17, October 1970, pp. 19-20.

³Current Scene, No. 10, October 7, 1971.

security, but it was also a basic condition for the realization of the national goal, that is to build China into a powerful, modern socialist country before the end of the century.

(2) The Personalities of the Chinese Leaders

The rapid erosion of radical influence in Peking after 1969 was an important element in the shift in Chinese priorities concerning Southeast Asia. The triumph of Chou En-lai over Lin Piao in 1971 likewise facilitated the return to active diplomacy in the region.

Beginning with his 1965 treatise⁴ Lin Piao had established himself as an authority on "people's wars" in Southeast Asia, and he was outspoken during the Cultural Revolution in proclaiming China's support for and identity with the Communist revolutionaries in the area. Chou, on the other hand, had been closely associated with Peking's peaceful co-existence policies of the 1950's, which several Southeast Asian Maoist parties later condemned as having also involved pressure on them to give up armed struggle.

Although after 1968 Lin, in keeping with Peking's evolving diplomatic line, increasingly stressed a broader anti-U.S. united front, he still persisted, in his report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, in giving attention to revolutionary movements in those countries, such as Burma, Malaysia and India, with which Peking was preparing to move towards normalization of relations to varying degree.

⁴Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).

Certain glaring inconsistencies evident during 1970-71 between Peking's public treatment of revolutionary insurgents on the one hand and Peking's developing diplomacy on the other hand, may have been a reflection of differences on this question between the two Chinese leaders.

The influence of Lin and the civilian radicals, for example, possibly accounted for the appearance of an NCNA article in May 1971 that broke the new pattern in Chinese public treatment of the insurgents in Burma and Malaysia by favourably commenting on their revolutionary struggles and again stressing the need for "coordination" of all the insurgent movements in the area.⁵

In contrast, in keeping with his pragmatic view, Chou gradually returned China to a selective and flexible approach in dealing with both the governments and as well as the Maoist parties in Southeast Asia. In regard to those countries that indicated a willingness not to get involved in the Indochina war - the most clearcut example being Malaysia - Chou sanctioned a "classical rightist" strategy of giving priority to state-to-state relations over the support to insurgency by China. The vital interests for which Chou sought accommodation included recognition of her internal legitimacy and her world role.

Chou's strategy called for China to drop her open identification with and encouragement of Communist Parties in those

⁵NCNA, May 19, 1971.

countries that met these minimum terms and to relegate her support for these fraternal friends to clandestine level. The new style also required a cessation of attention to exile organizations in Peking from those Southeast Asian countries that showed promise. The Malayan National Liberation League office in Peking and its head, P.V. Sarma, for example, disappeared from view. Eventually, relations with those exile groups that continued to operate in the open were put more on a strictly party basis. For example, beginning in 1971, a separate reception on the eve of the National Day was given by the CCP's Central Committee, which the resident Communist exiles attended. Likewise, the NCNA stopped publishing National Day greetings from the Communist Parties.

The "Chou En-lai doctrine" also called for a return to the post-Cultural Revolution posture towards Overseas Chinese. Peking would not claim dual nationality for Overseas Chinese, nor would it interfere in attempts by the Southeast Asian Governments to force the pace of cultural integration in their countries; on the contrary, the Chinese leaders would again publicly urge the Overseas communities to accept integration. In other words, while still looking upon the Overseas Chinese as an economic asset, Peking would not undertake to protect their parochial interests so long as the host governments prevented civil violence against them.

(3) Struggle for Power and Alignments within the Top Leadership

As a result of the Cultural Revolution the ruling power

structure emerged to be a coalition of radicals, moderates and military cliques bound together by shared interests. Strong groups and factions opposed to the radicals and Lin Piao made up an important element in this coalition. Mao and his coterie held the balance. Many powerful regional military commanders, like Hsu Hsih-yu in Nanking and Chen Hsi-lien in Shenyang who were not part of Lin Piao's clique, constituted forces at play. Chou En-lai, through his political acumen, his personal prestige, his numerous friendships, and his demonstrated loyalty to Mao, also retained considerable power at the centre. After 1967 Chou began slowly to recover his authority in foreign affairs.

The most radical aspects of the Cultural Revolution began to be reversed. Chou En-lai's administrators and planners, together with the security-minded regional military leaders, formed or gradually evolved into a new coalition in opposition to the Cultural Revolution group of radical ideologists. Those who had responsibility for the achievement of concrete objectives - national defense, economic development, and foreign relations - began to recover power from those whose interests lay in intellectual, ideological, and cultural affairs. Lin Piao at this time probably took an ambivalent position, lending some support to his erstwhile radical allies but also perhaps adjusting to the new situation. In any event, he must have been defensive about rejection of some of the radical policies in foreign as well as domestic affairs with which he had been identified.

The 12th Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the CCP

held in October 1968 marked a watershed in the evolution of foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution. Although the radicals continued to influence foreign policy, a more supple and subtle style to deal with both the United States and the Soviet Union began to emerge.

In foreign affairs, the main difference between the 11th and 12th Plenum was that in 1966, it was stipulated that those with whom a common cause could be made against "Soviet revisionist" were limited to "revolutionary Maoist-Leninists," that is pro-Peking Communists while in 1968 the policy was widened to include other revolutionary movements.*

Two major revisions were made in policy, during and following the 12th Plenum, that pointed towards a major effort to maximize diplomatic support for China which was essentially related to Peking's fear of the growing threat from the Soviet Union as could be seen in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. For the first time in October 1968, China took notice of the Paris Peace Talks, and in early November it reprinted statements given by both sides at the talks. Following that, a November 26 Foreign Ministry statement⁶ on the Warsaw talks between Peking and Washington renewed the pre-Cultural Revolution position that the United States and China should conclude an agreement on peaceful

⁶J. Taylor, op.cit., p. 63

*Ibid.

coexistence.* This position is in contrast to a People's Daily article in 1967⁷ which attacked Liu Shao-chi for alleging that Sino-American relations could improve once the Taiwan Question was resolved, a line that had been criticised as ignoring China's international proletarian responsibilities. Simultaneously with the issue of the November 1968 statement on the Warsaw Talks, Peking tried to rationalize its reversal by republishing a March 1949 statement⁸ by Mao which have him referring to the permissibility of negotiating with the "enemy".

The revolutionary line of hostility to "U.S. imperialism", however, still remained alive as the core of China's foreign policy. The December 31, 1968 joint New Year editorial⁹ omitted the broad united front policy and simply referred to the great struggle by "genuine Marxist-Leninists" and revolutionary people. In January 1969, there were vitriolic attacks¹⁰ on the new American President, and the Warsaw Talks scheduled for February were cancelled on the pretext of a defection of a Chinese official in the Netherlands.¹¹ At this time, Lin Piao and the radicals might have seen Chou's attempts to redirect China's international line as aimed in part at them to discredit them. It may be presumed that at this point Mao had not

⁷Ibid., p. 63

⁸Ibid., p. 64

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

* Refer to Appendix 5.

yet been fully won over to Chou's new line but had adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Moscow, however, was to decide for him.

During 1969, China's attention had been focused on the Soviet Union and the threat she was posing from the north. Being faced with the most serious threat since the Korean War, the mainstream group in Peking came to the fore and focussed on military preparedness and internal unity. It also began to win Mao's approval of a foreign policy line that would maximize international support for China as well as concentrate on diverting and weakening the Soviet Union.

In Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Party Congress of the CCP held in April,¹² he expressed the advancement of the united front line by emphasizing the goal of forming "the broadest possible united front" opposed to both the United States and the Soviet Union. He included in this front all the countries as well as all the people who had a common interest in resisting the dominance of "imperialism" and "social-imperialism". Lin, nonetheless made clear that the main target was still the United States. The revolutionary line was also continued in Lin's separate pledges of support to the "revolutionary people of all countries," mentioning, among others, Burma, "Malaya", Indonesia and India. The continuing influence of the Cultural Revolution group was

¹²Ibid.

also denoted by the election at the Party Congress of Chen Po-ta and Kang Shang to the five-man Politburo in the Standing Committee. The Ninth Congress was the pinnacle of Lin's career.

The trend to a pragmatic and expedient line in dealing with the Soviet threat resulted in China's efforts to defuse the border situation and eventually in its acceptance of negotiations with the Kremlin in September 1969.

A government statement¹³ issued at Peking on October 7, 1969 declared that normal state relations should be maintained between China and the Soviet Union on the basis of peaceful co-existence despite "irreconcilable difference of principles". Subsequently, Peking's anti-Soviet polemics were reduced, but at the same time Peking began to develop her diplomatic, as distinct from her former ideological, offensive within the communist camp. A main objective of this diplomatic campaign was to improve relations with North Korea and North Vietnam. Advances were to be made in both areas in 1970, but the Chinese could not reconstruct the informal alliance that they had begun to develop with these Communist states in 1964 against "Soviet revisionism".

Concurrent with her perception of increasing danger from

¹³Ibid.

the Soviet Union, China also began to calculate that the American "threat" was diminishing and that American policy towards China was in fact beginning to change.

As a result, the Chinese assessment of American intentions began to change. The Washington failure to retaliate for the North Korean destruction of an American reconnaissance plane over international waters on April 14, 1969, also probably indicated to Peking that the new administration could not be easily provoked. Even more important was the avoidance of the United States to try directly to exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1969.

The threat that American involvement in Vietnam might lead to conflict with China seemed to be finally expunged when Nixon failed to retaliate against the DRV-Viet Cong offensive of February 1969 and instead proposed total withdrawal of all American forces and at the same time, made his first move towards accommodation with Peking. The danger of an American attack on China had seemed serious to her leaders at the time of the general offensive mounted by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in 1968, but by mid-1969 it probably appeared all but certain to the professional Chou En-lai group that the Republican administration in Washington also had no intention of escalating the war but like the previous administration had concluded that the primary goal "should be to level off our involvement and to work toward gradual disengagement."¹⁴

¹⁴Clark Clifford, "A Vietnam Reappraisal," Foreign Affairs, July 1969.

But next to the war scare with the Soviets, the most potent ingredient in the 1969 mixture of developments of China's foreign policy was the first secret approach by Nixon "to communicate our new attitude ... and to seek contact with the People's Republic of China."¹⁵ According to Nixon, his first secret contact with China was made within two weeks of his inauguration, and "the two sides began clarifying their general intentions."

(B) External Environment

(1) Confrontation with Moscow

Since the late 1960s it has been Soviet Union, rather than the United States, which became the primary target of Chinese hostility. The Sino-Soviet conflict has been particularly acute in Asia, where China has felt most directly threatened by the perceived Soviet attempt at encirclement, and where it has been most anxious to prevent the establishment of a Moscow-inspired system of collective security. It is largely in order to offset the Soviet, and to a lesser extent the American, initiatives inimical to her interests that China favoured the creation of a multipolar system and encouraged the rise of new focal points of international diplomacy. Here lies the significance of Japan and Western Europe in China's strategy for a revised world order. Apart from restoring her diplomatic links with all the major capitals of Western Europe, China has become a staunch advocate of European integration and repeatedly warned of the dangers of Russian expansionism. A similar approach has marked China's

¹⁵"Foreign Policy Report to Congress," Documentation, February 9, 1972, USIS Hong Kong, February 10, 1972.

relations with Japan, resulting in the rapid development of diplomatic and economic ties.

Over the last two decades China's relations with Southeast Asia have been closely intertwined with her policies towards the two super-powers. The Chinese support for the various Communist Parties and liberation movements in the region has had as one of its principal objectives the partial, if not complete, withdrawal of the American military presence.* With the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamization policy, and the consequent removal of American ground forces from the Indochina conflict, it can be argued that this objective has been at least partly fulfilled. However, a new critical problem arose with the growing Sino-Soviet rift, which gained momentum since the origin in the middle or late 1950's, thus making Southeast Asia a key element in the Chinese determination to thwart Soviet designs. The Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of August 1971, the groping efforts towards détente with the United States, the Soviet's attempts to develop diplomatic and economic cooperation with Japan, her proposal for an Asian Collective Security System, her obvious pressures on North Vietnam, and her increasing overtures to several Southeast Asian countries have convinced China both of the hostility of Soviet intentions and of the need to foil them in the Southeast Asian theatre where presumably China should be able to exercise most leverage.

Apart from extending her bilateral contacts with individual Southeast Asian countries, China has endeavoured to

* See People's Daily editorial, "A Programme for Anti-Imperialist Struggle," Peking Review, May 21, 1971; "Strive for New Victories," Peking Review, October 6, 1972; also refer to Appendix 6.

gain a diplomatic advantage over Russia by exposing the latter's so-called "superpower" interests and ambitions. To this end, the Chinese responded sympathetically to the "neutrality" concept, and responded favourably to the Malaysian neutralization proposal with the Soviet Asian Collective Security scheme, first enunciated in 1969 and subsequently rejected by both Malaysia and Indonesia. Particularly encouraging for China was the refusal of Southeast Asian countries to promote Soviet at the expense of Chinese interests, as was clearly indicated by M. Ghazali bin Shafie, a senior Malaysian Minister:

"It would seem that any Soviet initiative that is designed or even only such as to appear to further the Soviet cause in the Sino-Soviet dispute is not likely to gain the support of countries in the region. This factor is unfortunate because the Soviet Union has much to contribute to the development of the region."¹⁶

In pursuit of this same strategy China on more than one occasion denounced Soviet naval ambitions in East Asia, and portrayed the Soviet call for the "internationalization" of the Malacca Straits as "a violation of other countries' sovereignty over their territorial waters", and a part of a grand design to establish hegemony in the vast waters between Vladivostok and the Indian Ocean.¹⁷ China, for her part, has consistently defended the right of small and medium powers to extend their

¹⁶ Malaysian Digest (Kuala Lumpur), October 31, 1973, p. 10.

¹⁷ Article by Hsian Tung, People's Daily, March 19, 1974.

sovereignty beyond the twelve-mile territorial limit, thereby standing against the position held at that time by all great powers, including the Soviet Union.¹⁸ It is largely in return for China's recognition of the Malacca Straits as an internal Indonesian and Malaysian waterway that Indonesia has recently supported the Chinese claim to the Paracel Islands.

China's presence in the South China Sea has far-reaching strategic significance, especially in the light of the gradual U.S. military withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union's naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. With the opening of the Suez Canal, the Soviet Union will be able to link her Mediterranean and Indian Ocean fleets far more effectively and thereby increase the pressure that it can bring to bear in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asian region. Such an expansion in Soviet naval strength could threaten China's fishing, shipping and trading interests. On the other hand, China's control of these islands would enable her to frustrate the Soviet encirclement policy, provide her with valuable observation points and weaken Soviet leverage over Southeast Asian countries.¹⁹

¹⁸ See "China's Stand on Question of Rights Over Seas and Oceans," Peking Review, March 10, 1972.

¹⁹ Anticipating the development of Chinese naval strength in the coming years, C.P. Fitzgerald has foreseen a "situation in the South China Sea which will resemble that coming into being with the development of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean: an institution of a power long absent, or never previously present, into an area where other powers were formerly unchallenged." See C.P. Fitzgerald, China and Southeast Asia Since 1945, (Melbourne: Longman, 1973), p. 104.

(2) The Shanghai Communiqué

The Warsaw ambassadorial talks, having been postponed a year at the request of China, were scheduled to resume on February 20, 1969, a month after the inauguration of the new President, Richard M. Nixon. They were cancelled, however, by China to show her displeasure because the United States granted asylum to a Communist Chinese defector. In April, 1969, the Chinese Communist Party convened its Ninth Party Congress, and as order and normalcy slowly returned to the mainland, Peking showed a renewed interest in relations with other countries by returning its ambassadors to their diplomatic posts.

However, China's relations with the Soviet Union, strained since the 1960s, continued to deteriorate. Fighting broke out on the Ussuri River in March 1969, followed by clashes in the western region of Sinkiang in August. Disturbed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the "Brezhnev Doctrine," which justified the overthrow of Soviet-bloc governments unacceptable to Moscow, China became even more nervous about rumors circulating in Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union was consulting her allies regarding their reactions to a Soviet preemptive strike against her. These developments prompted China to assess the potential benefits that an improvement in relations with the United States might make possible.

Another encouraging sign which appeared to China was the announcement of the "Nixon Doctrine" in 1969, which reflected a

contemplated reduction of the American commitment in Asia by requesting any nation "directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."²⁰

Late in the year, China consented to the first meeting with the Nixon administration at Warsaw. A second meeting took place in February 1970, but the third, scheduled for May, was cancelled by China because of the coup in Cambodia in March overthrowing Prince Sihanouk, one of Peking's closest friends. The United States was immediately accused of complicity, and Mao personally denounced it:

"Unable to win in Vietnam and Laos, the United States aggressors treacherously engineered the reactionary coup d'etat by the Lon-Sirik Matak clique, brazenly dispatched their troops to invade Cambodia and resumed the bombing of North Vietnam."²¹

when American-supported South Vietnam troops intruded into Laos, Chou En-lai visited Hanoi and declared;

"Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are close neighbours of China and we will never allow U.S. imperialism to do whatever it pleases there. If U.S. imperialism should obdurately go down the road of expanding its war of aggression in Indochina, the Chinese people will take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices, to give all out support and assistance to the Vietnamese people's ear against U.S. aggression ... until the thorough defeat of the U.S. aggressors."²²

²⁰ U.S. Department of State, United States Foreign Policy, 1969-70 (1971), p. 36.

²¹ NCNA, May 20, 1970.

²² Peking Review, No. 11, March 12, 1971, p. 17.

The American decision to withdraw gradually from Vietnam, however, accompanied by a drastic reduction in American forces dispelled much of China's fears and made it more receptive to Nixon's overtures. In his foreign policy message to the Congress in February 1971, Nixon stated that in this decade,

"there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the PRC into a constructive relationship with the world community and particularly with the rest of Asia."

He, nevertheless, explained:

"The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own commitments ... We will continue to honor treaty commitments to the security of our Asian allies. An honorable relationship with Peking cannot be constructed at their expense."²³

Referring specifically to Taiwan, Nixon added that it should not constitute an obstacle to the movement towards normal relations between the United States and China, "and that the differences between Taipei and Peking must be resolved by peaceful means."²⁴

As early as 1969, to give substance to his desire to improve communications with the mainland, Nixon eliminated some of the old travel and trade restrictions with China. Americans

²³Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971, p. 106.

²⁴Ibid.

were permitted to travel to China on American passports for the first time since 1952, and tourists could make unlimited purchases of Chinese goods for import to the United States. Collectors, museums, and universities were allowed to import Chinese products, and American-controlled foreign subsidiaries were permitted to sell non-strategic goods, while selected American-made components and related spare parts for non-strategic foreign goods were licensed for export to that country.

In an unexpected move, China invited all the table-tennis teams competing in a world tournament in Japan, including the American, to play an exhibition game in Peking during April of 1971. At a reception to honor the players, Chou En-lai said to the American team:

"Your visit to China on invitation has opened the door to friendly contacts between the people of the two countries supported by the majority of the two peoples."²⁵

Nixon promptly reciprocated with more relaxations in travel and trade restrictions.

On July 15, 1971, Richard Nixon announced on television his planned visit to China, revealing that he had secretly sent Henry Kissinger, his assistant for national security affairs, to China between the 9th and 11th of July. Kissinger had talked with Chou En-lai, who extended to Nixon an invitation to visit

²⁵Peking Review, No. 17, April 23, 1971, pp. 4-5.

the country some time before May 1971. Nixon accepted with pleasure, but cautiously promised:

"Our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our friends. It is not directed against any other nation."²⁶

On October 25, 1971 Taiwan's delegation walked out of the United Nations after the American and Japanese-sponsored resolution to consider her expulsion an "important question" was defeated in the General Assembly.²⁷ Many members of the U.N. questioned the sincerity of American intentions, since Kissinger was in China at the time of the vote arranging for Nixon's pending visit which, as later announced, would take place on February 21, 1972.

Before his departure for China, Nixon announced another relaxation of American trade restriction on February 14, 1972. China was to be treated "on the same footing for the export of non-strategic goods as the Soviet Union and most Eastern European countries."²⁸ Finally, the Shanghai Communiqué* was issued on February 27, prior to Nixon's trip home.

²⁶ United States Information Service, London, Press Release, July 16, 1971.

²⁷ The China Quarterly, No. 49, January/March, 1972, p. 202.

²⁸ Ibid., No. 50, April/June, 1972, p. 391.

* Refer to Appendix 10.

The face-to-face meeting between the top leaders of China and U.S.A. brought to an end the American quarantine of China over the years. While China was seated in the U.N. much before Nixon's arrival in Peking, Nixon's visit gave to the Peking regime the stamp of approval and legitimacy that its leaders had sought ever since their assumption of power on the mainland. Further, the visit allayed the fears of China that the United States might possibly join the Soviet Union in impeding Chinese advancement towards the goal of becoming a full-scale nuclear power. The Shanghai Communique issued at the end of the Nixon-Mao-Chou talks did not pledge American withdrawal from Taiwan or abrogation of the United States-Taiwan Defense Treaty. It did extract the concession from the United States that Taiwan was a part of the mainland China, while obligating China not to use force to bring back Taiwan into her fold.

(3) The Paris Conference on Vietnam of 1973 and
American Defeat

In the Communique signed by President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai in Shanghai on February 27, 1972 China expressed her firm support for the struggle of the Indochinese people to attain their goal, but it did not directly condemn the United States in this regard. Both sides agreed that their relations should be conducted on the basis of peaceful coexistence and that international disputes should be conducted on the basis of peaceful coexistence and should be settled without resort to the use of threat of force. Both sides also agreed that neither should seek hegemony in the Asian

Pacific region and that each was opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish hegemony.

Thus, China and the United States formalized their mutual reassessment of intentions of other powers; each no longer saw the other as the major threat in Asia but instead as an important counter to the expansionism of others.

But after Nixon returned from his successful visit to China, Vietnamese official newspaper Nhan Dan indirectly attacked the Sino-American communiqué and Nixon's statements* in China about peace in Asia. Nhan Dan proclaimed that the United States was still seeking dominance in Asia, that she had "changed a bit," and that she was still "the most dangerous enemy, the enemy number one of all nations in the world."²⁹

China's reaction to the North Vietnamese spring offensive of 1972 and the U.S. blockade of the Haiphong reflected the changes that had been wrought by the American-Chinese rapprochement.

In contrast to China's categorical point-by-point rejection of Nixon's eight-point proposal, which was made public on January 25, 1972, the Chinese after the Shanghai Communiqué made no direct criticism of American peace plans. At the same time China gave only limited support to the People's Revolutionary Government's

²⁹Nhan Dan (Vietnam), March 3, 1972.

* Refer to Appendix 10.

(Viet Cong) seven-point proposal, referring to it as providing a basis for settlement but not, as stated before, the "only" basis. The implication was that Nixon's new proposals of May also provided a basis for a compromise agreement.

China's pressure in the summer and fall of 1972 for an early United State-Democratic Republic of Vietnam compromise was suggested by Hanoi's continued criticism of "none too agreeable" outside pressures for compromise. In addition, China indicated that there was no alternative to dealing with Nixon and that the American elections were unlikely to result in an administration willing to capitulate. Unlike Hanoi, China ignored the American election campaign as well as criticism of the President's Vietnam policy by his political opponents or even by U.S. newspapers. In the Chinese outlook, McGovern's Vietnam proposals and indeed the senator himself, hardly seemed to exist.

China reacted with patience to the breakdown of the Vietnam negotiations in October and then in December 1972. China's controlled reaction was seen in her restrained treatment of the alleged bombing of a Chinese ship in Haiphong harbor and in various official statements on Vietnam. Most striking was the calm reaction of both China and the Soviet Union to the intense American bombing of Hanoi during Christmas week.

It is uncertain what direct pressure the Chinese or the Soviets brought upon the North Vietnam. But it is clear that their attitude contributed to a sense of isolation in Hanoi and greatly

strengthened the position of those in North Vietnam who argued for a settlement. Finally, the agreement on ending the war was signed in Paris on January 23, 1973.*

The Chinese called the agreement a "great victory" ending the involvement of foreign forces and allowing the South Vietnamese people to solve their political problems free of outside interference. Like Hanoi, China referred to the struggle as entering a "new stage." But it was clear that the Chinese foresaw a protracted political stalemate in South Vietnam and that they favoured Hanoi's acquiescence in this situation for some indefinite time.*

The Communist victory in 1975 in Indochina was in a way a victory for China's policy of détente with the United States. It was the ultimate repudiation of Lin Piao's charge that China's rapprochement with the United States represented a "sell-out" of the Vietnamese revolution.* Mao and Chou could argue that Sino-American détente, by creating an environment in which the United States was more easily able to disengage from Indochina, had contributed significantly to the victory.

The end of the war posed certain problems for China. Differences with Hanoi would intensify; the Soviets would find opportunities to exploit them and Peking-Moscow rivalries in Indochina and Thailand would sharpen. China would have to deal with these problems as they arose. But perhaps the most important result for Peking was the fact that China was no longer in danger of being dragged into a war with the United States.

* Refer to Appendix 14.

* Jay Talor, op.cit., p. 184.

* Refer to Appendix 3.

Instead, the American resources, freed from the Southeast Asian entanglement, could be channeled away from China's periphery and into American-Soviet arenas, such as Europe and the Middle East. Cadre briefings inside China explained that this shift in power politics was one of the primary benefits of China's rapprochement with the United States and of peace in Vietnam.³⁰

Although Hanoi's bold strategies during the Tet Offensive in 1968, the Cambodian Incursions of 1970, and the Lamson Operation of 1971 had given Mao some bad moments, he could claim that some of his views of 1964-65 had been vindicated. As he had predicted, the "local war" of national liberation in Vietnam had been contained and nuclear war had been avoided, and at the same time China had made no concession to her "revisionist" rivals in Moscow. Mao had continued to give priority to his own internal goals and to his challenge of Soviet ideological leadership in the World Communist Movement.*

Liu Shao-chi had been purged in 1966, when the United States was threatening, because he urged reconciliation with Moscow. Lin Piao was purged in 1971 when the Soviets were threatening, because he opposed reconciliation with the United States. Mao felt he would handle the "capitalist Americans" whether they were threatening or retreating, but he was determined never to make up

³⁰Jay Taylor, op.cit.

*Refer to Appendix 12.

with the heretical Soviets until they accorded equality to China within the International Communist Movement.

The Soviet policy of re-engagement in the Vietnam conflict and her offer of united action in support of Hanoi effectively destroyed Mao's budding Communist front in Asia. By 1971, China's interest in Vietnam and Indochina no longer focused on her contest with Moscow for leadership of the International Communist Movement, but rather on the strategic goal of discouraging the expansion of Soviet and potentially Japanese power into the partial vacuum created by American retrenchment.

(4) Support for Neutralization of Southeast Asia

At a time when the United States appeared to be disengaging progressively from Southeast Asia and when, on the contrary, the Soviet Union is trying to expand her influence in the region, China's efforts are likely to be directed mainly at stopping the Soviet Union in her containment of China policy.

Excluding a rapprochement with Moscow, the attitude of Peking towards that country with respect to Southeast Asia, therefore, appears clearly defined for several years to come. As for India, in spite of that country's close relations with Moscow, China did not perceive her as a threat in the Southeast Asian area, because of India's limited capabilities there. As can be expected, the most complex and uncertain types of relationships between China and other major powers in Southeast Asia involve both the United States and Japan.

The interaction and sometime opposition of political and economic factors have made China's relations with the United States and Japan complex and uncertain. The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973 and the ensuing oil embargo had given the existing and potential oil-rich areas, eg. in the coastal waters of Indonesia, Indochina, and China, an increased importance. The question is whether that importance is temporary or long-lasting, in relation to such factors as the potential renewal of the embargo, the stabilization of oil production in the Middle East in the face of increased world demand, and the search for alternative sources of energy. Accordingly, American economic and political interests in the area may increase. Japan's economic interests are also important, long-lasting, and can only increase in Southeast Asia because the region is perceived by her as a source of raw materials and market - also leading to competition with China. China could benefit from American technical knowledge, and there has even been mention of joint U.S.-Chinese explorations for oil off the China coast, as China's own need for oil is likely to increase with her growing industrialization to the point where she will no longer be self-sufficient in oil. But economic cooperation between the two countries on a large scale is probably unrealistic, given the blatant disparities between them, especially in terms of economic level of advancement, ideologies, and past heritage. Furthermore, China would not want to become overly dependent on a superpower, the United States, for political reasons, as her past experience with the Russian was certainly a lesson. Far greater

prospects appear to be the Sino-Japanese cooperation. Economically, China needs Japan far more than Japan needs China.

In spite of recent and bitter antagonism, Japan is much closer to China geographically and emotionally, spiritually, culturally than any other major power. She could provide China with capital and expertise and find there a huge market for her own products. In Southeast Asia, Japan is at present strong economically, but weak politically. The Southeast Asians have not forgotten the Japanese occupation during World War II and are wary of Japanese economic colonialism, as shown in the anti-Japanese demonstrations that took place.³¹ It is to China's advantage to work out a compromise with Japan in Southeast Asia in terms of economic interests, keeping the superpowers out, with an Asia-for-the-Asians approach, and progressively detaching Japan from her alliance with the United States. But in so doing, she has to be careful not to make Japan feel insecure, and consequently not to drive the Japanese to fullscale remilitarization, possibly at the nuclear level. So long as that last eventuality does not exist, China can expect, by continuing to observe a moderate and peaceful stance, to become the politically dominant power in Southeast Asia.

As important as any other consideration is China's attitude towards the countries of Southeast Asia themselves, in the framework of the new balance of power. The emergence of a

³¹In Thailand, an anti-Japanese demonstration took place in 1972.

balance of power in Southeast Asia, with its flexibility and possibilities for realignments between the major powers involved, has created new possibilities of flexibility for the Southeast Asian nations themselves.³² Most Southeast Asian countries are aware that the new situation can only enhance China's influence in the region. An ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting took place in Kuala Lumpur from November 25, to 27, 1971, and a declaration of neutralization was issued. The vague declaration was considerably short of what the Malaysians had desired. Yet for the first time, the ASEAN states declared themselves in favour of creating a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" in Southeast Asia. Neutralization was declared a desirable objective, although the precise meaning of the term was not defined - nothing was said about military bases or defense pacts. It was also agreed to establish a committee to study what further steps should be taken to bring about the realization of this objective.

Peking maintained a prudent silence on the neutralization declaration. The Malaysian Trade Delegation that visited Peking in May 1971, however, reported that Chou En-lai had reacted favourably to the idea.³³ Chou, of course, had unsuccessfully pushed a similar concept in the mid-1950's, and he very likely

³²Howard Wriggins, "The Asian State System in the 1970's," in Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose, Gavin Boyd, (Ed.), Asia and the International System, (Cambridge, Mass: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), pp. 350ff.

³³Kuala Lumpur Radio, May 18, 1971.

viewed the pronouncement by the ASEAN ministers as the beginning of an evolutionary process that could lead to the neutralization of the ASEAN states on the pattern of Burma, Nepal and Ceylon.

In asserting her influence, China is going to proceed with caution, taking the government-to-government approach, using the traditional channels of official diplomacy, developing trade and aid, de-emphasizing the subversive use of the Overseas Chinese. However, Chinese support of subversive activities could always be revived should the need arise, since China's ideological objectives are not likely to disappear, and such support - or the threat of it - can also serve China's national interests. In that respect, the significance of the renewal of Communist activities in Burma and Malaysia is somewhat unclear, and might demonstrate independence on the part of local Communist insurrectionists.

CHAPTER VI

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND CHINA

(A) Political Aspects

Formal ties with China are a precondition to the Malaysian proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia based on the guarantees of the big powers. The Malaysian representatives have been holding talks with the Chinese representatives in New York on this question for a considerable period of time.

When the negotiations started in June 1973 in New York, the Malaysian team was led by Encik Zakaria Bin Haji Mohamed Ali, Permanent Representative of Malaysia at the United Nations while the Chinese team was headed by Huang Hua, a close advisor to Premier Chou En-lai. These two representatives had first met in Ottawa; both were Ambassadors to Canada in addition to being representatives at the United Nations.¹ From the beginning, Malaysia wanted talks not only on the question of diplomatic relations but also on "other issues", such as the position of Peking vis-à-vis the Malayan Communist Party and the status of the estimated 220,000 stateless Chinese in Malaysia after the establishment of relations. But up to October 1972, China would not go beyond the question of diplomatic ties. She argued that the "other issues" could be settled after relations had been established. Malaysia refused to go along with that.

The deadlock was broken when China consented to negotiations

¹The Straits Times (Singapore), May 21, 1974, New Nation (Singapore), December 27, 1973. Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore) May 21, 1974 and June 1, 1974.

being extended to the "other issues". By the end of December 1973 an agreement had been reached on the entire range of questions. From then on, the two teams began to draft the communiqué which could be issued at the end of the talks between the Malaysian Prime Minister and Chinese leaders. The communiqué was to set out the general guidelines on the relations and on the agreed positions of the two countries on the "other issues", including the status of a quarter million Chinese residents without Malaysian citizenship in Malaysia. The Chinese stated that the government of any country must be chosen by the people free from foreign interference.²

At the invitation of Mr. Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Tun Razak accompanied by representatives of political parties and government officials visited the People's Republic of China from May 28th to June 2nd, 1974.³

During his visit Tun Razak called on Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the People's Republic of China. With Premier Chou En-lai and Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien, Tun Razak had wide-ranging talks on various subject matters of bilateral, regional and international nature. The two Prime Ministers agreed that in recent years the situation in Asia had undergone deep changes favourable to the peoples of all countries. It is in conformity with the interests of the

²The Straits Times (Singapore), May 21, 1974.

³Joint Communiqué of the Government of Malaysia and the Government of the People's Republic of China. Ibid., June 1, 1974; Sin Chew Jit Poh, (Singapore) May 21, 1974.

peoples of China and Malaysia to normalise the relations between the two countries. To this end, the two Prime Ministers have decided to announce the establishment of diplomatic relations between their two countries by issuing the Joint Communiqué as given in Appendix 29.

Upon the release of the Joint Communiqué signed in the People's Republic of China by Tun Abdul Razak and Chou En-lai establishing diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China, the Government of Malaysia terminated all existing Consular relations between Malaysia and Taiwan. All offices belonging to Taiwan in Kuala Lumpur were no longer allowed to operate in Malaysia as from the date of the announcement of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China. Meanwhile, the Malaysian Consul in Taiwan had been directed to close down the Malaysian Consulate in Taipei.⁴

Since Malaysia terminated the Consular relations with Taiwan, all trade relations, investment and tourism between Malaysia and Taiwan were to be continued by private individuals based on people-to-people relations and on a local basis.⁵

⁴Statement by the Malaysian Government on the Termination of Consular Relations with Taiwan, The Straits Times (Singapore), June 1, 1974; Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), June 1, 1974 and June 4, 1974. Also refer to Appendix 34.

⁵Nanyang Siang Pau (Malaysia), June 3, 1974; The Straits Times (Singapore), June 1, 1974 and June 3, 1974; Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), May 22, 1974 and June 4, 1974.

(B) Economic and Trade Aspects

Following a Malaysian Government's statement in early April 1971 that it was prepared to consider a privately-sponsored trade delegation to mainland China, an application was promptly received from the United Chamber of Commerce.⁶ Permission was quickly granted and a nineteen-man unofficial trade mission, sponsored by Perbadnan Nasional Berhad, a National Corporation Limited (PERNAS),⁷ was led by Tengku Razaleigh and including four government officials left Hong Kong for China on May 8, 1971, less than a month after official announcement of the application. The mission's announced objective was to increase Malaysian exports to China because of the decline of Peking's rubber purchases from Malaysia in the preceding year.⁸

The first trade mission was successful. Upon his return to Kuala Lumpur on May 18, Tengku Razaleigh announced that Peking had agreed to increase its rubber purchases from Malaysia to 150,000 - 200,000 tons a year, and to explore new purchases of Malaysian timber, palm oil, and copra. In turn, Malaysia would import Chinese foodstuffs, light machinery, and farm equipment. In addition, it was agreed that all exports would be handled by vessels owned or chartered by the national shipping lines of the two countries. The two parties also

⁶The Straits Times (Singapore), April 10, 1971.

⁷A National Trading Corporation, which among other things, handles trade with Communist countries; Foreign Affairs Malaysia, Vol. 6 No. 2, June 1973, p. 13.

⁸Op. Cit., May 8, 1971.

had agreed to trade directly rather than through some third party, and an invitation was extended to the Chinese to send a similar trade mission on a return visit. Above all, however, Chou En-lai declared in a fifty-five minute interview with Tengku Razaleigh that he "welcomed in principle Malaysia's policy on the neutralization of Southeast Asia to be guaranteed by the big powers."⁹ Furthermore, Chou was said to have referred to Malaysia instead of Malaya during the entire conversation, and to have sent his greetings to the King of Malaysia and to Tun Razak. Chou also made a point of saying that the Overseas Chinese in Malaysia should live there as Malaysians.¹⁰ Earlier, Peking had notably abstained from criticizing the new constitutional announcement in Malaysia that had prohibited any public challenge of the special position of the Malays or of the language issue. The return visit of a Chinese trade mission in August was announced two months later by the Chairman of the United Chamber of Commerce.¹¹

Although Tun Razak was "encouraged" by the Chinese reception of the Malaysian trade mission and thought that Peking had begun to change her attitude toward Malaysia, certain reservations remained. First, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁹Kuala Lumpur Radio: several reports on May 19, 1971. Also on May 18..

¹⁰The Straits Times (Singapore) May 24, 1971.

¹¹Ibid, July 22, 1971.

stated immediately after the mission's return that the government would not abandon its intention to wipe out domestic insurgency, in spite of increased contacts with Peking.¹² Second, Malaysia's position on diplomatic recognition remained unchanged. Peking must first recognize the independence and territorial integrity of Malaysia. The last point was reiterated by Tun Razak in Parliament on July 21. The long government statements proved to be more eloquent and persuasive than Chou En-lai's personal greetings and approval in principle of Malaysia's neutralization scheme.

The unofficial Chinese trade delegation arrived in August, stayed for six days, and offered to buy "promptly" 40,000 tons of rubber, 5,000 tons of palm oil, and 50,000 cubic meters of logs.¹³ The Chinese delegation paid a call on Prime Minister Tun Razak and extended Chou En-lai's "best wishes".¹⁴ In turn, Malaysia promised to send technical experts to China to provide advice on the use of standard Malaysian rubber.¹⁵ Since then, Malaysia businessmen had visited the Canton Trade Fair several times. In October a forty-seven-member Malaysian mission attended the Autumn Canton Fair.

¹²This statement was made by Tan Sri Zaiton Ibrahim during an interview on Radio and Television Malaysia, May 26, 1971.

¹³Kuala Lumpur Radio, August 25, 28, 30, 1971.

¹⁴South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), August 25, 1971.

¹⁵Ibid., August, 1971.

A Malaysian trade delegation then went to the Canton Trade Fair, and an agreement was reached between the Chinese and PERNAS on methods of clearing and on settlement of trade balances.¹⁶ By the end of 1971, however, these increased contacts had failed to bring the two sides together on the issue of diplomatic recognition.

A year later, in November, Tun Sri Raja Mohar, economic advisor to the Prime Minister, went to Peking for a meeting with Premier Chou En-lai and other officials. They discussed topics relating to a greater bilateral trade, diplomatic relations such as the situation in Southeast Asia and the ultimate "normalization of relations" between the two countries.¹⁷

The National Padi and Rice Authority which was to take delivery of sixty thousand tons of rice from China by September 1973,¹⁸ had purchased more rice from that country. In October, 1973, Malaysia sent 123 traders and officials to the Canton Trade Fair. This delegation included eight officials, five from PERNAS, and one each from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the National Padi and Rice Authority, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The officials were to hold discussions with the Chinese trade representa-

¹⁶Ibid., November 2, 1971.

¹⁷New Nation (Singapore), March 16, 1973; Bombay PTI report in English, November 17, 1972.

¹⁸The Straits Times (Singapore), June 14, 1973.

tives to seek ways to further improve trade between Malaysia and China. PERNAS bought \$250,000 worth of Chinese goods at the trade fair, including light industrial products, electrical goods, sports goods and stationery.¹⁹

From January to August 1973, Malaysia had bought goods worth \$120 million from China. This was \$40 million more than the purchase of China from Malaysia for the corresponding period. In order to woo China to purchase more rubber, palm oil and timber from Malaysia, a delegation which comprised 25 men from the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce was led by Mr. Yeap Seok Moh to attend the Autumn Trade Fair in Canton.²⁰

Direct Malaysian exports to China in 1973 were nearly \$200 million, two and a half times more than the year before. Imports were \$65 million, nearly the figure of 1972.²¹

In the first quarter of 1974, Peninsula Malaysia exports to China totalled \$68 million, 75 per cent more than in the first quarter of 1973. Chinese interest in Malaysia's rubber,²² palm oil

¹⁹Ibid., October 9, 1973.

²⁰Ibid., October 13, 1973.

²¹Ibid., June 5, 1974.

²²Ibid., December 5, 1973. China replaced the U.S. as the biggest buyer of natural rubber. Her purchases in October of 1973 amounted to 8,790 tons edging the United States, the biggest importer since 1965 to second place.

and timber was increasing, and the tendency will be for China to buy more and more direct from Malaysia, shipped from Malaysian ports.²³

Malaysia needed a rice supply from other countries such as Pakistan, Thailand and China. In 1974, it signed treaties with these countries to import 155,000 tons of rice. She purchased 85,000 tons of rice from China.²⁴ It was about half of the total amount of its rice purchased.

(C) Cultural and other Aspects

From 1970, cultural, sports and other contacts between Malaysia and China began to increase. In November 1971, Malaysia's ping-pong team was invited to visit China. This team, led by Malaysia's foreign affairs officials, participated in a 45 minutes discussion with China's Vice Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei. In the discussion China appreciated the concept of neutralization which was emphasized by Malaysia, and Malaysia's support for China's seat in the United Nations.²⁵

China's attitude was shown to be friendly towards Malaysia when Malaysia's representative Mr. Michael Chen²⁶ was elected as one

²³Ibid., June 5, 1974.

²⁴Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore) February 13, 1972, Nanyang Siang Pau (Malaysia) June 1, 1974, Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore) June 22, 1974.

²⁵Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), June 1, 1974.

²⁶Ibid., June 3, 1974.

of the Vice-Presidents of the ASEAN Table Tennis Union in May 1972. In August 1972, Malaysia's ping-pong team was again led by Michael Chen in a visit to Peking. In November, Malaysia's badminton team visited China.

In response to the visits made by the Malaysian sports teams, China sent her ping-pong team to Malaysia in June 1973 and in September, her badminton team visited Malaysia.²⁷

In increasing her sporting contacts with China, Malaysia was meanwhile decreasing her sporting contacts with Taiwan. Malaysia refused to invite Taiwan's ping-pong team and football team to visit Malaysia in 1972.²⁸

Since Malaysia and China had increased their economic and sporting contacts, it is evident that the contacts between the people of these two countries had arrived at a new phase. From January to August 1972, visits made by Malaysians to China were on the increase. During this period 6,538 Malaysian Chinese visited China. For the period from January to July 1972 there were 5,434 Malaysian Chinese who visited China. Comparing with the corresponding period in 1972 and 1970, it was 1,806 Malaysian Chinese more than the number in

²⁷Nanyang Siang Pau (Malaysia), June 1, 1974.

²⁸Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore) February 13, 1972.

1971, and 2,605 Malaysian Chinese more than the number in 1970.²⁹

There were two limitations for Malaysian Chinese who wanted to visit China. Malaysian permits were only given to those Chinese who were suffering from some disease or who wished to call on their relatives.³⁰ However, it was clear that the contacts between the people of both countries were increasing.³¹

The increase of the Malaysian Chinese visiting China can be seen in the following table.

Year/Month	1970	1971	1972
January	80	31	267
February	133	192	207
March	481	685	502
April	803	883	1,113
May	601	787	1,458
June	380	576	1,018
July	351	474	869
August	454	-	1,104

Source: Sin Chew Jit Poh (Malaysia), October 18, 1972.

²⁹Ibid., October 18, 1972.

³⁰Ibid., July 2, 1974.

³¹Op. Cit. The Calculation of the number of Malaysians who visited China did not include the economic groups of sporting teams.

In other contacts, China showed her positive response to Malaysia's effort to re-establish her relations with China. For instance, when Malaysia suffered the greatest flood in her history in 1971, the Red Cross Association of China immediately donated supplies worth about M\$625,000 towards the alleviation of the flood victims' misery.³² Although the offer was made in a telegram to the Malaysian Red Cross Society, it was regarded by government authorities as an indication of a change in Peking's policy toward the country itself.³³

³²Nanyang Siang Pau (Malaysia), June 1, 1974.

³³Nanyang Siang Pau (Malaysia), June 1, 1974; AFP, Singapore, February 11, 1971.

CHAPTER VII

THE AFTERMATH OF RECOGNITION

In his official visit to China Tun Razak discussed with Mao Tse-tung, in a ninety-minute meeting, topics regarding the policy of China towards the Overseas Chinese, terrorists in Malaysia, integration of the various races and trade.

(A) The Problems of Citizenship

The problem of coming to an agreement on the status of the 220,000 stateless people of Chinese origin in Malaysia had undoubtedly been a stumbling block to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China. But incredibly, the negotiations have succeeded in devising a formula which satisfied Malaysia's opposition to, and China's tacit support of, the principle of jus sanguinis.¹

Tun Razak considered "the agreement on nationality" as the most satisfying single feature of the discussions. As he explained to Mao Tse-tung his main problem, which was the integration of the various races, Mao Tse-tung was delighted about the agreement reached over Malaysian citizens of Chinese origin. From Mao Tse-tung's point of view, he consented that the Chinese in Malaysia must owe loyalty to Malaysia. As Tun Razak stated,

"Chairman Mao said that China's policy on Overseas Chinese has always been that they must owe loyalty to the country of their adoption and that once they had adopted citizenship of that country they would automatically lose citizenship of China. They no longer

¹ New Nation (Singapore), June 3, 1974.

have any thing to do with China. They may have relatives in China, but they are citizens of another country."²

It has been Malaysia's main concern to build up the Federation into a united country. From the advocacy of non-recognition of dual nationality, it was clear that the Malaysian citizens of Chinese origin should understand that they have no more ties with China because China considers these terminated once they have become citizens of another country. There have been some doubts on this score for some time, but since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China, there could be no doubt that when a citizen of Chinese origin becomes a Malaysian citizen he automatically forgoes Chinese nationality.

The Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai, once told Tun Abdul Razak that,

"You have nothing to fear because we regard the people of Chinese origin who are your citizens as Malaysians, we regard this as a matter of your internal affairs, it is up to you entirely."³

As far as China was concerned, the citizenship problem should be the internal affairs of Malaysia. China was to issue the permanent residents and stateless Chinese with Chinese passports if they wanted to become Chinese nationals. Chinese citizenship in

²The Straits Times (Singapore), June 2, 1974.

³The Sunday Times (Singapore), June 2, 1974.

Malaysia was not automatic for those who were of Chinese origin. Any one of the 220,000 stateless people of Chinese origin who wants his rights to be protected by the Peking Government has to go to the Chinese Embassy and acquire documentary proof of his Chinese nationality.⁴

However, China was not particularly anxious to have these people.⁵ Chinese policy was that a Chinese who takes the nationality of the country of his residence automatically forfeits Chinese nationality.⁶ She urged those Chinese who chose to retain their citizenship to abide by the laws of the country of their residence and live in amity with the people there.

Why did China declare in clear terms that any ethnic Chinese who acquired a foreign nationality ceased to be a citizen of China? Peking's Overseas Chinese Policy has been very well studied by an Australian scholar, Stephen Fitzgerald.⁷ His documentary study

⁴New Nation (Singapore), June 3, 1974.

⁵The Sunday Times (Singapore), June 2, 1974. Tun Razak pointed out that: "They (China's leaders) say if these people want to become citizens of China they will accept them. The Chinese government is not particularly anxious to have them."

⁶The Straits Times (Singapore), June 13, 1974. Also refer to Appendix 29.

⁷Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972) p. 112; Nanyang Siang Pau (Malaysia) May 21, 1974; Goh Cheng-Teik, "Peking, Kuala Lumpur, and the Chinese Minority in Malaysia," Southeast Asian Spectrum, Vol. II, No. 2, 1974.

entitled: China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy, 1949-1970, shows that since the mid-1950's a definite contrast has emerged in the attitudes of Peking and Taipei towards the Southeast Asian Chinese.

Since the revolution of Sun Yat-sen was a revolution from without which had no power-base within China, he had to sought support from Overseas Chinese communities of Southeast Asia, America and elsewhere. Chiang Kai-shek followed the policy of Sun Yat-sen and searched for the support of Overseas Chinese in the Nanking and Chungking eras because he needed contributions to the economic regeneration of the motherland and later for the war effort against the Japanese. In the post civil war period, he still considered the Overseas Chinese as a most vital force in giving support to the eventual "liberation" of continental China from Marxist "tyranny".

The revolution led by Mao Tse-tung was different from that of Sun Yat-sen. His revolution was from within. He managed to establish his power-base inside China and to win the peasants to his side. He does not need the Overseas Chinese for support since China has eight hundred million inhabitants within her jurisdiction who have demonstrated their competence to make China strong.

Since the Chinese Government has not officially repudiated her principle of jus sanguinis, such a person would presumably find no difficulty in obtaining Chinese nationality when he approached the embassy. His difficulties are likely to arise after his voluntary act of acquiring Chinese citizenship.

Tun Razak has made it clear that once a man obtained Chinese nationality, he would be treated as a foreigner staying in the country and would be subject to the rules and regulations covering foreign residents. This would mean that he could even lose his right to stay in Malaysia.

Therefore, the 220,000 stateless people of Chinese origin in Malaysia have before them two choices. They can either opt to remain stateless permanent residents and hope to obtain Malaysian citizenship at a later date, or they can choose to have Chinese citizenship and face the prospect of being sent back to China.⁸

In this context, it would be interesting to see how many in fact would opt for the latter since this would indicate the strength of attachment that the stateless Chinese in Malaysia have for the Chinese mainland and the Communist system.⁹

⁸ Interview with Mr. Michael Chen, then Minister with Special Functions in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on September 20, 1976. Mr Michael Chen pointed out that the application for Malaysian citizenship has become stricter from 1969 and it was not because of the establishment of Sino-Malaysian relations. He said that until 1976 there was no one applying for Chinese citizenship. He also referred to Tun Abdul Razak and M. Ghazali bin Shafie, Minister of Internal Security, who said that those who were willing to become Malaysian citizen had enough time to apply for their citizenship.

⁹ According to a survey held by the MCA, ninety percent of the 220,000 stateless Malaysian Chinese prefer Malaysia to China as their country of allegiance. Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), July 3, 1974. The recent events in Vietnam, which may be witnessing the biggest repatriation of Overseas Chinese (hua-chiao) since the wholesale evacuation from Indonesia in the early 1960s, have focused attention on the problems of the Overseas Chinese in general. Southeast Asian Governments in particular are watching the situation closely and assessing China's response to it. Far Eastern Economic Review, (Hong Kong), June 16, 1978, pp. 17-24.

For those people of Chinese origin who have been granted Malaysian citizenship, the position was less ambiguous. But they too will be undergoing a severe test with the establishment of diplomatic ties between Malaysia and China. "There are enough people," the Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs and Information, Tan Sri M. Ghazali Shafie said, "waiting to wag an accusing finger, and, with wagging tongues will sweepingly categorize everyone of Chinese origin as disloyal and a social scourge."

The establishment of relations between Malaysia and China has given Malaysian Chinese the chance to remove the historical suspicion permanently. On them lies the tremendous responsibility of proving to the world at large, and to the other Southeast Asian nations in particular, that the Overseas Chinese who have been given citizenship of their countries of residence, have loyalty only to their countries of adoption.

However, the diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China will facilitate the acceptance of the United Malays National Organization - Malaysian Chinese Association (UMNO-MCA) formula by the Chinese minority in Malaysia and expedite the erosion of communalism in Malaysian politics. First of all, the Chinese Government believes that the Malaysian Chinese should master the Malaysian National Language Bahasa Malaysia and use it in their daily life. According to the view of Mao Tse-tung,* Chinese settlers anywhere in the world should try to learn the local language so as to communicate with the local population, understand them and live in harmony with them.

*Refer to Appendix 35.

Secondly, China accepts that the Malaysian Chinese should not only be integrated but even assimilated. Although education in Bahasa Malaysia may dilute the Chinese culture in Malaysia and detribalize the settler community, China will not regret the death of a way of life she had condemned as feudal and decadent. As a matter of fact, China recommends that the Malaysian Chinese be converted en bloc to Islam and that religion has been a snag to the assimilation of the Chinese settlers.

Thirdly, China will act as a catalyst in assisting the Malaysian Chinese to resolve once and for all the so-called "identity" question. By accepting all Malaysian Chinese as Malaysians and not Chinese, and by urging them to look inwards and integrate, China may awaken in them a new sense of pride and thrill in being Malaysian. As time passes by, even the hesitant and reluctant may appreciate that it is rational to come to terms with Malay nationalism and accept it as a part of the Malaysian way of life.

(B) The Problems of the Malayan Communist Party

In the Joint Communique signed by the Malaysian leader Tun Razak and the Chinese leader, Chou En-lai, it was explicitly shown that the two governments considered all foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion to be impermissible. They held that the social system of a country should only be chosen and decided by its own people.*

From this standpoint, China had categorically assured Malaysia that she regarded the Communist guerillas in Malaysia

*Refer to Appendix 29 & 35.

as her internal problem As Tun Razak pointed out:

"The Chinese leader have told me that it is up to the Malaysian Government to deal with the guerillas in whatever way we think best."¹⁰

From the Malaysian Government's view, the establishment of relations between Malaysia and China does not influence Malaysia's hostile attitude towards the Malayan Communist Party.

The Malaysian Government was equally and genuinely serious that it would continue to deny those jungle terrorists the position of influence or dignity. She would certainly not tolerate those elements who "through bluff, bluster and blackmail are trying to frustrate the desires of the people for development, progress and democracy."¹¹ But she was prepared to give the guerrillas the basic rights if they choose to return to society and begin a new life. Otherwise, they would be destroyed.¹²

However, in the view of Malaysian Government, the establishment of diplomatic relations meant that Peking recognised the Federation of Malaysia and this would seriously damage the MCP's armed struggle.¹³

¹⁰The Straits Times (Singapore), June 4, 1974.

¹¹Ibid., June 11, 1974.

¹²Ibid., June 4, 1974.

¹³Ibid., June 11, 1974.

But the Communist guerilla in Malaysia was still very much alive and kicking.* Now Malaysia was facing about 1,500 hard-core guerillas in her northern states and around the border with Thailand,¹⁴ and another 1,000 Communist insurgents in the east Malaysian States of Sarawak.¹⁵ The continuing struggle against the Communist guerillas had marked success in Sarawak,¹⁶ but in peninsular Malaysia, the violent activities committed by the Malayan Communist Party occurred very often. On May 23, 1974 about a hundred terrorists took part in planting explosives which blew up earth-moving equipment valued at at least M\$10 million on the East-West Highway, near Grik.¹⁷ The other incidents which may be linked with the terrorists were the shooting of the Inspector General of Police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman, approximately two weeks later, and the shooting of the Inspector General of Police of Perak, Datuk Ku, on November 14, 1975.¹⁸ The authorities have not

¹⁴The Mirror (Singapore), July 30, 1973.

¹⁵Ibid., Milne R.S. "Malaysia and Singapore in 1974," Asian Survey, February 1975, Vol. XV, No. 2, pp. 166-173. In Sarawak, early in March 1974, it was announced that the communist leader, Bong Kee Chok, had written to Datuk Rahman Yaakub the previous October, indicating his desire to abandon the struggle. After several meetings had taken place, Bong and 481 followers laid down their arms, amounting to about three-quarters of the total communist force estimated to be operating in Sarawak. On June, 15, 1974 it was announced that a further 91 had surrendered.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Ibid.

* Refer to Appendix 36, 37 & 38.

found any evidence of material aid to the guerillas from China. In fact, the aged and poor quality of equipment captured speaks clearly against it. But the clandestine 'Voice of the Malayan Revolution' was still supporting the Malayan Communist Party.¹⁹

It is easy to understand why China still supports the Communist Party if we look at the famous Chinese "People's Diplomacy". In China's view, although she continued her support for the guerillas of the Communist Party in any Southeast Asian country, Peking leaders and the leaders of these Communist Parties enjoyed fraternal relations on a party-to-party basis which had nothing to do with the state-to-state relations between the governments of the two countries.²⁰ In the Malaysian case, China would still persist on verbal support to the Malayan Communist Party and this would lead us to ask whether this would influence the relations between Malaysia and China. It can be stated that as long as China does not give any material support to the Malayan Communist Party, the relations between both countries

¹⁹The Mirror (Singapore), July 30, 1973; Sin Tao Jit Pau (Toronto), November 10, 1975. Propaganda is beamed to all of Southeast Asia from Radio Peking which transmits from Yunan province on the Southern border of the People's Republic of China. In addition to these messages, a station which refers to itself as 'Voice of the Malayan Revolution' broadcasts to Malaysia and Singapore. This station comes on the air four times a day and includes in its programming 'Commentaries on the Situation' in either Malaysia or Singapore; revolutionary songs, etc. See "Observers Foreign News Service," Bangkok World, August 19, 1971, p. 2.

²⁰The Mirror (Singapore), July 30, 1973.

will not turn sour in the future.

(C) Economic and Other Contacts

The balance of trade between Malaysia and China was still in favour of the latter. In order to persuade China to buy more rubber and other raw materials, an official mission led by Malaysian Minister of Rural Development, Mr. Jafa, visited China on October 10, 1975.²¹ The visit of this official delegation was not only to persuade China to buy more goods from Malaysia, but also to investigate the development of Chinese fruit and vegetable industries. Mr. Jafa stated that if was necessary, he would like to send a Malaysian official mission to China to learn about Chinese agricultural methods.²²

²¹ Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore) November 6, 1975; Sin Tao Jit Pau (Toronto), October 25, 1975; Interviewed on September 20, 1976, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Mr Michael Chen pointed out that after the establishment of relations between Malaysia and China, except the verbal support in the form of the 40th anniversary congratulatory message sent to the Malayan Communist Party, Peking had kept to the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs" in Malaysia. He had also commented that China's diplomatic officers in Malaysia were very careful and precise in dealing with every case that arose. Therefore, there was no need to worry about the danger of subversive activities, verbal support or a revival of Chinese chauvinism accompanied by communal tension provoked by China's diplomatic officers in Malaysia.

²² Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), October 10, 1975; Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), October 10, 1975.

Through Perbadanan Nasional Berhad, a National Corporation Limited (PERNAS), economic contact between Malaysia and China was on an increase.²³ On October 13, 1975 a 100-member trade delegation led by Acting General Manager of PERNAS Trading, Encik Amin Mohamed Salleh, visited China and participated in the Autumn Canton Trade Fair. This delegation, including seven officials and 12 bumiputra businessmen and other traditional Chinese traders, visited China to persuade her to buy about \$50 million worth of goods. Encik Amin said that there was no problem in the trade with China and that the PERNAS was working closely with the commercial section of the Chinese Embassy in Malaysia.²⁴ From 1975, the delegation could get visas from the Chinese Embassy in Malaysia instead of having to get them at Hongkong.²⁵

Sports contact between Malaysia and China was increasing after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China. After a Chinese football team visited Malaysia on October 22, 1975²⁶ a Malaysian football team led by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport, Mr. Ahmad Sabki Jahidinn, visited China in October 1975, in order to reciprocate the visit of

²³Nanyang Siang Pao (Singapore), October 13, 1975; The Straits Times (Singapore), October 1, 1975.

²⁴The Straits Times (Singapore), October 1, 1975.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Nanyang Siang Pao (Singapore), September 28, 1975; and November 4, 1975; Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), September 24, 1975; and October 5, 1975; also October 15, 1975; Sin Tao Jit Pau (Toronto), November 6, 1975.

the Chinese football team.²⁷

All forms of contact between Malaysia and China were on the increase so that both countries could cultivate deeper friendship and understanding among the people.

(D) Problem of Security in Southeast Asia

The outstanding expression of Malaysia's independent foreign policy was the imaginative proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia.²⁸ The proposal, though scoffed at by many of Malaysia's neighbours as idealistic and impractical, was in fact ingenious and represented a keen awareness of new possibilities in international politics. Malaysia believed that the source of instability in Southeast Asia was great power rivalry in the region; some of the Southeast Asian countries were nothing more than pawns manipulated at will by the super powers. The countries of the region should declare that Southeast Asia should be made an area of peace, free from great power interference and involvement. They should be allowed to develop politically and economically to the fullest extent in cooperation among themselves and with the international community. In other words, Southeast Asia should be declared an "area of neutrality" and this should be guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet

²⁷The Straits Times (Singapore), October 30, 1975.

²⁸Suryanarayan, V., "Malaysia's China Policy," China Report, Vol. VIII, No. 5, September-October, 1972, pp. 16-23.

Union and China. As Tun Abdul Razak declared in the U.N. General Assembly:

What is required in Southeast Asia in our view is a new international order by which the region is free and isolated from competition and interference by outside powers and in which the neutrality of the region and the independence and territorial integrity of the countries in it, are fully guaranteed."²⁸

Admittedly, the strategy cannot be implemented overnight. But it was the only way in which the countries in the region could extricate themselves from the dilemma, contrived and complicated by the involvement of the big powers. Of the three powers - the United States, the Soviet Union and China - which should guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia, China is crucial in the situation from the Malaysian point of view.

In his talks with Razak, Chou En-lai guaranteed Peking's support for Malaysia's programmes of neutralization of Southeast Asia, which was phrased as "shaking off foreign interference and control."* In addition, Chou said that "the Southeast Asian countries are an important part of the Third World and so long as the Southeast Asian peoples strengthen their unity and persist in struggle, they will certainly be able to frustrate superpower schemes and safeguard their independence and sovereignty."²⁹

²⁸ Suryanarayan, V., "Malaysia's China Policy," China Report, Vol. VIII, No. 5, September-October, 1972, pp. 16-23.

²⁹ "Chou En-lai's Speech at a Banquet Welcoming Prime Minister Razak," People's Daily, (Peking), May 29, 1974.

*Refer to Appendix 31.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY

The relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China have been taken a remarkable transformation during the past few years. This change was brought about by the transformation of the systems, both domestic and international, which necessitated a policy of adjustment in Kuala Lumpur and in Peking.

After the Cultural Revolution and the death of Lin Piao in 1971, the moderates in Peking gained control of the central political power and initiated the so-called "smiling diplomacy". The growing Sino-Soviet conflicts, the admission of China into the United Nations, and Peking's pending "detente" with the United States which was initiated by the Nixon administration in 1972 set off a chain reaction of new and dramatic developments which transformed most of the international sub-systems and forced the leaders of many countries to reassess their foreign policies and embark upon new initiatives not anticipated only a few years before. One of the most affected sub-systems was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Southeast Asia in which Malaysia took the bold initiative to become the first to establish diplomatic relations with Peking. The change of the world situation and the need for Malaysia to win China's support of her proposal of making Southeast Asia a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" necessitated Malaysia to reassess her foreign policies. Besides, Tun Abdul Razak also hoped to win the psychological-warfare with the MCP; to solve the problem of the 220,000 stateless Chinese, to increase economic relations with Peking and to acquire prestige among the ASEAN states.

Malaysia's foreign policy has undergone significant transformation in the 70's. Immediately after becoming Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak made a number of important pronouncements designed to improve Malaysia's non-aligned image in general and her relations with China in particular. China has responded favourably to some of these diplomatic moves. It would be no exaggeration to say that there is no country with which China's relations have changed so rapidly in Southeast Asia as they have with Malaysia.

The succession in 1970 of the pragmatic Tun Razak to the staunchly anti-Communist Tunku Abdul Rahman brought about a rapprochement between China and Malaysia, as Razak's policies were markedly different from those of the Rahman era of 1957-70. The latter advocated non-recognition and, if possible, non-contact with China since he believed that a rapprochement would impede Malaysia's attempts of nation-building.¹ Rahman was convinced that China's policies towards Southeast Asia in the 1960's were of an adventurous and expansionist nature. Being a pragmatist, however, Razak believed that it would be shortsighted not to seek a modus vivendi with Peking.² But he made it clear that peaceful coexistence

¹It seemed to have been one of the Tunku's practices to blame the Maoist agents for the political disturbances in Malaysia during the racial riots in 1969. See Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13, Before and After, (Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu Press Ltd., 1969).

²Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 48.

and non-interference were the prerequisites for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The reasons for the significant change of the Malaysian foreign policy towards China are manifold. The major factors are:

(A) There were about 220,000 stateless Chinese in Malaysia. Malaysia would want Peking to declare and observe a hands-off policy and not to do anything to make unstable the domestic communal pattern, so that the Chinese in Malaysia can work in harmony with the Malays and make the integration go beyond the fundamental level of "working together".

(B) The problem of the Malayan Communist Party has been a serious menace to Malaysia's national unity. The party from the very beginning was a Chinese movement. Since the party had posed a threat to Malaysia's policy of nation-building and consolidation of power, it has always been the major task of the Malaysian Government to eliminate such a threat which was relying on China's support. Razak's visit to Peking was an act of psychological war between the Malaysian Government and the Malayan Communist Party. The Malaysian Government thought that gaining its recognition from China would cut down the relationship between the Chinese Government together with the Chinese Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Party in such a way that the latter's struggle will become seriously undermined.

(C) Malaysia would want to have direct contacts with Peking so that relations with China could help to expand her markets, and

counteract Western influence and encourage assistance from the Great Powers.

(D) The anti-Communist Tunku and non-Communist Razak represent two different attitude sets. Tun Razak's visit to China was due perhaps to his desire for prestige and to have Malaysia become the leader among the ASEAN countries.

(E) The Nixon Doctrine brought an end to the doctrine of "containment", which stood for U.S. involvement anywhere in the world where the threat of Communist expansion was perceived. Responding to the new international situation, major shifts in Malaysia's foreign policy were also made.

(F) The entry of PRC into the United Nations and President Nixon's visit to Peking recognized China as a power of global importance. Facing this situation, the Malaysian leaders perceived that it would be a curious and anomalous attitude indeed for the countries in the region to continue not to have relations with China when the rest of the world was doing so.

(G) The outstanding expression of Malaysia's independent foreign policy is the proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. Of the three powers - the United States, the Soviet Union and China - which should guarantee the neutrality of Southeast Asia, from the Malaysian point of view, China is crucial in the situation.

It is relevant to summarize the reasons why China was keen to develop friendly relations with Malaysia, a country whose inevitable

doom she predicted not so long ago. The major factors were as follows:

(A) China embarked on a massive programme emphasizing decentralized agricultural and industrial development, a departure from the earlier highly centralized system. As this programme required great expense and time, the People's Republic of China urgently needed a long period of peace so that scarce resources were not diverted from the modernization effort, which effort oriented China's national objectives to a more moderate direction.

(B) The triumph of Chou En-lai over Lin Piao in 1971 facilitated the return to the diplomatic line over the revolutionary strategy.

(C) As a result of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese power struggle emerged to be a coalition of radicals, moderates, and military cliques bound together by shared interests. Important groups and factions opposed to the radicals and Lin Piao made up the key element in the coalition which enabled them to initiate a new "smiling diplomacy"; thus, the Chinese assessment of American intentions in Asia began to change.

(D) The People's Republic of China was already adapting to the post-Vietnam situation in Southeast Asia. China did not and would not hope for an indefinite continuation of the Vietnamese War or any other national liberation struggles as she had done in the mid-sixties. The Chinese leaders did not seem interested in a Southeast Asia which would be dominated by the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

Therefore, Malaysia's proposal of a truly "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" in Southeast Asia was favoured by the People's Republic of China.

(E) The underlying factors of China's changing attitude towards the non-Indochinese nations of Southeast Asia could be due to her need for national security and prestige. Geopolitical considerations practically dictated China's leaders, who suffered from an "encirclement mental outlook," to establish good and cordial relations with her neighbours to the south. The American containment policy could be said to have ended formally after the Vietnam War was over. China's objective was to curb the growing Soviet encirclement of her replacing the old U.S. "detente perimeter" and to fight for leadership in the Communist movement. Moreover, the emergence of Japan was causing her considerable concern. The Chinese leaders seemed to have realised that good relations with her southern neighbours revolve primarily round the Overseas Chinese problem. Thus, China expected her southern Asian neighbours to have good relations with her and to pose no special danger to her national security.

(F) Southeast Asia is an area geographically adjacent to China, an area with which China has had a long relationship. The highly visible American military and political presence in Indochina could not help but make China concerned because she perceived that the United States menaced her security and threatened her legitimacy. If the United States was carrying out her policies in an area distant from China, however onerous these policies might be to the Chinese, Chinese attention towards these might be lower. However, because China perceived that a hostile relationship existed between her and

the United States, and because the United States was carrying out policies in Indochina which, from the Chinese standpoint, threatened China, the Chinese paid a good deal of attention to the Indochina War and provided the Communist combatants with military assistance. China's changing attitude towards Malaysia was due to the result of the Sino-Soviet-American dialogue.

The Chinese response to Malaysia's overtures, guided by her own foreign policy aims, was gratifying to the Malaysians. The first indication of a change came when Radio Peking referred to Malaysia as "Malaysia" and not "Malaya". Peking invited Tunku Razaleigh, now Finance Minister, to visit China in May 1971, where Chou En-lai assured him that his country would uphold the Bandung principles. In October 1971 Razak thus took the initiative to reverse Malaysia's policy regarding the seating of China in the United Nations. However, he had to move cautiously, as Malaysians and other Southeast Asians still needed time to catch up with his new policy. As a result, formal contacts with China began only in June 1973 in New York, and the establishment of diplomatic relations did not take place until May 1974.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China ended an era of mutual suspicion, antagonism and fear between these two states of Asia. It has also profoundly influenced Malaysia's politics, economy and internal affairs.

In internal affairs, two major problems that were irking the Malaysian Government have been discussed and a clear understanding reached between the leaders of both countries. These problems are the

problem of the Chinese minority and the problem of the Malayan Communist Party. The clear understanding of both countries and the solution of these two problems will greatly help the Malaysian Government in solving the crucial problem of nation-building and integration.

In the short term, it is possible that the establishment of diplomatic relations may lead to over-reaction by some Malaysian Chinese, a mild "back-lash" among the Malays, especially the youth, and a partial set-back in race relations. The Malaysian and Peking governments will undoubtedly act in good faith but they may not be able to defuse immediately the time-bomb of Overseas Chinese chauvinism.

For more than twenty years, the Malaysian Chinese, except for the sick and the elderly, were denied contacts with China. However, this policy has not been completely negative because it has helped the Malaysian Chinese to look inward, to find their place within the evolving nation-state and to develop a sense of belonging to their land of adoption at a critically formative period. Now that this crucial stage in nation-building is over, this policy can afford to be relaxed but, in the meanwhile, a certain romantic yearning for the ancestral lands and an uncritical admiration for the New China have grown rapidly. Displays of excessive enthusiasm would result if such a state of mind and emotion is unduly excited.

The Malaysian Government is aware of this problem and has pursued a policy of "controlled exposure" in the past few years. The Home Ministry under the Late Tun (Dr.) Ismail bin Dato Abdul

Rahman started to lift the restrictions on selected occasions. This practice was continued by his successor Tan Sri M. Ghazali bin Shafie. Malaysian traders visited Canton regularly, especially during the trade fairs. Ping-pong and badminton players have played friendly matches at Peking, Shanghai and other Chinese cities. Doctors have toured hospitals and other medical institutions in China. In response to these visits, Chinese trade ~~missions~~, ping-pong players and badminton players have also visited Malaysia. Chinese-made films on the Afro-Asian Table-Tennis Championship in Peking, China's admission to the United Nations, the visits of Nixon and Tanaka to China and so on have been shown in Malaysian cinemas. Periodicals like China Pictorial and China Reconstructs can now be found circulating in Malaysia freely.

As a result of these limited exposures, a more sophisticated appreciation of China is gaining ground within the Malaysian Chinese community. For example, those Malaysians who went to China with great expectations have returned with mixed feelings. They were impressed by the vigour and vitality of the Chinese economy but they also noticed the not so high standard of living. Cinema-goers had noticed that the Chinese delegate at the United Nations delivered his speech in a unfamiliar tone and manner. Sports fans could easily discern the great differences between the two top Chinese badminton stars' standard of play and the rest of the team.

Whatever over-reaction there may be in the aftermath of diplomatic relations between the two countries it is safe to say that

it will not last in the long run. China has a big stake in Malaysia. She wants the rapprochement with the Malaysian Government in general and the Malays in particular to succeed so that she can prove to the Indonesians, the Filipinos and other governments which are preoccupied with the Overseas Chinese question that there are no valid reasons for fear and anxiety. In other words, China is not only looking for reconciliation with Malaysia but is aiming for a diplomatic scoop in the whole of Southeast Asia. Therefore, Peking can be expected to help Kuala Lumpur bury whatever image of Overseas Chinese chauvinism there may still be in Malaysia.

In the view of the Malaysian Government, normalization of relations has also undercut the appeal of the Malayan Communist Party for which Peking has been a source of inspiration and support. Malaysian's establishment of diplomatic relations with China would weaken the Malayan Communist Party, and definitely sap its morale. On his return from a tour of Europe on May 5, 1975, Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak was asked if there would be an upsurge of terrorist activities in Malaysia in view of the grave situation in South Vietnam and Cambodia. He replied that there was no connection. The people of Indo-China fought for national liberation from foreign influence and domination while the terrorists in Malaysia were merely bandits. He recalled that during his visit to China in 1974, Chairman Mao Tse-tung had categorically assured him that Peking regarded the terrorists in Malaysia as "entirely our internal affair which is for us to deal with as we think best." In Razak's view, he believed that Peking had assured him that there would be "no export of subversion".

Malaysian Government regarded the terrorist problem as her internal affair and was striving hard to fight against the Malayan Communist Party. Strict security measures were being enforced throughout Malaysia in the wake of increased Communist activities and the New Essential (Security Cases) Regulations were passed in October 1975, in order to eliminate the Communist and anti-national elements. The importance of continuing joint cooperation in maintaining the security of the common border between Malaysia and Indonesia was stressed.

In the economic field, Malaysia's establishment of diplomatic relations with China can be expected to open the way for more and more direct bilateral trade. There are opportunities for further development of trade, although the expansion is limited by the fact that China will mainly want to purchase raw materials from Malaysia. The increased import of China's cheap priced goods will help Malaysia to relieve the pressure of her inflation.

Politically, one of the motives of Tun Razak's China visit was to seek the support of China for Malaysia's proposal to create in Southeast Asia a "Zone of Peace, Neutrality and Stability". Now that China has pledged her support to Malaysia's proposals, security and peace in this region is drawing closer. Such a stable, peaceful and neutral environment will enable her to concentrate more on economic development.

Malaysia actually welcomes foreign capital and expertise which can help her in her economic development. Now that Malaysia has established diplomatic relations with China, it can be expected

that Malaysia will benefit from the transfer of technological knowledge and skills from China especially in the field of agriculture. Malaysia has much to gain from a peaceful, cooperative and fruitful relationship with China.

The initiative of Malaysia's in the establishment of diplomatic relations with China and the subsequent developments will influence the response of other ASEAN countries towards a re-orientation of their foreign policy towards China.

China's stand on the issue of Communist insurgency and the Overseas Chinese problem is being watched closely by Malaysia's four fellow-members in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Three of those countries - Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines - have sizeable Chinese minorities and are afflicted with Communist-led insurrection movements of varying magnitudes.

All ASEAN governments are, in fact, dedicated to neutrality and the creation of a "Zone of Peace, Non-alignment and Freedom". China's support for the Kuala Lumpur Declaration is a strong prop for ASEAN policy, assurance that communist subversion within their frontiers will die on the vine if they depend upon Peking for help.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China was appreciated by the other ASEAN countries as a development which could be of regional importance, as well as help to lay a stronger foundation for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The Philippines and Thailand, proceeding cautiously, engaged in a growing dialogue with China for more than a year, and followed

the step of Malaysia to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. Bringing up the rear will be Indonesia which only needs to lift her "suspension" of diplomatic relations. As for Singapore, in view of the particular characteristics of Singapore's society, and the image of Singapore in Southeast Asian countries, she would be the last among the ASEAN countries to establish formal relations with China.

From an extra-regional point of view, the prospects of Sino-Malaysian relations would depend on the continuation of the present quadrilateral power-balance among the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. Some unpredictable developments in the following questions could upset it and thereby affect the current relatively stable Sino-Malaysian relations. First, would there be an increase or decrease in the Sino-Soviet rivalry and hostility in Asia? Second, would the United States continue with her present commitments in Asia or withdraw from the Southeast Asian region? Third, would Japan retain her present low military profile? From an intra-regional point of view, Malaysia and all the other ASEAN states must first and foremost put their houses in order, both domestically and regionally, as prolonged internal strife, unsuccessful economic developments and regional conflicts among the ASEAN and the Indochinese states, could easily lead to manipulation and intervention by the great powers.

In conclusion, one could summarize Sino-Malaysian relations as follows: On the one hand, China moved from hostility in the 1960's to endorsement and support in the mid-1970's. On the other

hand, most ASEAN leaders now tend to better understand China's foreign policy, yet their perception and fear of her long-term political objectives remains unchanged, as they are well aware that Peking will not discard entirely its support of the Communist insurgent movements for the sake of state-to-state relations with the ASEAN Governments. There was, in fact, no reason to believe that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur would lead Peking to abandon her dual strategy. Solidarity with Southeast Asian Communist Parties and advocacy of armed struggle might not be given the same priority or overt encouragement as in previous years, but they would undoubtedly remain one of the ingredients in Chinese foreign policy. On the other hand, it is equally evident that China's revised global strategy with her emphasis on the anti-imperialist struggle of the Third World governments rather than liberation movements, should help bridge the diplomatic gap between Peking and many of the vehemently anti-Communist governments of Southeast Asia. As long as the ASEAN states and China accept the present new situation, Sino-ASEAN relations will remain stable in the next five to ten years.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY CHOU EN-LAI BEFORE THE FULL
CONFERENCE OF AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES AT BANDUNG,
APRIL 19, 1955.

In our conference we should seek common ground among us, while keeping our differences. As to our common ground, the conference should affirm all our common desires and demands. This is our main task here. As to our differences, none of us is asked to give up his own views, because difference in view-points is an objective reality. But we should not let our differences hinder us from achieving agreement as far as our main task is concerned. On the basis of our common points, we should try to understand and appreciate the different views that we hold.

Now first of all I would like to talk about the question of different ideologies and social systems. We have to admit that among our Asian and African countries, we do have different ideologies and different social systems. But this does not prevent us from seeking common ground and being united. Many independent countries have appeared since the Second World War. One group of them are countries led by the Communist Parties; another group of them are countries led by nationalist. There are not many countries in the first group. But what some people dislike is the fact that the 600 million Chinese people have chosen a political system which is socialist in nature and led by the Chinese Communist Party and that the Chinese people are no longer under the rule of imperialism.

The countries in the second group are greater in number, such as India, Burma, Indonesia and many other countries in Asia and Africa. Out of the colonial rule both of these groups of countries have become independent and are still continuing their struggle for complete independence. Is there any reason why we cannot understand and respect each other and give support and sympathy to each other? There is every reason to make the five principles the basis for establishing friendly co-operation and good neighbourly relations among us. We Asian and African countries, with China included, are all backward economically and culturally. In as much as our Asian-African Conference does not exclude anybody, why could not we understand each other and enter into friendly co-operation?

Secondly, I would like to talk about the question as to whether there is freedom of religious belief. Freedom of religious belief is a principle recognized by all modern nations. We Communists are atheists, but we respect all those who have religious belief. We hope that those who have religious belief will also respect those without. China is a country where there is freedom of religious belief. There are in China, not only seven million Communists, but also tens of millions of Islamists and Buddhists and millions of Protestants and Catholics. Here in the Chinese Delegation, there is a pious Imam of the Islamic faith. Such a situation is no obstacle to the internal unity of China. Why should it be impossible in the community of Asian and African countries to unite those with religious belief and those without? The days of

instigating religious strife should have passed, because those who profit from instigating such strife are not those among us.

Thirdly, I would like to talk about the question of the so-called subversive activities. The struggle of the Chinese people against colonialism lasted for more than a hundred years. The national and democratic revolutionary struggles led by the Chinese Communist Party finally achieved success only after a strenuous and difficult course of thirty years. It is impossible to relate all the sufferings of the Chinese people under the rule of imperialism, feudalism and Chiang Kai-shek. At last, the Chinese people have chosen their state system and the present government. It is by the efforts of the Chinese people that the Chinese revolution has won its victory. It is certainly not imported from without. This point cannot be denied even by those who do not like the victory of the Chinese revolution. As a Chinese proverb says: "Do not do unto others what you yourself do not desire." We are against outside interference; how could we want to interfere in the internal affairs of others? Some people say: There are more than ten million overseas Chinese whose dual nationality might be taken advantage of to carry out subversive activities. But the problem of dual nationality is something left behind by old China. Up to date, Chiang Kai-shek is still using some very few overseas Chinese to carry out subversive activities against the country where the overseas Chinese are residing. The People's Government of new China, however, is ready to solve the problem of dual nationality of overseas Chinese with the governments of countries concerned. Some other people say that the autonomous region of Tai people in China

is a threat to others. There are in China more than forty million national minorities of scores of nationalities. The Tai people and the Chuang people, who are of the same stock as the Tai people, number almost ten million. Since they do exist we must grant them the right of autonomy. Just as there is an autonomous state for Shan people in Burma, every national minority in China has its autonomous region. The national minorities in China exercise their right of autonomy within China, how could that be said to be a threat to our neighbours?

On the basis of strict adherence to the five principles, we are prepared now to establish normal relations with all the Asian and African countries, with all the countries in the world, and first of all, with our neighbouring countries. The problem at present is not that we are carrying out subversive activities against the governments of other countries, but that there are people who are establishing bases around China in order to carry out subversive activities against Chinese Government. For instance, on the border between China and Burma, there are in fact remnant armed elements of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are carrying out destructive activities against both China and Burma. Because of the friendly relations between China and Burma, and because we have always respected the sovereignty of Burma, we have confidence in the Government of Burma for the solution of this problem.

The Chinese people have chosen and support their own government. There is freedom of religious belief in China. China has no intention whatsoever to subvert the governments of its neighbouring

countries. On the contrary, it is China that is suffering from the subversive activities which are openly carried out without any disguise by the United States of America. Those who do not believe in this may come to China or send someone there to see for themselves. We take cognizance of the fact that there are doubts in the mind of those who do not yet know the truth. There is a saying in China: "Better seeing once than hearing a hundred times." We welcome the delegates of all the participating countries in this Conference to visit China, at any time they like. We have no bamboo curtain, but there are people who are spreading a smokescreen between us.

The 1,600 million people of Asia and Africa wish our conference success. All the countries and peoples of the world who desire peace are looking forward to the contribution which the conference will make towards the extension of the area of peace and the establishment of collective peace. Let us, the Asian and African countries, be united and do our utmost to make the Asian-African Conference a success.

Source : Adapted from People's China (May 16, 1955), pp. 11-13.

APPENDIX 2: EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY CHOU EN-LAI BEFORE THE POLITICAL
COMMITTEE OF THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE, APRIL 23, 1955

The points on which we all agree are no longer five. They are seven. I hope we can all agree. With this basis of seven points we on our part would like to give our assurances here that we will carry them out. China is a big country and China is led by the Chinese Communist Party. So some people feel that we will not carry them out. So we give you our assurances and we hope that other delegations will do likewise.

The first point: We respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will adhere to this principle. Our relations with Burma have proved that we have respected the sovereignty of Burma. As to respect for territorial integrity, it is stated that China will not and should not have any demand for territory. We have common borders with four countries. With some of these countries we have not yet finally fixed our border line and we are ready to do so with our neighbouring countries. But before doing so, we are willing to maintain the present situation by acknowledging that those parts of our border are parts which are undetermined. We are ready to restrain our government and people from crossing even one step across our border. If such things should happen, we would like to admit our mistake.

As to the determination of common border which we are going to undertake with our neighbouring countries, we shall use only

only peaceful means and we shall not permit any other kinds of methods. In any case, we shall not change this.

The second point is abstention from aggression and threats against each other. We shall also abide by this principle. There is fear of China on the part of our neighbours, Thailand and the Philippines. Since we lack mutual understanding, it is quite natural that they have this fear. But during our contacts this times, we have made assurances to Prince Wan of Thailand and General Romulo of the Philippines that we will not make any aggression or direct threats against Thailand or the Philippines. We also told Prince Wan of Thailand that even before diplomatic relations are established between our countries, we welcome a delegation from Thailand to visit our province of Yunnan and see if we have any aggressive designs against others. We have told Prime Minister U Nu that we would very much like to pay a visit with him to that border region, but unfortunately we have no time now. We will see next time.

There is a notion that China has aggressive designs on the Philippines. We also welcome a delegation from the Philippines to visit our coastal regions, especially Fukien and Kwangtung provinces, and to see for themselves whether we are carrying out any activities for the purposes of directing threats against the Philippines.

The third point: Abstinance from interference or intervention in the internal affairs of one another. This is a question with which the Indo-China states are most concerned. During the

time of the Geneva Conference we made assurances to Cambodia and Laos. We have also told Mr Eden, the then Foreign Secretary, and Mr Molotov about our assurances. Later we also told Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu about our assurances. This time again we make our assurances to the delegations of Cambodia and Laos. We earnestly hope that these two countries will become peace-loving countries, peace-loving countries like India and Burma. We have no intention whatsoever to interfere in the internal affairs of these two neighbouring states of ours. This is our policy toward all countries. We are merely mentioning these two countries as examples.

The fourth point: Recognition of equality of races. This point needs no explanation: we have always regarded that different races are equal. New China has not practised any discrimination.

The fifth point: Recognition of the equality of all nations, large and small. We attach special importance to this question because we are a big nation. It is easy for big nations to disregard small nations and have no respect for small nations. This is the result of tradition. We are constantly examining our behaviour towards small nations. If any delegation here finds that a representative of China does not respect now any of the countries which are represented here, please bring this point out. We will be glad to accept the criticism and rectify mistakes.

The sixth point: Respect for the rights of the people of all countries to choose freely a way of life as well as political

and economic systems. We think that this is acceptable to all. The Chinese people have chosen a way of life as well as political and economic systems in new China. We will not allow any outside interference.

We on our part respect the way of life as well as the political and economic systems chosen by other people. For instance, we respect the way of life and political and economic systems chosen by the American people. We have also told the delegation of Japan that we respect the choice made by the Japanese people. When the Japanese people chose the Yoshida Government we recognized that Government as representing the Japanese people. Now the Japanese have chosen a Hatoyama Government, and we recognize that Government as representative of the Japanese people. The Chinese Prime Minister said the same thing to all the delegates when they visited China.

Point seven: The abstention from doing damage to each other. Our relations should be mutually beneficial to each other, and one side should not do damage to each (sic) other. For instance, in our trade, it must be equally and mutually beneficial to one another; neither side should ask for privileges or attach conditions. China can give the assurance that in its dealings with the countries represented here and other countries which are not represented here, when entering into peaceful co-operation with all countries, when having economic and cultural intercourse with those countries, she will not ask for privileges or special conditions. We will go on an equal basis

As to the relations between China and the United States, the Chinese people do not want to have war with the United States. We are willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means. If those of you here would like to facilitate the settlement of disputes between the United States and China by peaceful means, it would be most beneficial to the relaxation of tension in the Far East and also to the postponement and prevention of a world war.

Source: Adapted from New York Times (April 25, 1955)

APPENDIX 3: EXTRACT FROM LIN PIAO, "LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF
PEOPLE'S WAR", PEOPLE'S DAILY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1965

The history of the people's war in China and other countries provides conclusive evidence that the growth of the people's revolutionary forces from weak and small beginnings into strong and large forces is a universal law of development of class struggle, a universal law of development of people's war. A people's war inevitably meets with many difficulties, with ups and downs and setbacks in the course of its development, but no force can alter its general trend towards inevitable triumph.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung points out that we must despise the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically.

To despise the enemy strategically is an elementary requirement for a revolutionary. Without the courage to despise the enemy and without daring to win, it will be simply impossible to make revolution and wage a people's war, let alone to achieve victory.

It is also very important for revolutionaries to take full account of the enemy tactically. It is likewise impossible to win victory in a people's war without taking full account of the enemy tactically, and without examining the concrete conditions, without being prudent and giving great attention to the study of the art of struggle, and without adopting appropriate forms of struggle in the concrete practice of the revolution in each country

and with regard to each concrete problem of struggle

It must be emphasised that Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside is of outstanding and universal practical importance for the present revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed nations and peoples, and particularly for the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed nations and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys.

Many countries and peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America are now being subjected to aggression and enslavement on a serious scale by the imperialists headed by the United States and their lackeys. The basic political and economic conditions in many of these countries have many similarities to those that prevailed in old China. As in China, the peasant question is extremely important in these regions. The peasants constitute the main force of the national-democratic revolution against the imperialists and their lackeys. In committing aggression against these countries, the imperialists usually begin by seizing the big cities and the main lines of communication, but they are unable to bring the vast countryside completely under their control. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the broad areas in which the revolutionaries can manoeuvre freely. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. Precisely for this reason, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of establishing revolu-

tionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions.

Taking the entire globe, if North America and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world", then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world". Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement has for various reasons been temporarily held back in the North American and West European capitalist countries, while the people's revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas. In the final analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it as their internationalist duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America

Defeat US Imperialism and its Lackeys by People's War

Since World War II, US imperialism has stepped into the shoes of German, Japanese and Italian fascism and has been trying to build a great American empire by dominating and enslaving the whole world. It is actively fostering Japanese and West German militarism as its chief accomplices in unleashing a world war.

Like a vicious wolf, it is bullying and enslaving various peoples, plundering their wealth, encroaching upon their countries' sovereignty and interfering in their internal affairs. It is the most rabid aggressor in human history and the most ferocious common enemy of the people of the world. Every people or country in the world that wants revolution, independence and peace cannot but direct the spearhead of its struggle against US imperialism

Viet Nam is the most convincing current example of a victim of aggression defeating US imperialism by a people's war. The United States has made south Viet Nam a testing ground for the suppression of people's war. It has carried on this experiment for many years, and everybody can now see that the US aggressors are unable to find a way of coping with people's war. On the other hand, the Vietnamese people have brought the power of people's war into full play in their struggle against the US aggressors. The US aggressors are in danger of being swamped in the people's war in Viet Nam. They are deeply worried that their defeat in Viet Nam will lead to a chain reaction. They are expanding the war in an attempt to save themselves from defeat. But the more they expand the war, the greater will be the chain reaction. The more they escalate the war, the heavier will be their fall and the more disastrous their defeat. The people in other parts of the world will see still more clearly that US imperialism can be defeated and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do too.

History has proved and will go on proving that people's war is the most effective weapon against US imperialism and its

lackeys. All revolutionary people will learn to wage people's war against US imperialism and its lackeys. They will take up arms, learn to fight battles and become skilled in waging people's war, though they have not done so before. US imperialism like a mad bull dashing from place to place, will finally be burned to ashes in the blazing fires of the people's war it has provoked by its own actions.

Source: Reprinted from Peking Review, Vol. 8 No. 36 (September 3, 1965), pp. 9-30.

APPENDIX 4: FOUNDING DECLARATION OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN), AUGUST 1967

The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among the countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and co-operation:

Desiring to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional co-operation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region:

Conscious that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful co-operation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture:

Considering that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and insuring their peaceful and progressive

national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples:

Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development:

Do hereby declare:

First, the establishment of an association for regional co-operation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Second, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian nations:
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter:
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance

on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields:

4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres:
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples:
6. To promote South-East Asian studies:
7. To maintain close and beneficial co-operation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer co-operation among themselves.

Third, that, to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be established:

- A. Annual meeting of foreign ministers may be convened as required
- B. A standing committee, under the chairmanship of the foreign minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members the accredited ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between meetings of foreign ministers

- C. Ad hoc committees and permanent committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects
- D. A national secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the annual or special meetings of foreign ministers, the standing committee and such other committees as may hereafter be established

Fourth, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes;

Fifth, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and co-operation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.

Done in Bangkok on August 8, 1967

Fore Indonesia:	(Signed) Adam Malik Presidium Minister of Political Affairs, Minister for Foreign Affairs
For Malaysia:	(Signed) Tun Abdul Razak Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and Minister of National Development
For the Philippines:	(Signed) Narciso Ramos Secretary of Foreign Affairs
For Singapore:	(Signed) S. Rajaratnam

Minister for Foreign Affairs

For Thailand:

(Signed) Thanat Khoman

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Source: Press Release No. 16 of the Permanent Mission of Thailand
to the United Nations, August 8, 1967.

APPENDIX 5: THE CHINESE PROPOSAL FOR A PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES, NOVEMBER 1968

Over the past 13 years, the Chinese Government has consistently adhered to the following two principles in the Sino-US ambassadorial talks: First, the US Government undertakes to immediately withdraw all its armed forces from China's territory Taiwan Province and the Taiwan Straits area and dismantle all its military installations in Taiwan Province; second, the US Government agrees that China and the United States conclude an agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. But in the past 13 years, while refusing all along to reach an agreement with the Chinese Government on these two principles, the US Government, putting the cart before the horse, has kept on haggling over side issues. The Chinese Government has repeatedly told the US side in explicit terms that the Chinese Government will never barter away principles. If the US side continues its current practice, no result whatsoever will come of the Sino-US ambassadorial talks no matter which administration assumes office in the United States.

Source: This proposal, made by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 26 November 1968, was the last point of a statement that, overall, was sharply critical of the US Government for cancelling a Sino-American meeting of ambassadors scheduled for that day in Warsaw, Poland. It occurred soon after the election of Richard Nixon, in the early months of the Paris peace talks on Indochina, only three months after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and in the aftermath of the Chinese leadership's reassertion of political order throughout the mainland. Reprinted from Peking Review, no. 48, November 29, 1968, p. 31.

APPENDIX 6 : PARTY REPORT: ON RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN
COUNTRIES, APRIL 1969

Now we shall go on specifically to discuss China's relations with foreign countries.

The revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and the oppressed people and nations of the world always support each other. The Albanian Party of Labour and all other genuine fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations, the broad masses of the proletariat and revolutionary people throughout the world as well as many friendly countries, organizations and personages have all warmly acclaimed and supported the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of our country. On behalf of the great leader Chairman Mao and the Ninth National Congress of the Party, I hereby express our heartfelt thanks to them. We firmly pledge that we the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people are determined to fulfil our proletarian inter-nationalist duty and, together with them, carry through to the end the great struggle against imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction.

The general trend of the world today is still as Chairman Mao described it: "The enemy rots with every passing day, while for us things are getting better daily." On the one hand, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat of the world and of the people of various countries is vigorously surging forward. The armed struggles of the people of southern Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, Palestine and other countries and regions in Asia, Africa, and

Latin America are steadily growing in strength. The truth that "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is being grasped by ever broader masses of the oppressed people and nations. An unprecedentedly gigantic revolutionary mass movement has broken out in Japan, Western Europe and North America, the "heartlands" of capitalism. More and more people are awakening. The genuine fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations are growing steadily in the course of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution in their own countries. On the other hand, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionist social-imperialism are bogged down in political and economic crises, beset with difficulties both at home and abroad and find themselves in an impasse. They collude and at the same time contend with each other in a vain attempt to re-divide the world. They act in co-ordination and work hand in glove in opposing China, opposing communism and opposing the people, in suppressing the national liberation movement and in launching wars of aggression. They scheme against each other and get locked in strife for raw materials, markets, dependencies, important strategic points and spheres of influence. They are both stepping up arms expansion and war preparations, each trying to realize its own ambitions.

Lenin pointed out: Imperialism means war. "... imperialist wars are absolutely inevitable under such an economic system, as long as private property in the means of production exists." (Lenin, Collected Works, Chinese ed., Vol. 22, p. 182.) Lenin further pointed out: "Imperialist war is the eve of socialist revolution." (Lenin, Collected Works, Chinese ed., vol. 25, p. 349.) These scientific

theses of Lenin's are by no means out of date.

Chairman Mao has recently pointed out, "With regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibilities: One is that the war will give rise to revolution and the other is that revolution will prevent war." This is because there are four major contradictions in the world today: The contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social-imperialism on the other. The existence and development of these contradictions are bound to give rise to revolution. According to the historical experience of World War I and World War II, it can be said with certainty that if the imperialist, revisionist and reactionaries should impose a third world war on the people of the world, it would only greatly accelerate the development of these contradictions and help arouse the people of the world to rise in revolution and send the whole pack of imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries to their graves.

Chairman Mao teaches us: "All reactionaries are paper tigers." "Strategically we should despise all our enemies, but tactially we should take them all seriously." This great truth enunciated by Chairman Mao heightens the revolutionary militancy of the people of the whole world and guides us from victory to victory in the struggle against imperialism, revisionism and all reaction.

The nature of U.S. imperialism as a paper tiger has long since

been laid bare by the people throughout the world. U.S. imperialism, the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world, is going downhill more and more. Since he took office, Nixon has been confronted with a hopeless mess and an insoluble economic crisis, with the strong resistance of the masses of the people at home and throughout the world and with the predicament in which the imperialist countries are disintegrating and the baton of U.S. imperialism is getting less and less effective. Unable to produce any solution to these problems, Nixon, like his predecessors, cannot but continue to play the counter-revolutionary dual tactics, ostensibly assuming a "peace-loving" appearance while in fact engaging in arms expansion and war preparations on a still larger scale. The military expenditures of the United States have been increasing year by year. To date the U.S. imperialists still occupy our territory Taiwan. They have dispatched aggressor troops to many countries and have also set up hundreds upon hundreds of military bases and military installations in different parts of the world. They have made so many airplanes and guns, so many nuclear bombs and guided missiles. What is all this for? To frighten, suppress and slaughter the people and dominate the world. By doing so they make themselves the enemy of the people everywhere and find themselves besieged and battered by the broad masses of the proletariat and the people all over the world, and this will definitely lead to revolutions throughout the world on a still larger scale.

The Soviet revisionist renegade clique is a paper tiger, too. It has revealed its social-imperialist features more and more

clearly. When Khrushchov revisionism was just beginning to emerge, our great leader Chairman Mao foresaw what serious harm modern revisionism would do to the cause of world revolution. Chairman Mao led the whole Party in waging resolute struggles in the ideological, theoretical and political spheres, together with the Albanian Party of Labour headed by the great Marxist-Leninist Comrad Enver Hoxha and with the genuine Marxist-Leninists of the world, against modern revisionism with Soviet revisionism as its centre. This has enabled the people all over the world to learn gradually in struggle how to distinguish genuine Marxism-Leninism from sham Marxism-Leninism and genuine socialism from sham socialism and brought about the bankruptcy of Khrushchov revisionism. At the same time, Chairman Mao led our Party in resolutely criticizing Liu Shao-chi's revisionist line of capitulation to imperialism, revisionism and reaction and of suppression of revolutionary movements in various countries and in destroying Liu Shao-chi's counter-revolutionary revisionist clique. All this has been done in the fulfilment of our Party's proletarian internationalist duty.

Since Brezhnev came to power, with its baton becoming less and less effective and its difficulties at home and abroad growing more and more serious, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has been practising social-imperialism and social-fascism more frantically than ever. Internally, it has intensified its suppression of the Soviet people and speeded up the all-round restoration of capitalism. Externally, it has stepped up its collusion with U.S. imperialism and its suppression of the revolutionary struggles of, the people of various countries, intensified its control over and its exploitation

of various East European countries and the People's Republic of Mongolia, intensified its contention with U.S. imperialism over the Middle East and other regions and intensified its threat of aggression against China. Its dispatch of hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy Czechoslovakia and its armed provocations against China on our territory Chenpao Island are two foul performances staged recently by Soviet revisionism. In order to justify its aggression and plunder, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique trumpets the so-called theory of "limited sovereignty", the theory of "international dictatorship" and the theory of "socialist community". What does all this stuff mean? It means that your sovereignty is "limited", while his is unlimited. You won't obey him? He will exercise "international dictatorship" over you - dictatorship over the people of other countries, in order to form the "socialist community" ruled by the new tsars, that is, colonies of social-imperialism, just like the "New Order of Europe" of Hitler, the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" of Japanese militarism and the "Free World Community" of the United States. Lenin denounced the renegades of the Second International: "Socialism in words, imperialism in deeds, the growth of opportunism into imperialism." (Lenin, Collected Works, Chinese ed., Vol. 29, p. 458.) This applies perfectly to the Soviet revisionist renegade clique of today which is composed of a handful of capitalist-robbers in power. We firmly believe that the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in the Soviet Union with their glorious revolutionary tradition will surely rise and overthrow this clique consisting of a handful of renegades. As Chairman Mao points out:

The Soviet Union was the first socialist state and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was created by Lenin. Although the leadership of the Soviet Party and state has now been usurped by revisionists, I would advise comrades to remain firm in the conviction that the masses of the Soviet people and of Party members and cadres are good, that they desire revolution and that revisionist rule will not last long.

Now that the Soviet government has created the incident of armed encroachment on the Chinese territory Chenpao Island, the Sino-Soviet boundary question has caught the attention of the whole world. Like boundary questions between China and some of her other neighbouring countries, the Sino-Soviet boundary question is also one left over by history. As regards these questions, our Party and Government have consistently stood for negotiations through diplomatic channels to reach a fair and reasonable settlement. Pending a settlement, the status quo of the boundary should be maintained and conflicts avoided. Proceeding from this stand, China has satisfactorily and successively settled boundary questions with neighbouring countries such as Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, the People's Republic of Mongolia and Afghanistan. Only the boundary questions between the Soviet Union and China and between India and China remain unsettled to this day.

The Chinese Government held repeated negotiations with the Indian government on the Sino-Indian boundary question. As the reactionary Indian government had taken over the British imperialist policy of aggression, it insisted that we recognize the illegal "MacMahon line" which even the reactionary governments of different periods in old China had not recognized, and moreover, it went a step further and vainly attempted to occupy the Aksai Chin area, which has

always been under Chinese jurisdiction, thereby disrupting the Sino-Indian boundary negotiations. This is known to all.

The Sino-Soviet boundary question is the product of tsarist Russian imperialist aggression against China. In the latter half of the 19th century when power was not in the hands of the Chinese and Russian people, the tsarist government took imperialist acts of aggression to carve up China, imposed a series of unequal treaties on her, annexed vast expanses of her territory and, moreover, crossed the boundary line stipulated by the unequal treaties, in many places, and occupies still more Chinese territory. This gangster behaviour was indignantly condemned by Marx, Engels and Lenin. On September 27, 1920, the Government of Soviets led by the great Lenin solemnly proclaimed: It "declares null and void all the treaties concluded with China by the former Governments of Russia, renounces all seizure of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China and restores to China, without any compensation and for ever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie." (See Declaration of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic to the Chinese Government.) Owing to the historical conditions of the time, this proletarian policy of Lenin's was not realized.

As early as August 22 and September 21, 1960, the Chinese Government, proceeding from its consistent stand on boundary questions, twice took the initiative in proposing to the Soviet government that negotiations be held to settle the Sino-Soviet boundary question. In

1964, negotiations between the two sides started in Peking. The treaties relating to the present Sino-Soviet boundary are unequal treaties imposed on the Chinese people by the tsars, but out of the desire to safeguard the revolutionary friendship between the Chinese and Soviet people, we still maintained that these treaties be taken as the basis for the settlement of the boundary question. However, betraying Lenin's proletarian policy and clinging to its new-tsarist social-imperialist stand, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique refused to recognize these treaties as unequal and, moreover, it insisted that China recognize as belonging to the Soviet Union all the Chinese territory which they had occupied or attempted to occupy in violation of the treaties. This great-power chauvinist and social-imperialist stand of the Soviet government led to the disruption of the negotiations.

Since Brezhnev came to power, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has frenziedly stepped up its disruption of the status quo of the boundary and repeatedly provoked border incidents, shooting and killing our unarmed fishermen and peasants and encroaching upon China's sovereignty. Recently it has gone further and made successive armed intrusions into our territory Chenpao Island. Driven beyond the limits of their forbearance, our frontier guards have fought back in self-defence, dealing the aggressors well-deserved blows and triumphantly safeguarding our sacred territory. In an effort to extricate them from their predicament, Kosygin asked on March 21 to communicate with our leaders by telephone. Immediately on March 22, our Government replied with a memorandum in which it was made

clear that, "In view of the present relations between China and the Soviet Union, it is unsuitable to communicate by telephone. If the Soviet government has anything to say, it is asked to put it forward officially to the Chinese Government through diplomatic channels." On March 29, the Soviet government issued a statement still clinging to its obstinate aggressor stand, while expressing willingness to resume "consultations". Our Government is considering its reply to this.

The foreign policy of our Party and Government is consistent. It is: To develop relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation with socialist countries on the principle of proletarian internationalism; to support and assist the revolutionary struggles of all the oppressed people and nations; to strive for peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war. Our proletarian foreign policy is not based on expediency; it is a policy in which we have long persisted. This is what we did in the past and we will persist in doing the same in the future.

We have always held that the internal affairs of each country should be settled by its own people. The relations between all countries and between all parties, big or small, must be built on the principles of equality and non-interference in each other's internal

affairs. To safeguard these Marxist-Leninist principles, the Communist Party of China has waged a long struggle against the sinister great-power chauvinism of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique. This is a fact known to all. The Soviet revisionist renegade clique glibly talks of "fraternal parties" and "fraternal countries", but in fact it regards itself as the patriarchal party, and as the new tsar, who is free to invade and occupy the territory of other countries. They conduct sabotage and subversion against the Chinese Communist Party, the Albanian Party of Labour and other genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties. Moreover, when any part of any country in their so-called "socialist community" holds a slightly different view, they act ferociously and stop at nothing in suppressing, sabotaging and subverting and even sending troops to invade and occupy their so-called "fraternal countries" and kidnapping members of their so-called "fraternal parties". These fascist piratical acts have sealed their doom.

U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are always trying to "isolate" China; this is China's honour. Their rabid opposition to China cannot do us the slightest harm. On the contrary, it serves to further arouse our people's determination to maintain independence and keep initiative in our own hands, rely on our own efforts and work hard to make our country prosperous and powerful; it serves to prove to the whole world that China has drawn a clear line between herself on the one hand and U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism on the other. Today, it is not imperialism, revisionism and reaction but the proletariat and the revolutionary people of all countries

that determine the destiny of the world. The genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations of various countries, which are composed of the advanced elements of the proletariat, are a new rising force that has infinitely broad prospects. The Communist Party of China is determined to unite and fight together with them. We firmly support the Albanian people in their struggle against imperialism and revisionism; we firmly support the Vietnamese people in carrying their war of resistance against U.S. aggression and for national salvation through to the end; we firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, Palestine and other countries and regions in Asia, Africa and Latin America; we firmly support the proletariat, the students and youth and the masses of the Black people of the United States in their just struggle against the U.S. ruling clique; we firmly support the proletariat and the labouring people of the Soviet Union in their just struggle to overthrow the Soviet revisionist renegade clique; we firmly support the people of Czechoslovakia and other countries in their just struggle against Soviet revisionist social-imperialism; we firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of Japan and the West European and Oceanian countries; we firmly support the revolutionary struggles of the people of all countries; and we firmly support all the just struggles of resistance against aggression and oppression by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. All countries and people subjected to aggression, control, intervention or bullying by U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, unite and form the broadest possible united front and overthrow our common enemies!

On no account must we relax our revolutionary vigilance because of victory or ignore the danger of U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism launching a large-scale war of aggression. We must make full preparations, preparations against their launching a big war and against their launching a war at an early date, preparations against their launching a conventional war and against their launching a large-scale nuclear war. In short, we must be prepared. Chairman Mao said long ago: We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. If they insist on fighting, we will keep them company and fight to the finish. The Chinese revolution won out the battlefield. Armed with Mao Tsetung Thought, tempered in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, and with full confidence in victory, the Chinese people in their hundreds of millions, and the Chinese People's Liberation Army are determined to liberate their sacred territory Taiwan and resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and completely wipe out all aggressors who dare to come!

Our great leader Chairman Mao points out:

Working hand in glove, Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism have done so many foul and evil things that the revolutionary people the world over will not let them go unpunished. The people of all countries are rising. A new historical period of opposing U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun.

Whether the war gives rise to revolution or revolution prevents the war, U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism will not last long! Workers of all countries, unite! Proletarians and

oppressed people and nations of the world, unite! Bury U.S.
imperialism, Soviet revisionism and their lackeys!

Source: This is part of the official report which read by Vice-Chairman Lin Piao on April 1, 1969, at the party's post-revolution Ninth Congress and was adopted by the Chinese Communist Party as the program of action for the 1970s. Adapted from Peking Review, special issue, April 28, 1969, pp. 25-30. Title is the subtitle of the original report.

APPENDIX 7: THE ASEAN DECLARATION ON THE NEUTRALIZATION OF
SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOVEMBER 1971

We the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand:

Firmly believing in the merits of regional co-operation which has drawn our countries to co-operate together in the economic social and cultural fields in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations;

Desirous of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting peace in Southeast Asia;

Inspired by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, abstention from the threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of States;

Believing in the continuing validity of the "Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Co-operation" of the Bandung Conference of 1955, which, among others, enunciates the principles by which States may co-exist peacefully;

Recognizing the right of every State, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its

internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, independence and integrity;

Dedicated to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired;

Believing in the need to meet present challenges and new developments by co-operating with all peace and freedom loving nations, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

Cognizant of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the "Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tensions;

Reiterating our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967, "that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples";

Agreeing that the neutralization of Southeast Asia is a

desirable objective and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization, and

Convinced that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of Southeast Asia to ensure the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic and social well-being;

Do hereby state

1. that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers;
2. that Southeast Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of co-operation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, Foreign Affairs Malaysia Vol. 4, no. 4, December 1971, pp. 57-59.

APPENDIX 8: THE NIXON DOCTRINE, FEBRUARY 1971

It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies. On the contrary, our aim is to place America's international commitments on a sustainable, longterm basis, to encourage local and regional initiatives, to foster national independence and self-sufficiency, and by so doing to strengthen the total fabric of peace.

Address to the United Nations

General Assembly

September 18, 1969

This Administration began with the conviction that a global structure of peace requires a strong but redefined American role. In other countries there was growing strength and autonomy. In our own there was nascent isolationism in reaction to overextension. In the light of these changed conditions, we could not continue on the old path.

We need to replace the impulses of the previous era: both our instinct that we knew what was best for others and their temptation to lean on our prescriptions. We need to head off possible overreactions in the new era: a feeling on our part that we need not help others, and a conclusion on their part that they cannot count on America at all. We need to strengthen relations with allies and friends, and to evoke their commitment to their own future and to the international system.

Perception of the growing imbalance between the scope of America's role and the potential of America's partners thus prompted the Nixon Doctrine. It is the key to understanding what we have done during the past two years, why we have done it, and where we are going.

The Doctrine seeks to reflect these realities:

- * that a major American role remains indispensable.
- * that other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours.
- * that the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines.
- * that the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.

Toward New Forms of Partnership

The tangible expression of the new partnership is in greater material contributions by other countries. But we must first consider its primary purpose - to help make a peace that belongs to all.

For this venture we will look to others for a greater share in the definition of policy as well as in bearing the costs of programs. This psychological reorientation is more fundamental than the material redistribution; when countries feel responsible for the formulation of plans they are more apt to furnish the assets needed to make them work.

For America this could be the most critical aspect of the Doctrine. To continue our predominant contribution might not have been beyond our physical resources - though our own domestic problems summoned them. But it certainly would have exceeded our psychological resources. For no nation has the wisdom, and the understanding, and the energy required to act wisely on all problems, at all times, in every part of the world. And it asks too much of a people to understand - and therefore support - sweeping and seemingly permanent overseas involvement in local problems particularly when other countries seem able to make greater efforts themselves.

The intellectual adjustment is a healthy development for other nations as well as for us. It requires them to think hard about some issues that had been removed, or had never appeared, on their national agendas. It is no more in their interest than in ours to place on the United States the onus for complicated decisions - the structure of an army, the outline of a development plan, the components of an economic policy, the framework of a regional alliance.

The Nixon Doctrine, then, should not be thought of primarily as the sharing of burdens or the lightening of our load. It has a more positive meaning for other nations and for ourselves.

In effect we are encouraging countries to participate fully in the creation of plans and the designing of programs. They must define the nature of their own security and determine the path of their own progress. For only in this manner will they think of their

fate as truly their own.

This new sharing requires a new, more subtle form of leadership. Before, we often acted as if our role was primarily one of drawing up and selling American blueprints. Now, we must evoke the ideas of others and together consider programs that meet common needs. We will concentrate more on getting other countries engaged with us in the formulation of policies; they will be less involved in trying to influence American decisions and more involved in devising their own approaches.

More than ever before in the period since World War II, foreign policy must become the concern of many rather than few. There cannot be a structure of peace unless other nations help to fashion it. Indeed, in this central fact lie both its hope and its elusiveness: it cannot be built except by the willing hands - and minds - of all.

It was in this context that at Guam in the summer of 1969, and in my November 3, 1969, address to the Nation, I laid out the elements of new partnership.

"First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments." We will respect the commitments we inherited - both because of their intrinsic merit, and because of the impact of sudden shifts on regional or world stability. To desert those who have come to depend on us would cause disruption and invite aggression. It is in everyone's interest, however, including those with whom we have ties, to view undertakings as a dynamic process.

Maintaining the integrity of commitments requires relating their tangible expression, such as troop deployments or financial contributions, to changing conditions.

The concrete results vary. In South Korea fewer US troops are required, but Korean forces must receive more modern equipment. In NATO a continuing level of US forces and greater European contributions are in order. The best way of maintaining stable relationships with our allies is jointly to reach common conclusions and jointly to act on them.

In contemplating new commitments we will apply rigorous yardsticks. What precisely is our national concern? What precisely is the threat? What would be the efficacy of our involvement? We do not rule out new commitments, but we will relate them to our interests. For as I said in last year's report:

Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.

"Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security." Nuclear power

is the element of security that our friends either cannot provide or could provide only with great and disruptive efforts. Hence, we bear special obligations toward non-nuclear countries. Their concern would be magnified if we were to leave them defenseless against nuclear blackmail, or conventional aggression backed by nuclear power. Nations in a position to build their own nuclear weapons would be likely to do so. And the spread of nuclear capabilities would be inherently destabilizing, multiplying the chances that conflicts could escalate into catastrophic exchanges.

Accordingly, while we maintain our nuclear force, we have encouraged others to forego their own under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have assured those signing the NPT that they would not be subject to nuclear blackmail or nuclear aggression. The Soviet Union has done so as well.

"Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." No President can guarantee that future conflicts will never involve American personnel - but in some theaters the threshold of involvement will be raised and in some instances involvement will be much more unlikely. This principle, first applied to security matters, applies as well to economic development. Our economic assistance will continue to be substantial.

But we will expect countries receiving it to mobilize themselves and their resources; we will look to other developed nations to play their full role in furnishing help; and we will channel our aid increasingly through multilateral channels.

We will continue to provide elements of military strength and economic resources appropriate to our size and our interests. But it is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security or development around the globe is primarily America's concern. The defense and progress of other countries must be first their responsibility and second, a regional responsibility. Without the foundations of self-help and regional help, American help will not succeed. The United States can and will participate, where our interests dictate, but as weight - not the weight - in the scale.

The Process of Implementation

Policy becomes clearer only in the process of translation into programs and actions.

In this process the Nixon Doctrine seeks to reflect the need for continuity as well as the mandate for change. There are two concurrent challenges:

- * to carry out our new policy so as to maintain confidence abroad.

- * to define our new policy to the American people and to elicit their support.

This transition from bearing the principal burdens to invoking and supporting the efforts of others is difficult and delicate.

Some vestiges of the past consist of essentially sound relationships and valid practices. They should be preseved.

Others must be liquidated, but the method is crucial. Clearly, we could not have continued the inherited policy on Vietnam. Just as clearly, the way in which we set about to resolve this problem has a major impact on our credibility abroad and our cohesion at home. The same is true in other areas where our military presence remained too large, or our economic burden disproportionate, or our attitude paternalistic.

The challenge is not merely to reduce our presence, or redistribute our burden, or change our approach, but to do so in a way that does not call into question our very objectives.

Others judge us - and set their own course - by the steadiness of our performance as well as the merit of our ideas. Abrupt shifts in our policies - no matter how sound in concept - are unsettling, particularly for those who may have committed themselves to past practices at United States urging. For their own political future is involved. If we acquired a reputation for unsteadiness, we would isolate ourselves. We must avoid practicing either consistency or novelty for its own sake.

For the mood among many of our friends is ambivalent. They

seek autonomy but still presume American initiative. They at once realize the need for their new independent role, welcome it, and are apprehensive about its responsibilities. The Nixon Doctrine recognizes that we cannot abandon friends, and must not transfer burdens too swiftly. We must strike a balance between doing too much and thus preventing self-reliance, and doing too little and thus undermining self-confidence.

This balance we seek abroad is crucial. We only compound insecurity if we modify our protective or development responsibilities without giving our friends the time and the means to adjust, materially and psychologically, to a new form of American participation in the world.

Precipitate shrinking of the American role would not bring peace. It would not reduce America's stake in a turbulent world. It would not solve our problems, either abroad or at home.

The need for steadiness overseas has a domestic corollary. While striking a balance in the world it is also necessary, and in some ways even more difficult, to find the proper balance at home.

For the American people have grown somewhat weary of 25 years of international burdens. This weariness was coming in any event, but the anguish of the Vietnam war hastened it, or at least our awareness of it. Many Americans, frustrated by the conflict in Southeast Asia, have been tempted to draw the wrong conclusions. There are lessons to be learned from our Vietnam experience - about

unconventional warfare and the role of outside countries, the nature of commitments, the balance of responsibilities, the need for public understanding and support. But there is also a lesson not to be drawn: that the only antidote for undifferentiated involvement is indiscriminate retreat.

Our experience in the 1960's has underlined the fact that we should not do more abroad than domestic opinion can sustain. But we cannot let the pendulum swing in the other direction, sweeping us toward an isolationism which could be as disastrous as excessive zeal.

Thus, while lowering our overseas presence and direct military involvement, our new policy calls for a new form of leadership, not abdication of leadership. This policy must not only reflect a changed public will. It must shape a new consensus for a balanced and positive American role.

While cutting back overseas forces prudently, we must resist the automatic reduction of the American presence everywhere without regard to consequences. While trimming our defense budget where possible and adjusting defenses to modern realities, we must resist ritualistic voting against defense spending. Mere scaling down is not an end in itself. We need to determine the proper role for our forces abroad; the level of assistance for allied forces; and the shape of our respective budgets.

The Nixon Doctrine will enable us to remain committed in

ways that we can sustain. The solidity of domestic support in turn will reverberate overseas with continued confidence in American performance.

The Record of Implementation

Different national and regional circumstances dictate variations in style, speed, and substance in implementing the Nixon Doctrine. This past year the sharing of responsibilities was reflected in various ways.

In some areas the Nixon Doctrine resulted in reduced American presence:

- * In Vietnam, we progressively transferred combat burdens in an on-going war. Vietnamization produced substantial improvement in South Vietnamese forces, the withdrawal of some 260,000 Americans by May 1 of this year, and a decline in American casualties in 1970 to a level 70% below 1968.

- * In South Korea, we moved to a more supportive role in the continuing process of deterring a new war. We announced a reduction of 20,000 in the authorized American troop ceiling together with modernization of Korean forces through expanded military assistance.

- * Elsewhere in Asia we cut back our forces to reflect our declining involvement in Vietnam and the increased capabilities of our allies. Troop reductions and base consolidations by this July will lower the US presence by some 12,000 in Japan, 5,000 in Okinawa, 16,000 in Thailand and 9,000 in the Philippines.

* Worldwide we cut back the US official presence, civilian and military, for a more efficient and less conspicuous approach. A program begun in November 1969 reduced our government personnel abroad by about 86,000.

In other cases our new approach took different forms:

* In Europe we enlisted greater material and intellectual contributions from our allies. We jointly reviewed NATO strategy and agreed to a realistic defense in which the European conventional share will be relatively larger. For the ongoing SALT negotiations we stayed in close touch with our allies not only because of their interest but also for their ideas.

* In the Western Hemisphere we have shifted from paternalism to a more balanced partnership. We sought the ideas and initiatives of our neighbors and together strengthened the mechanisms for sharing responsibilities in hemispheric development and diplomacy.

* Our foreign assistance program enabled us to help countries who were helping themselves. Congressional passage of a \$1 billion supplemental appropriation at year's end was encouraging recognition that the Nixon Doctrine requires substantial American assistance.

* In our proposals for a new approach to foreign aid we emphasized multilateral institutions and collaboration. We will work more with, and ask more of, others in the development process.

In 1970 there were also examples of policies which belied oversimplified interpretations of the Nixon Doctrine as a formula for heedless withdrawal:

* The Cambodian sanctuary operations were not inconsistent with the plan for American disengagement. Rather they furthered the strategic purpose of insuring the Vietnamization and withdrawal programs.

* Maintaining the present level of US forces in Europe does not contradict the principle of self-help and burden sharing in Asia. Rather it is the best means of eliciting greater partnership in the European theater, while recognizing the reality of the security problem.

* The discreet projection of American presence in the Mediterranean during the Jordanian crisis did not increase the chances of outside intervention. Rather it served as a reminder that outside intervention carried great risks.

The Nixon Doctrine applies most directly to our dealings with allies and friends. But it animates all areas of our new foreign policy.

* In our economic posture. We look towards increased US economic and military assistance in certain areas to help our friends make full use of their resources and move on to greater self-reliance. International trade and monetary policies will demand mutual accommodations and adjustment.

* In our defense posture. We will provide the nuclear shield of the Nixon Doctrine. Our general purpose forces are more and more keyed to our partners' capabilities, to provide truly flexible response when our commitments are involved. And our security assistance program will provide indispensable support to our friends,

especially where there are reductions in US manpower.

* In our negotiating posture. When we conduct bilateral negotiations with the USSR, as in SALT, partnership involves close consultations with our allies both to protect their interests and solicit their views. In turn partnership requires our allies, in their negotiations, to pursue their course within a framework of common objectives. And there are areas of multilateral negotiations in which partnership is most immediately involved.

* In our global posture. Nonpolitical world problems call for co-operation that transcends national rivalries. Here, more comprehensively than in traditional realms, there is a need for shared approaches and shared participation.

The Necessity for Dialogue

The Nixon Doctrine, then, is a means to fulfill our world responsibilities on a sustained basis by evoking both the contributions of our friends and the support of our own people. Its very nature calls for continuing dialogue abroad and at home.

We recognize that the Doctrine, like any philosophic attitude, is not a detailed design. In this case ambiguity is increased since it is given full meaning through a process that involves other countries. When other nations ask how the Doctrine applies to them in technical detail, the question itself recalls the pattern of the previous period when America generally provided technical prescriptions. The response to the question, to be meaningful, partly depends on

them, for the Doctrine's full elaboration requires their participation. To attempt to define the new diplomacy completely by ourselves would repeat the now presumptuous instinct of the previous era and violate the very spirit of our new approach.

In coming years we will therefore be engaged in a broad and deep discussion with others concerning foreign policy and the nature of our respective roles. To define and assume new modes of partnership, to discover a new sense of participation, will pose a great intellectual challenge for our friends and ourselves.

At home the challenge is comparable.

It is always a requirement of American leadership to explain, as clearly as possible, its overall approach. We must convincingly demonstrate the relationship between our specific actions and our basic purposes. In turn, the leadership can ask the American people for some degree of trust, and for acknowledgement of the complexities of foreign policy. This does not mean a moratorium on criticism. It means listening to the rationale for specific actions and distinguishing attacks on the broad policy itself from attacks on tactical judgments.

This dialogue between the government and the people is all the more imperative in this transitional era. Gone for Americans is a foreign policy with the psychological simplicity of worrying primarily about what we want for others. In its place is a role that demands a new type of sustained effort with others.

To further this dialogue overseas and in America is the principal objective of this annual review.

To promote this dialogue is to improve the prospects that America, together with others, will play its vital part in fashioning a global structure of peace. A peace that will come when all have a share in its shaping. A peace that will last when all have a stake in its lasting.

Source: Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 25, 1971), pp. 10-21.

APPENDIX 9 : EXCERPTS ON CHINA FROM PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN
POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 1971

The People's Republic of China faces perhaps the most severe problem of all in adjusting her policies to the realities of modern Asia. With a population eight times greater than that of Japan, and possessing a much greater resource base, Mainland China nonetheless sees the free Japanese economy producing a gross national product two and a half times that of her own. The remarkable success of the Chinese people within the free economic setting of Taiwan and Singapore, and the contributions of the overseas Chinese to growth elsewhere in Asia, stands as an eloquent rebuttal to Peking's claim of unique insight and wisdom in organizing the talents of the Chinese people.

The People's Republic of China is making a claim to leadership of the less developed portions of the world. But for that claim to be credible, and for it to be pursued effectively, Communist China must expose herself to contact with the outside world. Both require the end of the insulation of Mainland China from outside realities, and therefore from change.

The twenty-two year old hostility between ourselves and the Peoples Republic of China is another unresolved problem, serious indeed in view of the fact that it determines our relationship with 750 million talented and energetic people.

It is a truism that an international order cannot be secure

if one of the major powers remains largely outside it and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the People's Republic of China into a constructive relationship with the world community, and particularly with the rest of Asia.

We recognize that China's long historical experience weighs heavily on contemporary Chinese foreign policy. China has had little experience in conducting diplomacy based on the sovereign equality of nations. For centuries China dominated its neighbors, culturally and politically. In the last 150 years it has been subjected to massive foreign interventions. Thus, China's attitude toward foreign countries retains elements of aloofness, suspicion, and hostility. Under Communism these historically shaped attitudes have been sharpened by doctrines of violence and revolution, proclaimed more often than followed as principles in foreign relations.

Another factor determining Communist Chinese conduct is the intense and dangerous conflict with the USSR. It has its roots in the historical development of the vast border areas between the two countries. It is aggravated by contemporary ideological hostility, by power rivalry and nationalist antagonisms.

A clash between these two great powers is inconsistent with the kind of stable Asian structure we seek. We, therefore, see no advantage to us in the hostility between the Soviet Union and Communist China. We do not seek any. We will do nothing to sharpen that conflict - nor to encourage it. It is absurd to believe

that could collude with one of the parties against the other. We have taken great pains to make it clear that we are not attempting to do so.

At the same time, we cannot permit either Communist China or the USSR to dictate our policies and conduct toward the other. We recognize that one effect of the Sino-Soviet conflict could be to propel both countries into poses of militancy toward the non-Communist world in order to validate their credentials as revolutionary centers. It is also possible that these two major powers, engaged in such a dangerous confrontation, might have an incentive to avoid further complications in other areas of policy. In this respect, we will have to judge China, as well as the USSR, not by its rhetoric but by its actions.

We are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking. We cannot accept its ideological precepts, or the notion that Communist China must exercise hegemony over Asia. But neither do we wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests.

The evolution of our dialogue with Peking cannot be at the expense of international order or our own commitments. Our attitude is public and clear. We will continue to honor our treaty commitments to the security of our Asian allies. An honorable relationship with Peking cannot be constructed at their expense.

Among these allies is the Republic of China. We have been associated with that government since its inception in 1911, and

with particular intimacy when we were World War II allies. These were among the considerations behind the American decision to assist the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan with its defense and economic needs.

Our present commitment to the security of the Republic of China on Taiwan stems from our 1954 treaty. The purpose of the treaty is exclusively defensive, and it controls the entire range of our military relationship with the Republic of China.

Our economic assistance to the Republic of China has had gratifying results. Beginning in 1951, the US provided \$1.5 billion in economic assistance. Its effective and imaginative use by the Government of the Republic of China and the people of Taiwan made it possible for us to terminate the program in 1965.

I am recalling the record of friendship, assistance, and alliance between the United States and the Government of the Republic of China in order to make clear both the vitality of this relationship and the nature of our defense relationship. I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China. As I have tried to make clear since the beginning of my Administration, while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the differences between Taipei and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved by peaceful means.

In that connection, I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the People's Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations. The question of its place in the United Nations is not, however, merely a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation. For a number of years attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of China of its place as a member of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. We have opposed these attempts. We will continue to oppose them.

The past four years have been a period of internal turmoil and upheaval in Mainland China. A calmer mood now seems to be developing. There could be new opportunities for the People's Republic of China to explore the path of normalization of its relations with its neighbors and with the world, including our own country.

For the United States the development of a relationship with Peking embodies precisely the challenges of this decade: to deal with, and resolve, the vestiges of the postwar period that continue to influence our relationship, and to create a balanced international structure in which all nations will have a stake. We believe that such a structure should provide full scope for the influence to which China's achievements entitle it.

We continue to believe that practical measures on our part will, over time, make evident to the leaders in Peking that we are

prepared for a serious dialogue. In the past year we took several such steps:

- * In January and February of 1970, two meetings were held between our representatives in Warsaw, thus restoring an important channel of communication. The subsequent cancelling of the scheduled May meeting was at Chinese initiative.

- * In April, we authorized the selective licensing of goods for export to the People's Republic of China.

- * In August, certain restrictions were lifted on American oil companies operating abroad, so that most foreign ships could use American-owned bunkering facilities on voyages to and from mainland Chinese ports.

- * During 1970, the passports of 270 Americans were validated for travel to the People's Republic of China. This brought to nearly 1,000 the number so validated. Regrettably, only three holders of such passports were permitted entry to China.

In the coming year, I will carefully examine what further steps we might take to create broader opportunities for contacts between the Chinese and American peoples, and how we might remove needless obstacles to the realization of these opportunities. We hope for, but will not be deterred by a lack of, reciprocity.

We should, however, be totally realistic about the prospects. The People's Republic of China continues to convey to its own people and to the world its determination to cast us in the devil's role. Our modest efforts to prove otherwise have not reduced Peking's

doctrinaire enmity toward us. So long as this is true, so long as Peking continues to be adamant for hostility, there is little we can do by ourselves to improve the relationship. What we can do, we will.

Source: Richard M. Nixon, US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 25, 1971), pp. 105-109.

APPENDIX 10: THE US-CHINA COMMUNIQUÉ AT THE CONCLUSION OF
PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO CHINA, FEBRUARY 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, US Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tsetung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-US relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution - this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the

two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea". It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

The US side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have

different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to reexamine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indo-china should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all US forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire

line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use of threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- * progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

- * both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

- * neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

- * neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third

party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".

The US side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the

ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior US representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of

the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

Source: The Chinese and US sides reached agreement on a joint communiqué on February 27, 1972 in Shanghai. This is the full text, reprinted from Peking Review No. 9, March 3, 1972, pp. 4-5.

APPENDIX 11: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF US-USSR RELATIONS,
MAY 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics,

Guided by their obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations with each
other and to place these relations on the firmest possible basis,

Aware of the need to make every effort to remove the threat
of war and to create conditions which promote the reduction of
tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security
and international cooperation,

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations and
their mutually advantageous development in such areas as economics,
science and culture will meet these objectives and contribute to
better mutual understanding and businesslike cooperation without
in any way prejudicing the interests of third countries,

Conscious that these objectives reflect the interests of
the peoples of both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

First, they will proceed from the common determination
that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their
mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences
in ideology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are

not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

Second, the USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means, discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodations and mutual benefit.

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives.

The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

Third, the USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject

to outside interference in their internal affairs.

Fourth, the USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

Fifth, the USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two Governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

Sixth, the parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Seventh, the USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the

strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

Eight, the two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

Ninth, the two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

Tenth, the USA and the USSR will seek to insure that their ties and cooperation in all the above mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

Eleventh, the USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special

rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

Twelfth, the basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

Moscow, May 29, 1972

For the United States of
America

Richard Nixon

President of the United
States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Leonid I. Brezhnev

General Secretary of the
Central Committee, C.P.S.U.

Source : The New York Times, May 30, 1972, p. 18.

APPENDIX 12: CHINESE COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1972

Twenty-three years have passed since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Over these years the Chinese people, led by the great leader Chairman Mao, have fought victoriously along the revolutionary road of socialism. The people of all nationalities of China are filled with joy as they celebrate the glorious festival today in an excellent domestic and international situation.

The world has witnessed great changes in the past year. There have been new developments in the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries. People's struggles to achieve national liberation and safeguard national independence are deepening and surging higher in Indochina and the Middle East, and throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. It has become the common demand of the people of various countries to oppose the power politics and hegemony of the superpowers. More and more countries in the first as well as the second intermediate zone are joining forces in different forms and on a varying scale to engage in struggles against one or two superpowers. The third world is playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. Even some countries under fairly tight control of Soviet revisionism or US imperialism are striving to free themselves from their dictate. Egypt's announcement of the sending away of Soviet military experts and part of the Soviet officers and men, the enlargement of the West European Common Market, the formation of the 17 nation free trade zone, and the new diplomatic moves of Japan and some other

countries — all this shows that international relations are undergoing new readjustments and changes.

During the past year, China has continued to carry out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs in an all-round way. We have further developed our relations of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation with the other socialist countries. We have firmly supported the people of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their struggle against US aggression and for national salvation, and supported the people of other Asian, African and Latin American countries in their just struggles to achieve and safeguard national independence and defend state sovereignty. We insist on peaceful coexistence with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles and strive for the relaxation of international tension. This is what we have done towards Asian, African and Latin American countries as well as towards countries in the second intermediate zone. Even if a country previously adopted a policy hostile to China, we would hold talks with it for the improvement of relations between the two countries when it indicates its readiness to change that policy. We uphold our principle and, at the same time, adopt a flexible attitude which is permissible and necessary for carrying out our principle. Our foreign policy has won ever wider sympathy and support in the world. Our friendly exchanges with other peoples have increased. We have finally regained our legitimate rights in the United Nations after being deprived of them for more than 20 years, and the Chiang Kai-shek clique has been driven out of this

world body. Twenty more countries have established or restored diplomatic relations with China in the past year. Heads of state and government, foreign ministers and government delegations from many countries have visited our country. After relations between China and the United States had been suspended for more than 20 years, US President Richard Nixon visited China last February, and the leaders of the two countries held earnest, frank and beneficial talks on Sino-US relations and world affairs. The gate to friendly contacts between the people of the two countries is now open. Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka has just visited China on invitation, and the leaders of the two countries held friendly talks and reached agreement on the important question of normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. The termination of the state of war and the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan have fulfilled a long-time desire of the Chinese and Japanese people and opened a new page in the relations between the two countries. This will exert a positive influence on the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace. As a result of the great achievements of Chairman Mao's line in foreign affairs, the policy of those who dreamt of isolating China has gone bankrupt and the still extant counter-revolutionary schemes to encircle China are falling apart.

The world today is far from peaceful. US imperialism is still waging a bloody war in Viet Nam and the rest of Indochina. It has not yet withdrawn all its aggressor troops and those of its

vassals from there, but instead has been reinforcing its naval and air forces engaged in the bombing and blockading of Viet Nam. The situation remains tense in the South Asian subcontinent, the Middle East and other areas as a result of contention between Soviet revisionism and US imperialism. Though the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have conducted negotiations and concluded certain agreements, their superficial compromise and ease-off only serve to prepare for a new fight. The Soviet Union and the United States signed in Moscow an agreement on the so-called limitation of strategic offensive arms, but before the ink was dry one stepped up the testing and manufacturing of new nuclear weapons and the other increased its military expenditures enormously. Thus they entered a new stage of nuclear arms race. While maintaining a no-war-no-peace situation in the Middle East, they have stepped up open and covert struggles to increase their control over Arab countries and suppress the Palestinian revolutionary movement. Soviet revisionism has exerted itself to play up the so-called European security question only to pinpoint Europe as the main area of its contention with US imperialism.

In the course of this contention, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique has further revealed its true colours of social-imperialism. With a growing appetite, it is reaching out its hands everywhere. It is even more deceitful than old-line imperialist countries, and therefore more dangerous. Social-imperialism is, as Lenin pointed out, "Socialism in words, imperialism in deeds, the growth of opportunism into imperialism." While obviously pursuing

a policy of military expansion, Soviet revisionist social-imperialism clamours for "peace" and "security". While obviously pushing neocolonialism in a big way in Asia, Africa and Latin America, it advertises "support to the national-liberation movement." While obviously stepping up its arms expansion and war preparations, it raises a hue and cry about "disarmament." At the current U.N. General Assembly Session, Soviet revisionism has talked glibly about so-called "permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons," just so much humbug with which it intends to avoid committing itself to the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and to maintain its nuclear monopoly. But sham is sham. It may deceive some people for some time, but not for ever. Soviet revisionism is still being condemned for its military occupation of Czechoslovakia; by instigating India to launch a war of aggression against Pakistan, it once again revealed its expansionist ambitions; its schemes to control the Arab countries have been further exposed; its subversive activities in many countries have been frustrated one after another. These ugly facts have helped people to see things much more clearly. The aggression and expansion by Soviet revisionism has not only evoked stronger and stronger opposition from the people of various countries, but also aggravated its domestic crises, thus placing it in an increasingly difficult position both at home and abroad.

Chairman Mao teaches: "With regard to the question of world war, there are but two possibilities: One is that war will give rise to revolution and the other is that revolution will

prevent the war." "The danger of a new world war exists, and the people of all countries must get prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today." The prospects of the world people's revolutionary movement are bright, while the road has twists and turns. Victory in the revolutionary struggle of the people of a country depends mainly on the people themselves gradually raising their political consciousness and sense of organization in the course of struggle and gradually combining the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution in their own country. We always support people's revolutionary struggles; we place hope on the people. The development of our relations with countries having different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the increase of our friendly exchanges with other peoples are not only conducive to the easing of international tension but are in the interests of the revolutionary struggles of the people of various countries. That is why the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence set forth by China have found their way ever deeper into the hearts of the people.

In this excellent international situation we should further implement in an all-round way Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policies in foreign affairs. We must unite with the other socialist countries and the working class throughout the world, with all oppressed people and oppressed nations and with all peace-loving countries and people who are against power politics, to firmly oppose the policy of aggression and war of imperialism

and social-imperialism, especially to expose the Soviet revisionist scheme of sham relaxation but real expansion, and strive for the easing of international tension and the maintenance of world peace. Our doing so conforms to the fundamental interests of the people of China and the world. And only by doing so can international tension be truly eased and world peace safeguarded

Source : This newspaper editorial, written to commemorate China's National Day (October 1), affords an official overview of the state of the world in the aftermath of the Nixon and Tanaka visits. Its title is "Strive for New Victories." Reprinted from Peking Review, No. 40, October 6, 1972, pp. 9-10.

APPENDIX 13: CHINESE COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1973

1. What is the Characteristic of the Present World Situation?

The Chinese Government has long held that our world is now going through a process of great turbulence, great division and great realignment. The basic contradictions in the world are all sharpening, and in particular the contradictions between imperialism and colonialism on the one hand and the oppressed nations and peoples on the other and the contradictions among the imperialist countries, especially those between the two superpowers. Although no new world war has broken out since World War II, local wars resulting from imperialist aggressions have never ceased. The great victory of the heroic Vietnamese people's war of resistance against US aggression and for national salvation has once again proved that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers. A small nation can defeat a big one and a weak nation can defeat a strong one, so long as they dare to struggle, are good at struggle and persevere in struggle. It is not the people who fear imperialism, it is imperialism which fears the people. Revolution is the main trend in the world today. Now that the war in Viet Nam has ended, can it be assumed that the world will henceforth be tranquil? Obviously not. When the Korean war was ended in 1953, some people thought that no more gun-shots would be heard in the world. Not long afterwards, however, the Suez war broke out and then the Viet Name war started. And even today, the war in Indochina has not

stopped completely, for there is still fighting in Cambodia. Tension in the Middle East has not relaxed in the least. The colonialists and racists are carrying out armed suppression against the African people, and the African people are developing armed resistance against them. The aggression, subversion, control and interference against countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America by the super-powers are continuing without end. A recent case in point is the military coup d'etat in Chile. President Salvador Allende died a martyr at his post. We express profound condolences on his heroic death. At the same time, we hold one should not forget how harmful the absurd theory of so-called "peaceful transition" is to the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American people, a theory which has been advocated by another superpower. To dismember a sovereign country by armed force and to legalize and perpetuate the division of a country have also become a tendency on the part of the big powers in their attempt to dominate the world. In the economic field, the gap is widening between the rich and developed countries and the poor and developing countries, and even among the developed countries there exist many contradictions, and hence detente among them is far from being the case. The recent Fourth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Non-Allied Countries strongly condemned racism, Zionism, colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism and strongly demanded a change in the present state of affairs in the world, demonstrating a further awakening of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples, In a word, we consider that the characteristic

of the present situation is one of great disorder throughout the world and not tranquillity. And the main trend amidst this great disorder is that countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution.

2. Why Is There No Tranquillity in the World Today?

We have always held that all countries in the world, big or small, should be equal; that all countries, irrespective of their social systems, should establish normal state relations on the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, and that international disputes should be settled peacefully on the basis of these principles without resorting to the use or threat of force. This should apply to relations between big powers, to relations between a big power and a small country, and all the more so to relations between a strong and a weak, or between a rich and a poor country. It was on these principles that China started to improve her relations with the United States and established diplomatic relations with Japan. In their joint communique issued in Shanghai, China and the United States further declared that they should not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and were opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. The same principles was reaffirmed in the Sino-Japanese statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between them. In our view, the above-mentioned principles are the

minimum criteria of equality of all countries in international relations and indicate the correct way to the relaxation of international tension.

As sovereign states, the United States and the Soviet Union are fully entitled to take measures they deem appropriate to improve and develop their bilateral relations. However, we cannot but point out that the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war signed by them goes far beyond the scope of bilateral relations. One may ask: Who has given them the right to enter into what they call "urgent consultations" in case of a dispute between either of the parties and other countries and even between any other two countries? The phrase about disputes which "appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict" is open to any interpretation, and their so-called "urgent consultations" are bound to be followed by actions dictated by their own interests. Does not this mean that they may interfere at will in the relations among all countries on the strength of the huge numbers of nuclear weapons in their possession? China absolutely will not go begging for nuclear protection from any country, nor is she afraid of nuclear threat from any country. But we feel duty bound to state our views on this matter since it concerns all the people of the world.

The signing of such an agreement by the Soviet Union and the United States is by no means accidental but is derived from the so-called principle which they agreed upon 1972 that the Soviet Union and the United States have "security interests based on the

principle of equality". What is meant by "security interests based on the principle of equality"? To put it bluntly, it means rivalry for world hegemony — wherever one goes, the other will do the same. What they have done is simply to wrap up this content in the form of an agreement.

In fact, this agreement is a mere scrap of paper. It contains no explicit undertaking on the non-use of nuclear weapons, still less does it envisage the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The US Government was more frank when it stated that the agreement was only a general statement of policy which did not involve any particular positive actions that either side had to take, and pointed out that agreements were not always maintained and there was nothing self-enforcing about this document.

However, the Soviet leaders have made a great fanfare, lauding this agreement to the skies, alleging that it ushered in "a new era" in international relations and opened up "historical vistas for strengthening universal security as a whole," and that it was "indeed of historic importance for all mankind." They have their motives for so eulogizing the agreement. One may recall Khrushchev's famous remarks: "Even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration," and "we (the Soviet Union and the United States) are the strongest countries in the world, and if we unite for peace there can be no war. Then if any madman wanted war, we would but have to shake our fingers to warn him off." In this way, if the Soviet Union could be bound together with the United States,

would not the whole world have to cringe to them? However, in our view, things may not necessarily turn out that way.

It is not so easy for the Soviet Union to bind herself to the United States. Shortly after the signing of the agreement, the Soviet Union pressed forward with her underground nuclear tests and hastened the development of missiles with multiple warheads. The United States will not take this lying down. Why? Because the desperate struggle for nuclear superiority and world hegemony still goes on. The contention between the Soviet Union and the United States now extends all over the world. A vivid proof can be found in the recent subversion of a government in Asia and another in South America. Their scramble is becoming increasingly fierce. This is the reason why there is no tranquillity in the world today. So, what peaceful coexistence is there to speak of? There is only a travesty of peaceful coexistence; the substance is coexistence in rivalry. But whether such coexistence can last is of course another question.

The Soviet leaders noisily proclaim that as a "socialist" state, the Soviet Union is the "natural and surest ally" of the developing countries. In the past, some people in China also believed this. Because they saw the Soviet Union as the homeland of the great Lenin and the Chinese revolution a continuation of the October Revolution. Therefore, how could the Soviet Union, as a socialist state, fail to give the developing countries wholehearted internationalist assistance? But since Khrushchev rose to power, thanks to the long and direct experience we gained as a result of

the Soviet Union's demand for the establishment of a joint fleet in the China Sea, withdrawal of experts, tearing up of contracts, border intrusions, subversions, etc., we came to realize that this was not the case, and that what the Soviet Union practised was not internationalism, but great-power chauvinism, national egoism and territorial expansionism. Therefore, we will not blame those friends who have so far failed to see this for lack of experience. How can a socialist turn into an imperialist? There is in fact nothing strange about it if one goes a little into the history of the international communist movement. Wasn't Karl Kautsky once a somewhat well-known Marxist? But he later betrayed Marxism and capitulated to imperialism. It was Lenin who passed the final historical verdict on Kautsky in his well-known pamphlet *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. People can change, so can a state. It has changed, and what can you do about it?

Lenin pointed out: "We judge a person not by what he says or thinks of himself but by his actions." This applies to a state as well. What has the Soviet Government done to other countries in these years? This is clear to the broad masses of the people of Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Pakistan, to the people of Cambodia who are fighting dauntlessly, and to other peoples who have been subjected to its aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying. The actions of the Soviet Government have amply shown that it is "socialist in words, imperialist in deeds," as Lenin said.

The Soviet-US agreement on the prevention of nuclear war cannot hoodwink many people or intimidate the peoples of the world, but can only arouse indignation, misgivings and disillusionment. The tide is mounting against the hegemonism and power politics practised by the superpowers

3. The Cambodian Question

The Chinese Government resolutely denounces the US Government for continuing to support in various ways the puppet regime in Phnom Penh and wantonly interfere in the affairs of Cambodia. The regime of the traitorous Lon Nol clique, which is now installed in Phnom Penh, was imposed on the Khmer people by the US imperialists and their allies and has been illegal from its very inception. The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia under the leadership of Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk is the sole legal government of Cambodia. The People's Armed Forces of National Liberation of Cambodia under its leadership have liberated over 90 per cent of Cambodia's territory with over 80 per cent of the population. The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia has been recognized by nearly 50 countries. The participants of the recent Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers have declared that the Royal Government of National Union under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk is the only legal government of Cambodia, and earnestly requested all countries which love peace and justice to give it formal recognition. This is a voice of justice. The Chinese Government holds that the continued usurpation by the traitorous Lon Nol clique of the seat in the United Nations is a

contempt (disgrace) for all countries that uphold justice, and for the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and for the United Nations itself. The Chinese Government firmly maintains that the present session of the General Assembly should take a decision immediately to expel the representatives of the traitorous Lon Nol clique from the United Nations and restore to the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia under the leadership of Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk its rightful seat in the United Nations

Mr President,

The People's Republic of China is taking part in the activities of the United Nations for the third year. We wish to say frankly that what we have experienced in the United Nations has caused us to become worried. Speeches are multiplying and resolutions piling up in the United Nations, yet it has not been able to look into matters which it ought to (for instance, the question of the prevention of nuclear war) and is impotent in the solution of many major issues (for instance, the Middle East question). If things continue this way, what future is there for the United Nations? However, we are not disheartened. We believe that the present conditions in the United Nations should be changed and the Charter should be revised. How can the United Nations go on working in the same old way it did more than twenty years ago, when the world has already changed? The Third World has risen up. The United Nations must be able to give expression to the desires of the numerous small and medium-sized countries, truly give effect to the principle of equality of all countries, big or small, and cease to

be controlled by the superpowers and their small number of followers if it is to be worthy of its name. China is ready to work together with all countries which love peace and uphold justice for the achievement of this noble aim.

Thank you, Mr President!

Source : The comments are by Ch'iao Kuan-hua, chairman of the PRC delegation to the United Nations and a Vice-Minister of foreign affairs. He spoke on October 2, 1973 to the U.N. General Assembly. Reprinted from Peking Review, No. 40, October 5, 1973, pp. 10-17.

APPENDIX 14: THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENTS (EXCERPTS), JANUARY
1973

Agreement on Ending the War
And
Restoring Peace in Vietnam

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in
Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese people's
fundamental national rights and the South Vietnamese people's
right to self-determination, and to contributing to the consolida-
tion of peace in Asia and the world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake
to respect and to implement them:

Chapter I

The Vietnamese People's
Fundamental National Rights

Article 1

The United States and all other countries respect the independence,
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam as re-
cognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Chapter II

Cessation of Hostilities-Withdrawal of Troops

Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Vietnam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its military activities against the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces, wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

Article 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties

shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

- * All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;
- * All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

Article 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

Article 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.

Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9 (b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

Chapter III

The Return of Captured Military Personnel
and Foreign Civilians, and Captured
and Detained Vietnamese Civilian Personnel

Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21 (b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the ceasefire comes into effect.

The Exercise of the South Vietnamese People's
Right to Self-Determination

Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.

Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

- * achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;
- * ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese

parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and ensurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9 (b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

Article 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis

of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9 (b).

Chapter V

The Reunification of Vietnam and the Relationship Between North and South Vietnam

Article 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotia-

tions with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Chapter VI

The Joint Military Commissions,
the International Commission
of Control and Supervision,
the International Conference

Article 16

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

* The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

* Article 3 (a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

* Article 3 (c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam;

* Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a);

* Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3 (a); ...

Chapter VII

Regarding Cambodia and Laos

Article 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military

activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Chapter VIII

The Relationship Between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Article 21

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

Article 22

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for

establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
News Release, January 24, 1973.

APPENDIX 15: VOTE IN THE UN OVER ADMITTING THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

<u>Year</u>	<u>For Peking</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>Abstentions</u>
1950	16	32	10
1951	11	37	4
1952	7	42	11
1953	10	44	2
1954	11	43	6
1955	12	42	6
1956	24	47	8
1957	27	48	6
1958	28	44	9
1959	29	44	9
1960	34	42	22
1961	34	61	7
1962	42	56	12
1963	41	57	12
1964*			
1965	47	47	20
1966	46	57	17

* It is important to note that the wording of the resolutions before the UN has varied somewhat from year to year. In 1964 there was no vote.

Source: Eor Franz Schunmann & Orville Schell eds. Communist China: Revolutionary Reconstruction & International Confrontation. New York: Random House, 1967.

APPENDIX 16: UNITED NATIONS ROLE CALL VOTE TO SEAT THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OCTOBER 25, 1971.

ON TWO-THIRDS REQUIREMENT

Resolution declaring the expulsion of Nationalist China an
"important matter" and thus requiring a two-thirds vote rather
than a simple majority for passage.

IN FAVOUR - 55

Argentina	Dominican Republic	Japan	Paraguay
Australia	El Salvador	Jordan	Philippines
Bahrain	Fiji	Lebanon	Portugal
Barbados	Gabon	Lesotho	Rwanda
Bolivia	Gambia	Liberia	Saudi Arabia
Brazil	Ghana	Luxembourg	South Africa
Cambodia	Greece	Madagascar	Spain
Cent. Afr. Republic	Gautemala	Malawi	Swaziland
Chad	Haiti	Mauritius	Thailand
China	Honduras	Mexico	United States
Colombia	Indonesia	New Zealand	Upper Volta
Congo (Kirsh.)	Israel	Nicaragua	Uruguay
Costa Rica	Ivory Coast	Niger	Venezuela
Dahomey	Jamaica	Panama	

OPPOSED - 59

Afghanistan	Czechoslovakia	Kenya	Singapore
Albania	Denmark	Kuwait	Somalia
Algeria	Ecuador	Libya	Southern Yemen
Bhutan	Egypt	Malaysia	Soviet Union
Britain	Equatorial Guinea	Mali	Sudan
Bulgaria	Ethiopia	Mauritania	Sweden
Burma	Finland	Mongolia	Syria
Burundi	France	Nepal	Tanzania
Byelorussia	Guinea	Nigeria	Trinidad/Tobago
Cameroon	Guyana	Norway	Uganda
Canada	Hungary	Pakistan	Ukraine
Ceylon	Iceland	Peru	Yemen
Chile	India	Poland	Yugoslavia
Congo (Brazza)	Iraq	Rumania	Zambia
Cuba	Ireland	Sierra-Leone	

ABSTENTIONS - 15

Austria	Iran	Morocco	Togo
Belgium	Italy	Netherlands	Tunisia
Botswana	Laos	Quatar	Turkey
Cyprus	Malta	Senegal	

ABSENT - 2

Maldives	Oman
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APPENDIX 16: UNITED NATIONS ROLE CALL VOTE TO SEAT THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OCTOBER 25, 1971 (CONTINUED)

ON SEATING PEKING

Resolution to seat Communist China and expel Nationalist China.

IN FAVOUR - 76

Afghanistan	Egypt	Laos	Rwanda
Albania	Eq. Guinea	Libya	Senegal
Algeria	Ethiopia	Malaysia	Sierra Leone
Australia	Finland	Mali	Singapore
Belgium	France	Mauritania	Somalia
Bhutan	Ghana	Mexico	Southern Yemen
Botswana	Guinea	Mongolia	Soviet Union
Bulgaria	Guyana	Morocco	Sudan
Burma	Hungary	Nepal	Sweden
Byelorussia	Iceland	Netherlands	Syria
Cameroon	India	Nigeria	Tanzania
Canada	Iran	Norway	Togo
Ceylon	Iraq	Pakistan	Trinidad-Tobago
Chile	Ireland	Congo (Brazza)	Tunisia
Cuba	Israel	Peru	Turkey
Czechoslovakia	Italy	Poland	Uganda
Denmark	Kenya	Portugal	Ukraine
Equador	Kuwait	Rumania	Britain
Yemen	Yugoslavia	Zambia	

OPPOSED - 35

Australia	El Salvador	Liberia	Saudi Arabia
Bolivia	Gabon	Madagascar	South Africa
Brazil	Gambia	Malawi	Swaziland
Cambodia	Guatemala	Malta	United States
Cent. Afr. Republic	Haiti	New Zealand	Upper Volta
Congo (Kinsh.)	Honduras	Nicaragua	Uruguay
Costa Rica	Ivory Coast	Niger	Venezuela
Dahomey	Japan	Paraguay	
Dominican Rep.	Lesotho	Philippines	

ABSTENTIONS - 17

Argentina	Fiji	Lebanon	Spain
Bahrain	Greece	Luxembourg	Thailand
Barbados	Indonesia	Mauritius	
Colombia	Jamaica	Panama	
Cyprus	Jordan	Qatar	

ABSENT - 3

China	Maldives	Oman
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APPENDIX 17: STATES WHICH HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AS OF DECEMBER 1975

Year	States	Year's total
1949	Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, Germany (Democratic Republic), Hungary, India, Korea (Democratic People's Republic), Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, USSR, Yugoslavia	13
1950	Afghanistan, Ceylon, Denmark, Finland, (Indonesia), Netherlands Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vietnam (Democratic Republic)	11
1955	Nepal	1
1956	Syria, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Yemen (Arab Republic)	3
1958	Cambodia, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan	4
1959	Guinea	1
1960	Cuba, Ghana, Mali, Somali	4
1961	Tanzania	1
1962	Algeria, Laos, Uganda	3
1963	Burundi, Kenya	2
1964	Congo, France, Tunisia, Zambia	4
1965	Mauritania	1
1968	Mauritius, Yemen (People's Democratic Republic)	2
1969	South Vietnam (Republic)	1
1970	Canada, Chile, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Italy	5
1971	Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Iceland, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nigeria, Peru, Rwanda, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Turkey	14

APPENDIX 17: STATES WHICH HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AS OF DECEMBER 1975
 (CONTINUED)

Year	States	Year's Total
1972	Argentina, Australia, Chad, Cyprus, Germany (Federal Republic), Greece, Guyana, Jamaica, Japan, Luxemburg, Malagasy, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Togo, Zaire	17
1973	Dahomey, Spain, Upper Volta	3
1974	Botswana, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Malaysia, Niger, Trinidad-Tobago, Venezuela	9
1975	Bangladesh, Comoros, Fiji, Mozambique, Philippines, Sao Tome & Principe, Thailand, Western Samoa	8

Source: Jen-min jih-pao and Peking Review for the years concerned.

APPENDIX 18: CHINESE FOREIGN TRADE, 1950-1972 (in US\$ million)

Year	Total	Index	Exports	Imports	Proportions with:		Trade with SEA Value	% of Total
					Non-Communist Countries (%)	Communist Countries (%)		
1950	1,210	28.0	620	590	71	29	84.5	7.0
1951	1,895	44.4	780	1,115	49	51	86.4	4.6
1952	1,890	44.3	875	1,015	30	70	42.1	2.2
1953	2,295	53.8	1,040	1,255	32	68	38.9	1.7
1954	2,350	55.1	1,060	1,290	26	74	44.5	1.9
1955	3,035	71.1	1,375	1,660	26	74	71.8	2.3
1956	3,120	73.1	1,635	1,485	34	66	102.4	3.3
1957	3,025	70.9	1,595	1,430	36	64	137.3	4.5
1958	3,735	87.5	1,910	1,820	37	63	201.9	5.4
1959	4,265	100.0	2,205	2,060	31	69	232.1	5.4
1960	3,975	93.2	1,945	2,030	35	65	196.6	4.9
1961	3,015	70.9	1,525	1,495	44	56	150.5	5.0
1962	2,675	62.7	1,525	1,150	47	53	157.5	5.9
1963	2,755	64.6	1,560	1,200	55	45	200.0	7.2
1964	3,245	76.1	1,770	1,457	65	35	244.9	7.5
1965	3,855	90.4	2,085	1,770	70	30	206.0	5.3
1966	4,205	98.6	2,170	2,035	74	26	246.4	5.8
1967	3,860	90.5	1,915	1,945	80	20	242.6	6.3
1968	3,710	87.0	1,890	1,820	78	22	283.4	7.6
1969	3,885	91.1	2,060	1,825	79	21	292.4	7.5
1970	4,224	99.0	2,060	2,165	79	21	225.1	5.3
1971	4,681	108.1	2,390	2,291	77	23	303.1	6.6
1972	5,716	134.0	2,948	2,768	77	23	-	-

Note : In 1959, the Chinese Government suspended the release of trade statistics, and the trade data have been compiled from the sources of the partner countries.

Sources : For 1950-64, Robert L. Price, "International Trade of Communist China, 1960-65", in Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of Mainland China (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 584; for 1965-70, Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol. IV, No. 3, February 1966; Vol. IX, No. 8, August 7, 1971; for 1971-72, Vol. XI, No. 10, October 1973; for China's trade with SEA, 1950-67, see Eckstein, op.cit.; for 1968-71, see Far Eastern Economic Review Yearbooks.

APPENDIX 19: TRADE FLUCTUATIONS OF WEST MALAYSIA: BY SELECTED
MAJOR TRADE PARTNERS, 1965-71

Country	Imports		Exports	
	Instability Index	Rank	Instability Index	Rank
U.K.	15.5	8	20.2	6
W. Germany	18.1	6	29.2	5
Hong Kong	15.2	9	32.2	4
India	19.3	5	45.6	3
Australia	14.1	10	14.7	10
U.S.A.	27.1	4	14.9	9
Japan	33.1	1	96.2	1
Singapore	16.0	7	15.8	8
U.S.S.R.	29.2	3	16.3	7
Thailand	30.1	2	13.9	11
China	10.0	11	96.0	2
Average	20.7		35.9	
W. Malaysian total	12.6		20.5	

Note: 1965 was the year Singapore separated from Malaysia.

Source: John Wong, The Political Economy of Malaysia's Trade Relations with China, Occasional Paper No. 20. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974, p. 30.

APPENDIX 20: CHINA'S MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS, 1973-1974

Unit: One Million U.S. Dollars

Country & Area	1973		1974	
	Trade	Rank	Trade	Rank
Japan	2,007	1	3,327	1
U. S.	876	2	1,064	2
Hong Kong	793	3	895	3
Malaysia-Singapore	495	4	595	5
West Germany	486	5	652	4
Canada	409	6	575	6
United Kingdom	340	7	328	9
Soviet Union	272	8	282	10
Romania	265	9	250	11
Australia	247	10	478	7
France	231	11	349	8
Italy	198	12	223	12

Source: U.S. Government, People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook (1975), in William F. Rope, "U.S.-China Trade: The Facts and Figures," in Howard M. Holtzmann, ed., Legal Aspects of Doing Business with China (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1976), pp. 31-32.

APPENDIX 21: CHINA: TRADE BY AREA AND COUNTRY, 1972-1974

Unit: One Million U.S. Dollars

Area and Country	1972				1973			
	Turnovr.	Exports	Imports	Balance	Turnovr.	Exports	Imports	Balance
Total, All Countries ¹	5,920	3,085	2,835	250	10,090	4,960	5,130	-170
Non-Communist Countries	4,645	2,345	2,300	45	8,380	3,960	4,420	-460
Developed Countries	2,740	1,070	1,670	-600	5,270	1,805	3,465	-1,660
East Asia and Pacific	1,220	530	690	-160	2,290	1,025	1,265	-240
Of which:								
Australia	104	55	49	6	247	86	161	-75
Japan	1,108	468	640	-172	2,007	918	1,089	-171
Western Europe	1,065	460	605	-145	1,695	665	1,030	365
Of which:								
France	158	91	67	24	231	128	103	25
Italy	161	73	88	-15	198	111	87	24
Netherlands	51	39	12	27	94	57	37	20
Sweden	66	18	48	-30	83	25	58	-33
Switzerland	39	17	22	-5	73	25	48	-23
United Kingdom	167	77	90	-13	340	102	238	-136
West Germany	282	92	190	-98	486	130	356	-226
North America	455	80	375	-295	1,285	115	1,170	-1,055
Of which:								
Canada	345	49	296	-247	409	53	356	-303
United States	111	32	79	-47	876	64	812	-748
Less Developed Countries	1,365	740	625	115	2,280	1,335	945	390
Southeast Asia	420	330	90	240	835	665	170	495
Of which:								
Indonesia ^{2&3}	75	70	5	65	115	110	5	105
Malaysia & Singapore ^{2&4}	235	190	45	145	495	355	140	215
Near East & South Asia	350	180	170	10	605	300	305	-5
Of which:								
Egypt	71	26	45	-19	43	22	21	1
Pakistan	35	20	15	5	60	46	14	32
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	41	14	27	-13	70	31	39	-8

APPENDIX 21: CHINA: TRADE BY AREA AND COUNTRY, 1972-1974 (CONTINUED)

Unit: One Million U.S. Dollars

1974				
Area and Country	Turnovr.	Exports	Imports	Balance
Total, All Countries ¹	14,005	6,515	7,490	-975
Non-Communist Countries	11,705	5,170	6,535	-1,365
Developed Countries	7,690	2,400	5,290	-2,890
East Asia and Pacific	3,870	1,395	2,475	-1,080
Of which:				
Australia	478	121	357	-236
Japan	3,327	1,241	2,086	-845
Western Europe	2,180	825	1,355	-530
Of which:				
France	349	160	189	-29
Italy	223	102	121	-19
Netherlands	156	84	72	-12
Sweden	103	34	69	-35
Switzerland	94	31	63	-32
United Kingdom	328	136	192	-56
West Germany	652	168	484	-316
North America	1,640	180	1,460	-1,280
Of which:				
Canada	575	62	513	-451
United States	1,064	115	949	-834
Less Developed Countries	3,085	1,860	1,225	635
Southeast Asia	1,010	805	205	600
Of which:				
Indonesia ^{2&3}	155	150	5	145
Malaysia & Singapore ^{2&4}	595	450	145	305
Near East & South Asia	890	530	360	170
Of which:				
Egypt	61	12	49	-37
Pakistan	64	52	12	40
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	124	74	50	24

APPENDIX 21: CHINA: TRADE BY AREA AND COUNTRY, 1972-1974 (CONTINUED)

Unit: Once Million U.S. Dollars

Area and Country	1972				1973			
	Turnovr.	Exports	Imports	Balance	Turnovr.	Exports	Imports	Balance
Latin America	230	20	210	-190	325	55	270	-215
Of which:								
Argentina	3	Negl.	3	-3	18	Negl.	18	-18
Brazil	78	1	77	-76	74	2	72	-70
Chile	82	3	79	-76	121	16	105	-89
Peru	47	Negl.	49	-47	43	1	42	-41
Africa	350	195	155	40	485	295	190	105
Of which:								
Nigeria	30	25	5	20	41	33	8	25
Sudan	70	24	46	-22	93	27	66	-39
Tanzania	86	65	21	44	106	91	15	76
Southern Europe ⁵	15	15	Negl.	15	30	20	10	10
Hong Kong and Macao	540	535	5	530	830	820	10	810
Of which:								
Hong Kong ⁶	513	509	4	505	793	784	9	775
Communist Countries	1,275	740	535	205	1,710	1,000	710	290
USSR	255	134	121	13	272	136	136	-
Far East ⁷	260	180	80	100	480	355	125	230
Eastern Europe	495	230	265	-35	605	305	300	5
Of which:								
Czechoslovakia	57	28	29	-1	84	44	40	4
East Germany	98	50	48	2	109	59	50	9
Poland	62	34	28	6	67	34	33	1
Hungary	53	20	33	-13	65	26	39	-13
Romania	218	96	122	-26	265	136	129	7
Other Communist Countries ⁸	265	196	69	127	355	205	150	55

APPENDIX 21: CHINA: TRADE BY AREA AND COUNTRY, 1972-1974 (CONTINUED)

Unit: One Million U.S. Dollars

1974

Area and Country	Turnovr.	Exports	Imports	Balance
Latin America	510	60	450	-390
Of which:				
Argentina	105	Negl.	105	-105
Brazil	161	1	160	-159
Chile	99	14	85	-71
Peru	77	Negl.	77	-77
Africa	635	440	195	245
Of which:				
Nigeria	50	40	10	30
Sudan	99	49	50	-1
Tanzania	94	80	14	66
Southern Europe ⁵	40	25	15	10
Hong Kong and Macao	930	910	20	890
Of which: ⁶				
Hong Kong	895	876	19	857
Communist Countries	2,300	1,345	955	390
USSR	282	139	143	-4
Far East ⁷	735	580	155	425
Eastern Europe	640	320	320	-
Of which:				
Czechoslovakia	72	29	43	-14
East Germany	153	80	73	7
Poland	60	30	30	-
Hungary	88	44	44	-
Romania	250	120	130	-10
Other Communist Countries ⁸	640	305	335	-30

Source: U.S. Government, People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook (1975), in William F. Rope, "U.S.-China Trade: The Facts and Figures," in Howard M. Holtzmann, ed., Legal Aspects of Doing Business with China, p. 31-32.

1. Data for individual countries, except where noted, are rounded to the nearest \$1 million. All other data are rounded to the nearest \$5 million.
2. Data are rounded to the nearest \$5 million.
3. Official statistics from Indonesia are believed to include re-exports of Chinese goods from Hong Kong and Singapore.
4. In the past few years the proportion of Chinese goods re-exported to Malaysia through Singapore has declined. Chinese exports to Singapore have been reduced by 10% for 1972 and 3% for 1973 and 1974 to eliminate double counting of re-exports to Malaysia.
5. Includes Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta.
6. Net of entrepot trade with third countries.
7. Includes North Korea, North Vietnam, and Mongolia.
8. Includes Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Albania.


APPENDIX 22: CHINA: COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF TRADE, 1967-1974

	Percent							
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Total exports	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Foodstuffs	26	28	30	31	31	31	31	32
Crude materials, fuels, and edible oils	23	21	22	21	20	19	18	21
Chemicals	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6
Manufactures	44	44	40	42	44	43	45	40
Other	3	3	3	1	1	1	1	1
Total imports	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Foodstuffs	19	23	19	16	13	16	19	21
Crude materials, fuels, and edible oils	16	16	17	17	17	19	21	20
Chemicals	15	17	17	15	14	13	9	8
Manufactures	48	43	46	52	56	51	50	51
Other	1	1	1	Negl.	Negl.	1	1	Negl.

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Source: U.S. Government, People's Republic of China: International Trade Handbook (1975), reprinted in William F. Rope, "U.S. - China Trade: The Facts and Figures," in Howard M. Holtzmann, ed., Legal Aspects of Doing Business with China, (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1976), p. 33.

APPENDIX 23: CHINA NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE AND RELATED CORPORATIONS



Note: A list of names of the corporations, their cable and mailing addresses follows:

China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation

82 Tung An Men Street, Peking

Cable: CEROILFOOD PEKING

Sixteen branches in thirteen cities and provinces

Hong Kong Agent: Ng Fung Hong

Bank of China Building

Hong Kong

Cable: NG FUNG HONG KONG

Macao Agent: Nam Kwong Trading Company

Rua Alm. Sergio Nos. 94-98

Macao

Cable: NAMKWONG MACAO

China National Native Produce and Animal By-Products Import and Export Corporation

82 Tung Ah Men Street, Peking

Cable: CHINATUHSU PEKING

Seventeen branches and eighteen subbranches in twelve cities and provinces

Hong Kong Agents: Teck Soon Hong Ltd. (for tea and native produce)

37 Connaught Road West

Hong Kong

Hua Yuan Company (for animal by-products)

37 Connaught Road West

Hong Kong

Macao Agent: Nam Kwong Trading Company

China National Textiles Import and Export Corporation

82 Tung An Men Street, Peking

Cable: CHINATEX PEKING

Eight branches in six cities and provinces

Hong Kong Agent: China Resources Company

Bank of China Building

Hong Kong

Macao Agent: Nam Kwong Trading Company

China National Light Industrial Products Import and Export Corporation

82 Tung An Men Street, Peking

Cable: INDUSTRY PEKING

Twenty branches in ten cities and provinces

Hong Kong Agent: Hua Yuan Company

Macao Agent: Nam Kwong Trading Company

China National Chemical Import and Export Corporation

Erh Li Kou, Hsi Chiao, Peking

Cable: SINOCHAM PEKING

Six branches in six cities and provinces

Hong Kong Agent: China Resources Company
 Macao Agent: Nam Kwong Trading Company

China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation
 Erh Li Kou, Hsi Chiao, Peking
 Cable: MACHIMPEX PEKING
 Five branches in five cities
 Hong Kong Agent: China Resources Company
 Macao Agent: Nam Kwong Trading Company

China National Metals and Minerals Import and Export Corporation
 Erh Li Kou, Hsi Chiao, Peking
 Cable: MINMETALS PEKING
 Six branches in six cities and provinces
 Hong Kong Agent: China Resources Company
 Macao Agent: Nam Kwong Trading Company

China National Technical Import Corporation
 Erh Li Kou, Hsi Chiao, Peking
 Cable: TECHIMPORT Peking

China National Complete Plant Export Corporation
 Fu-Wai Street, Peking
 Cable: COMPLANT PEKING

China National Export Commodities Packing Corporation
 Address not available

China National Publications Center (Guozi Shudian)
 P. O. Box 399, Peking
 Cable: GUOZI Peking

China National Publications Import Corporation
 P. O. Box 88, Peking

China Film Distribution Corporation
 Hsin Wai Ta Street, Peking
 Cable: CFDCORP PEKING
 Hong Kong Agent: Nan Fang Film Company

China Stamp Export Corporation
 28 Tung An Men Street, Peking
 Cable: CHINASTAMP PEKING

China National Chartering Corporation
 Erh Li Kou, Hsi Chiao, Peking
 Cable: ZHONGZU PEKING
 Six branches in six ports

China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corporation
 Erh Li Kou, Hsi Chiao, Peking
 Cable: ZHONGWAIYUN PEKING
 Nine branches in nine ports

Bank of China Head Office
 Address not available
 Cable: HOCHUNGKUO PEKING
 Thirty branches in thirty cities
 Branches in Hong Kong, Singapore, and London

Chinese People's Insurance Company
 34 Fan Ti Road, Peking
 P. O. Box 2149 Peking
 Cable: 42001 PEKING
 Six branches in six cities and seven sub-branches in seven cities

China Insurance Company, Limited
 P. O. Box 20, Peking
 Cable: CHINSURCO PEKING
 Branches in Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Macao.

Tai Ping Insurance Company
 Address not available
 Cable: TAIPINGING PEKING
 Branches in Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Ipoh.

China Ocean Shipping Agency
 6 Tung Chang An Street, Peking
 Cable: PENAVICO PEKING
 (Note: This agency handles international ocean-going ships engaged in passenger and/or cargo services calling at Chinese coastal ports.)

China Ocean Shipping Company
 6 Tung Chang An Street, Peking
 Cable: COSCO PEKING

Sino-Albanian Joint Shipping Company
 Address not available

Sino-Polish Joint Shipbrokers Company, Limited
 Address not available
 Cable: CHIPOLBROK PEKING

Sino-Tanzanian Joint Shipping Company
 Address not available
 Cable: SINOTASHIP PEKING

Source : Hsiangkang ching-chi nien-chien 1976, Part V, pp. 131-135; U.S. Government, "Foreign Trade Organizations of the People's Republic of China" (1975).

Appendix 24: Commodity Composition of Sino-Malaysian Trade (%)

Commodity	1971	1967	1958	1952
(1) <u>Food</u>	<u>39.4</u>	<u>43.7</u>	<u>45.3</u>	<u>64.2</u>
Meat	1.4	2.7	1.1	1.4
Cereals	12.7	23.2	6.3	12.0
(Rice)	(9.8)	(20.7)	(4.3)	(-)
Fruits & Vegetables	16.0	14.6	14.6	46.0
(2) <u>Manufactured Goods</u>	<u>27.2</u>	<u>27.2</u>	<u>30.1</u>	<u>27.4</u>
Paper	4.8	2.7	5.6	3.5
Textiles	9.5	7.6	14.7	3.3
Iron & Steel	2.8	9.0	1.5	-
(3) <u>Machinery & Transport Equipment</u>	<u>4.3</u>	<u>2.8</u>	<u>2.4</u>	<u>8.6</u>
(4) <u>Miscellaneous Manufactures</u>	<u>8.9</u>	<u>7.8</u>	<u>7.4</u>	-
Clothing	2.3	2.3	1.9	-
Scientific instruments	0.4	0.3	-	-
(5) <u>Others</u>	<u>20.2</u>	<u>14.9</u>	<u>14.8</u>	-
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* : 1952 refers to Pan-Malayan trade, i.e. Malaya and Singapore, under old classifications

Sources: Malayan Statistics: External Trade, and West Malaysia Monthly Statistics of External Trade.

APPENDIX 25: CHINA'S SHARES IN PAN-MALAYAN TEXTILE IMPORTS, 1953-1959 (% of Value)

Country	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
China	1.8	2.5	4.3	5.5	7.3	9.3	12.4
Japan	17.4	31.3	42.8	41.5	43.3	47.3	46.0
India	22.7	19.6	14.7	13.9	13.3	16.5	15.6
Hong Kong	10.5	11.0	12.0	9.8	9.7	8.5	3.5
U.K.	24.2	17.6	12.2	11.5	10.8	6.5	7.6
U.S.A.	7.6	9.9	8.0	9.5	6.7	5.3	4.4
Others	15.8	8.1	6.0	8.3	8.9	6.6	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Malayan Statistics: External Trade, various years.

APPENDIX 26: CHINA'S SHARES IN PAN-MALAYAN CEMENT IMPORTS, 1955-1959 (% of Value)

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
China	1.3	7.0	13.9	6.7	9.0
U.K.	53.2	41.6	33.6	31.9	20.7
Japan	31.8	42.7	50.2	56.6	63.7
Others	13.7	8.7	2.3	4.8	6.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Malayan Statistics: External Trade, various years.

APPENDIX 27: WEST MALAYSIA'S TRADE BALANCES WITH MAJOR TRADE
PARTNERS IN 1971 (in M\$ million)

Country	Imports	Exports	Balance
W. Malaysia	3,414.2	3,917.0	+ 502.8
U.K.	534.0	287.6	- 246.4
Hong Kong	51.7	39.7	- 12.0
Australia	232.2	63.4	- 168.8
China	137.9	53.4	- 84.5
Japan	694.3	445.4	- 248.9
Singapore	228.5	839.1	+ 610.6
W. Germany	189.3	117.6	- 71.7
U.S.A.	209.0	595.7	+ 386.7
Thailand	107.0	24.1	- 82.9

Source: West Malaysia Monthly Statistics of External Trade,
1971.

APPENDIX 28: TRADE OF CERTAIN NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WITH CHINA

Monthly Averages					MN \$		
Imports from China	January-December						Months covered
Industrial Countries	1973	1974	1975	1976	1976	1977	
Hong Kong	91.2	98.2	114.4	132.8	122.0	131.9	January-June
Japan	81.2	108.7	127.6	114.2	101.1	118.2	January-June
West Germany	12.5	16.1	18.7	22.6	21.3	21.5	January-June
France	12.3	15.3	14.5	16.2	16.6	15.7	January-June
Netherlands	5.5	8.1	6.8	7.4	7.0	7.5	January-June
Belgium/Luxemburg	3.3	3.9	3.7	4.4	4.6	3.3	January-June
Italy	10.7	9.7	10.7	12.9	12.6	12.5	January-June
United Kingdom	9.8	13.0	11.0	13.0	12.8	14.4	January-June
Spain	1.7	1.8	2.8	4.0	4.8	3.2	January-June
Sweden	2.4	3.3	3.9	4.2	3.8	5.1	January-June
Switzerland	2.4	3.0	2.6	3.0	3.1	3.3	January-June
USA ^a	5.3	9.6	13.2	16.8	15.1	16.9	January-June
Total of above	238.3	290.7	329.9	351.5	324.8	353.5	
<u>Others</u>							
Sri Lanka	3.1	5.7 ^b	-	-	-	-	
Indonesia	4.1	9.5	17.0	11.0	-	-	
Malaysia	12.3	16.3	12.4	11.2	11.0	10.1 ^c	January-June
Singapore	19.4	22.0	23.9	22.2 ^d	21.1	22.0	January-June
Pakistan	4.0	4.5	4.5 ^b	5.2 ^d	-	-	
Egypt	2.2	1.5	2.8 ^b	-	-	-	
Turkey ^a	0.3	0.4	1.8	0.1	0.1	0.2	January-June
Canada ^a	4.4	5.2	4.6	7.5	6.2	7.2	January-June
Australia	7.2	10.1	7.2	8.4	7.7	10.0 ^e	January-June
Total of above	57.0	75.2	74.2	65.6	46.1	49.5	

TRADE OF CERTAIN NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WITH CHINA (CONTINUED)

Monthly Averages

MN \$

Export to China	January-December						Months covered
Industrial Countries	1973	1974	1975	1976	1976	1977	
Hong Kong	4.4	4.8	2.8	2.5	2.2	3.3	January-June
Japan	86.6	165.4	188.2	138.6	179.9	132.5	January-June
West Germany	25.8	35.1	43.6	51.9	64.7	35.2	January-June
France	7.5	13.4	31.2	29.6	43.5	7.9	January-June
Netherlands	2.7	5.2	11.2	3.3	5.1	1.6	January-June
Belgium/Luxemburg	2.6	2.9	3.9	3.3	4.6	2.2	January-June
Italy	6.4	8.8	12.1	10.6	12.3	3.4	January-June
United Kingdom	17.2	14.0	14.9	10.5	13.7	8.3	January-June
Spain	0.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8	1.1	January-June
Sweden	4.2	5.0	3.5	2.6	2.9	2.1	January-June
Switzerland	3.5	4.6	4.7	4.3	5.1	4.1	January-June
Norway	2.0	5.6	9.0	1.5	2.9	3.4	January-June
USA	57.5	67.3	25.3	11.3	20.0	10.4	January-June
Total of above	220.9	333.0	352.3	271.5	358.7	215.5	
<u>Others</u>							
Sri Lanka	2.7	4.0 ^b	-	-			
Malaysia	6.7	7.3	4.4	3.7	2.5	8.5	January-June
Singapore	4.4	4.3	3.4	3.2	2.3	3.0	January-June
Pakistan	1.1	0.9	1.1 ^b	1.5 ^d	-	-	
Egypt	1.6	2.9	5.8 ^b	-	-	-	
Turkey	2.6	1.4	0.1	0.2	0.4	-	January-June
Canada	24.0	37.2	30.9	16.6	18.6	28.4	January-June
Australia	11.6	26.7	27.2	22.2	23.4	14.7 ^e	January-June
Total of above	54.7	84.7	72.9	47.4	47.2	54.6	

a) Imports fob
e) January-May

b) January-September

c) January-April

d) January-August

Source: Quarterly Economic Review of China, Hong Kong, North Korea 4th Quarter 1977, p. 21-22.

APPENDIX 29: JOINT MALAYSIA-CHINA COMMUNIQUE AT THE CONCLUSION
OF PRIME MINISTER TUN ABDUL RAZAK'S VISIT TO CHINA,
MAY 1974.

At the invitation of His Excellency Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Tun Abdul Razak bin Datuk Hussein, Prime Minister of Malaysia, visited the People's Republic of China from May 28 to June 2, 1974. His Excellency Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak was accompanied by representatives of political parties in the government and government officials.

During his visit, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak called on Chairman Mao Tse-tung and conveyed to him the best wishes of the Malaysian Government. They had a friendly and frank talk.

Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien and Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak had wide-ranging talks on various subject matters of bilateral, regional and international nature. These talks were held in a frank and friendly atmosphere. The two Prime Ministers agree that in recent years the situation in Asia has undergone deep changes favourable to the people of all countries. It is in conformity with the interests of the peoples of China and Malaysia to normalize the relations between the two countries. To this end, the two Prime Ministers have decided to announce the normalization of relations between their two countries by issuing this joint communiqué.

1. The Government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Malaysia, with a view to promoting the traditional friendship of the two peoples, have decided upon mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations as from the date this communiqué is published.

2. The two governments held that although the social systems of the People's Republic of China and Malaysia are different, this should not constitute an obstacle to the two governments and peoples in establishing and developing peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. The two governments consider all foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion to be impermissible. They hold that the social system of a country should only be chosen and decided by its own people. They are opposed to any attempt by any country or group of countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in any part of the world.

3. The government of Malaysia recognizes the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and acknowledges the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Malaysian Government decides to close down its consulate in Taipei.

4. The Government of the People's Republic of China recognizes the government of Malaysia and respects the independence and sovereignty of Malaysia.

5. The government of the People's Republic of China takes note of the fact that Malaysia is a multi-racial country with peoples of Malay, Chinese and other ethnic origins. Both the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Malaysia declare that they do not recognize dual nationality. Proceeding from this principle, the Chinese Government considers anyone of Chinese origin who has taken up of his own will or acquired Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality. As for those residents who retain Chinese nationality of their own will, the Chinese Government, acting in accordance with its consistent policy, will enjoin them to abide by the law of the government of Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there and live in amity with them. And their proper rights and interests will be protected by the government of China and respected by the government of Malaysia.

6. Premier Chou En-lai and Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak agree that the two governments, in conformity with international practice, will provide each other with all necessary assistance for the establishment and performance of the functions of embassies in their respective capitals, and that ambassadors will be exchanged as soon as practicable.

(signed)

Chou En-lai

Premier of the State Council
of the People's Republic of
China

(signed)

Tun Abdul Razak bin

Datuk Hussein

Prime Minister of Malaysia

Peking, 31 May 1974

Source: Hsinhua News Bulletin, 1 June 1974, pp. 3-4.

APPENDIX 30: STATEMENT BY TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEIN, PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA, AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAY 27, 1974.

I leave tomorrow to make an official visit to the People's Republic of China, at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai. This is the first official visit ever exchanged between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China and that fact alone underlines its particular significance. There have, of course, been exchanges of unofficial trade and sporting delegations in the last three years and, as you are also aware, there have been negotiations in New York in the last year which have concluded with an agreement in principle on establishing diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China. That agreement having reached, the way is open for me to pay an official visit to China and I was therefore happy to accept the invitation of Premier Chou to make the visit, which would formalise and conclude the agreement to establish diplomatic relations between our two countries.

This visit of mine represents the culmination of the foreign policy changes and initiatives which this Government has made since September 1970. We were among those countries which supported the seating of the PRC in the United Nations in 1971. In our foreign policy, we have shown our commitment to the cause of peace by consistently pursuing a policy of non-alignment and regional co-operation and of extending our hand of friendship to all countries who

wish to befriends with us irrespective of their political ideology or social systems on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference and co-existence.

Our China policy, I know, has the support of the people of this country. This is especially true of the political parties in the National Front which, by giving their full support to the Government's policy while at the same time showing complete understanding of the realities of the situation, have given added strength to the Government in achieving our objectives. My delegation to the PRC therefore includes representatives of each of the parties in the National Front to show the unity of the Government and the people in regard to our China policy.

I should naturally not be able to comment at this Press Conference on any matters of substance affecting Malaysia-PRC relations whether it is the question of Taiwan, permanent residents in Malaysia, the Malayan Communist Party which, I know are the topics which interest you, or indeed, any other. I shall do so when I meet with you again on my return from China. As regards the programme of my stay, I believe it is not the practice to give any details in advance but I shall have the opportunity not only of official discussions but of seeing something of Peking and Shanghai, which are the two cities I shall be visiting.

This visit of mine to the PRC represents afresh start in the relations between our two countries. It will quite clearly have repercussions beyond the bilateral relations between Malaysia

and the PRC and will begin a new pattern in international relations in Southeast Asia. Although the significance of my visit and of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC is obvious, I expect our people as a confident and self-reliant people to take these events in their stride and regard them as a normal development in our history.

After the doubts and differences which existed in the last two decades, I am going on a journey of good-will, to sow the seeds of mutual understanding and trust between Malaysia and the PRC. I hope that it will be the basis of enduring friendship between our two countries and that it contribute to lasting peace in this part of the world.

Source : Foreign Affairs Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Government Printing Office, 1974), Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1974) p. 40-41.

APPENDIX 31: SPEECH BY CHOU EN-LAI, PRIME MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AT THE BANQUET GIVEN IN HONOUR OF
TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEIN, PRIME MINISTER OF
MALAYSIA, IN PEKING, MAY 28, 1974.

Your Excellency Resepcted Prime Minister, Tun Haji Abdul Razak, Distinguished Guests from Malaysia, friends and comrades.

We are very glad that Your Excellency Tun Abdul Razak, Prime Minister of Malaysia, has come on our invitation to our country on an official visit.

On behalf of the Chinese Government and the people, I express our warm welcome to Your Excellency the Prime Minister and other distinguished guests from Malaysia. Malaysia is a beautiful and richly endowed country in Southeast Asia. Industrious, valiant and glorious people of various nationalities of Malaysia had a glorious tradition of opposing imperialism and colonialism.

In recent years, the Malaysian people had achieved new successes in safeguarding national independence and sovereignty. In international affairs, Malaysia had actively participated in the activities of the Thirld World countries, and opposed great power hegemonism and power politics. The Malaysian Government's position for the establishment of a Zone of Peace and Neutrality in Southeast Asia gives expression to the desire of the Southeast Asian people to shake off foreign interference and control had won support from many Third World countries.

The Chinese people sincerely wish the Malaysian people still greater victory on their road of advance. Friends and comrades, at present the people of the world are increasingly awakening, advancing with strides amidst great turbulence. The Third World countries are uniting on an ever broader scale and playing an ever greater role in international affairs. They had become the main force in the united struggle of the people of the world against hegemonism. Beset with troubles at home and abroad, the super powers are having an increasingly hard time.

The whole international situation is developing in a direction favourable to the people of the world. The Southeast Asian countries are an important part of the Third World. The realities of Southeast Asia show that the super powers' aggression and expansion are the main source of danger to peace and security in this region. We are convinced that so long as the Southeast Asian people strengthen their unity and persist in struggle they would certainly be able to frustrate super power schemes and safeguard their own independence and sovereignty.

China is a developing Socialist country belonging to the Third World. The Chinese people consistently support the just struggle of all the oppressed nations and oppressed people. This is our internationalist duty. We hold at the same time that the social system of a country can only be chosen and decided by its own people and cannot be imposed by other countries. Countries with different social systems can develop state relations on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and

territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

There is a traditional friendship of more than two thousand years between the peoples of China and Malaysia.

Our two peoples have always sympathised with and supported each other in the common struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

We are glad to see that in recent years the friendship between the peoples of China and Malaysia has made new progress. Trade and friendly exchanges between our two countries had steadily increased. Normalisation of relations between China and Malaysia is in the interest of both peoples. The Governments of China and Malaysia have, through friendly consultations and in the spirit of mutual understanding, reached agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

During Prime Minister Razak's visit to China, our two governments will formally announce the establishment of diplomatic relations, thus opening a new page in the history of China-Malaysia relations. The Chinese Government and people warmly welcome this development. We wish complete success to the visit of H.E. the Prime Minister and other distinguished guests from Malaysia.

Now I propose a toast to the prosperity of Malaysia and the well-being of the people, to the friendship between the peoples of China and Malaysia, to the health of His Majesty the Yang di-

Pertuan Agong of Malaysia, Tuanku Abdul Halim Mu'adzam Shah, to the health of the other distinguished guests from Malaysia, to the health of heads of diplomatic missions and their wives present, and to the health of all friends and comrades present here.

Source : Foreign Affairs Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Government Printing Office, 1974), Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1974), p. 42-43.

APPENDIX 32: SPEECH BY TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEIN, PRIME
MINISTER OF MALAYSIA, AT THE BANQUET GIVEN BY CHOU
EN-LAI, PRIME MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, IN PEKING, MAY 28, 1974.

I was happy to receive your invitation to visit China, Mr. Premier, and I thank you for your warm welcome and for the many courtesies which have been extended to me and members of my Delegation. Your generous words tonight have honoured my country and all Malaysians.

The journey that has brought me to Peking, Mr. Premier, is a reaffirmation and a renewal of the ties which have existed for so long between our two countries and peoples. These ties have not found expression at the official level owing to the political incidents of the past decades. In the last three years, however, there have been growing contacts between our two countries, and our relations can be said to have been resumed on the very practical note of trade and sporting missions. Today, with this journey of mine to China, we seek to set the final seal of formal diplomatic relations between our two countries.

In ancient times, Mr. Premier, the physical barriers of contacts between our two countries and peoples were indeed awesome. Today, it is the barriers of mind and spirit, of misunderstanding and misapprehension, that loom so large in our lives. I believe that these barriers must be crossed, if our two peoples are to

reforge their historic links. Voyagers on such a journey need to be both realistic and imaginative so as to meet both the challenges and the opportunities which lie ahead. These, I know, are the qualities that both our Governments bring to the present enterprise.

Malaysia, Mr. Premier, is a relatively young country, a small country, but like China, an ancient land with its vast continental expanses and immense population, we have a fierce pride in our freedom and independence. Like China, too, whose epic struggle over the centuries to forge an enduring unity, we are zealous of the unity we are moulding out of the diversity of peoples, languages and cultures which are to be found within our shores. Our two countries seek peace in the world, and freedom and justice. We both strive for a life of security, decency and dignity for our peoples. In rediscovering our ties, therefore, I am happy to note these similarities which we share.

I am not, at the same time, losing sight of the differences between us. Nevertheless, I am totally convinced, Mr. Premier, that differences in ideology, in our relative size, and in our approaches to some international issues, should not present obstacles to the development of fruitful relations and beneficial co-operation between our two countries on the basis of mutual respect, equality and peaceful co-existence. Malaysia extends our hand of friendship to all countries which respect us and wish to be friends with us, irrespective of their political ideology or social system. It is in that spirit, I know, that we meet today in Peking, to begin the

long journey ahead, after the vicissitudes of the recent past, of establishing genuine and enduring ties of friendship.

Mr. Premier, the last few years have seen positive developments in the international political scene, characterized by a spirit of mutual accommodation and goodwill. China's own contribution in this direction have been far-reaching. It is important for all of us that we should carefully nurture this spirit so that we may see even more fruitful results.

Nevertheless, we cannot be unaware, Mr Premier, of the conflicts that still beset our world. The countries of Southeast Asia know better than most the ravages of war for we have been its unceasing victims for the last three decades and more. And even today, the prospects of peace in Southeast Asia are by no means certain.

It is all the more important, therefore, that we must each do what we can to contribute towards peace. We in Malaysia choose the part of co-operation in international relations, not the path of conflict. Malaysian foreign policy seeks to avoid tension, to strengthen international co-operation and to bring about a greater awareness of the common interest of every country in a peaceful, just and equitable international order.

Malaysia and its neighbours in Southeast Asia are taking the first steps towards freeing our region from the constant threat of war. We collectively realize that if we do not endeavour to create within our region a climate of peace, others will not dis-

perse the clouds of war for us. The proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia, which the countries of ASEAN have put forward, is the frame-work within which we hope to achieve a secure freedom, lasting peace and greater prosperity for our troubled region. The way ahead will be both difficult and delicate but, because the proposal is designed to serve the interests of all, not deny the rights of any, I am confident of its eventual success. In that long journey that Southeast Asia must take to establish its true rights in the world, the comradeship and help of true companions can only serve to lighten the burdens along the way.

Historically, Mr. Premier, China has always contributed much to Southeast Asia. I am confident that today, in a spirit of mutual understanding and goodwill, China can play a constructive role in promoting the cause of peace and harmony in Southeast Asia. In these different and far more complex time, we in Malaysia warmly welcome the development of relations between us, based on the genuine desire for friendship. In renewing and reaffirming the relations between Malaysia and China by my presence in Peking today, I am fully confident that we can do much to contribute to greater understanding. It is in that spirit I look to the future.

Now it gives me great pleasure to propose a toast :

- to the health of His Excellency Chairman Mao Tse-tung,
- to the health of the acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China, His Excellency Tung Pi-wu,
- to the health of His Excellency Premier Chou En-lai,

— to the prosperity and well-being of China and the Chinese people,

— to the friendship between the peoples of China and Malaysia and the continuous development of the relations between our two countries.

Source : Foreign Affairs Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Government Printing Office, 1974) Vol, 7, No. 2 (June 1974) p. 44-46.

APPENDIX 33: SPEECH BY TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEIN, PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA, AT THE RETURN BANQUET IN HONOUR OF HIS EXCELLENCY, CHOU EN-LAI, PRIME MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, IN PEKING, MAY 31, 1974.

I thank you Mr. Vice-Premier, for the honour you do us this evening, by your presence. May I also extend our warm welcome to the distinguished guests and friends who have so graciously accepted our invitation. I very much regret that since he is under medical advice Premier Chou En-lai is unable to be with us tonight.

Three nights ago, Mr. Vice-Premier, in this very same hall, I expressed the belief that the barriers of mind and spirit, awesome as they may appear, have to be crossed, if our two peoples are to interact again, as we have done through history. Since our arrival in Peking, I had discussions with the leaders of your Government particularly Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai in the spirit of sincerity and frankness and we have been warmly welcomed wherever we went during our stay here. I am therefore, confident that we have made significant breaches in these barriers of mind and spirit, which have some decades kept us apart. The past cannot be undone, but we can resolve to make the present and the future free from the exaggerated fears and understanding each other better and better, will, of course, ~~take~~ time. This is not a matter for surprise or even regret. What is important is that we should move on. Let us begin now to lay, stone by careful

stone, the foundations of enduring and fruitful friendship between our two countries and peoples.

Mr. Vice-Premier, these last few days have been both eventful and pleasant for me. It was a rare pleasure for me to have had the opportunity of meeting with Chairman Mao Tse-tung during this visit. Our discussions ranged over a wide area, covering the challenges as well as the opportunities ahead for our two countries and for the world. I am impressed and gratified by the fact that although we may have different approaches on some issues, we also share a great degree of common interest and common purpose.

In my discussions with Premier Chou, I have found much cause for satisfaction. I am indebted to Premier Chou for the illumination which he has given me of China's views and positions on matters that are of common concern to us. In turn, I have endeavoured during our discussions, Mr. Vice-Premier, to convey to your Government our approaches and our thinking on the ever-changing mosaic of developments particularly in Southeast Asia. The better understanding that I believe we have both thus derived, will contribute to the development of sound relations between our two countries.

Sino-Malaysian relationship is very much in its infancy after the long hiatus of neglect. Our task is to ensure that our infant relations grow strong and healthy, not only for the benefit of our two countries and peoples, but also for others who are friends and with whom we enjoy good relations. Malaysia and China already

have substantial trade links.

Our peoples have had friendly contact with one another in the sports and cultural fields. This good-will that exists between us must be carefully nurtured. No feeling of mistrust and suspicion should be allowed to drive us apart, as in the past. In full realisation of the importance that we attach to our relations, and our confidence that they will develop in friendship in the future, we are able to celebrate tonight the decision taken by our respective governments to enter into diplomatic relations. No act can speak more eloquently of the satisfactory progress of our talks these last few days in Peking. None expresses better, our hope for the enduring friendship of our two countries.

My visit, Mr. Vice-Premier, is admittedly a short one, measured in terms of time. But, if we should use the measure of how much it has contributed to deepening our mutual understanding, it has been timeless. The personal pleasure I drawn from my visit to your country is, I think, obvious. I know that I speak for each and every member of my delegation, when I say that we shall long remember these pleasant days in Peking. The people we have had the opportunity to meet, the splendour of the sights we were privileged to see, and the graciousness of the hospitality extended to us, will remain treasured in our memory for a long time. It is my earnest hope that the ties of friendship we have woven in this short time will expand and endure in the years ahead.

In this spirit, I invite you, Ladies and Gentlemen, to

join me in a toast :

- in honour of H.E. Chairman Mao Tse-tung,
- in honour of H.E. Acting Chairman of the People's Republic of China, Tung Pi-wu,
- in honour of H.E. Premier Chou En-lai,
- in honour of H.E. Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien,
- in honour of all distinguished guests present,
- to the continued prosperity, happiness and well-being of China and of the Chinese people; and
- the enduring friendship between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China.

Source : Foreign Affairs Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia : Government Printing Office) Vol 7, No. 2 (June 1974) pp. 47-48.

APPENDIX 34: "TERMINATION OF CONSULAR RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN".
STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA,
MAY 31, 1974

Upon the release of the Joint Communiqué signed in the People's Republic of China by our Prime Minister YAB Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Hussein and the Premier of the People's Republic of China His Excellency Chou En-lai establishing diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China, the Government of Malaysia will terminate all existing consular relations between Malaysia and Taiwan. The Consul General of Taiwan has been informed in advance to close the Consulate General of Taiwan and all other offices belonging to Taiwan in Kuala Lumpur. These offices will no longer be allowed to operate in Malaysia as from the date of the announcement of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the People's Republic of China. Similarly the Malaysian Consul in Taiwan has been directed to close the Malaysian Consulate in Taipei.

In effect Malaysia will no longer have any official relations with Taiwan. All trade relations, investments and tourism between Malaysia and Taiwan will be continued by private individuals based on people-to-people relations and on a local basis.

Source : Foreign Affair Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Government Printing Office), Vol 7, No. 2 (June 1974) p. 54.

APPENDIX 35: STATEMENT BY TUN HAJI ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEIN, PRIME MINISTER OF MALAYSIA, ON HIS RETURN TO KUALA LUMPUR FROM THE OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, JUNE 2, 1974.

I have just returned from our historic visit to Peking. I am pleased to say that we have been successful in forging a new relationship with the People's Republic of China, a relationship which, I trust will not only benefit our two countries but also contribute to furthering the interests of peace in Southeast Asia and in the larger region of Asia. We have established full diplomatic relations with China and the exchange of Ambassadors will take place soon.

As I said to you before my departure, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC is the culmination of the foreign policy initiatives which we began in September 1970. There is no better indication of the success of those initiatives and of their international acceptance. Our foreign policy of friendship, neutrality and regionalism has come to be accepted by the world as constructive, progressive and worthy of support. We have reason to be proud of what we have achieved in the realm of international affairs.

During my stay in China I had the pleasure of meeting and exchanging views with the chairman Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai as well as other Chinese leaders. These meetings and exchanges of views have been extremely useful and I must say we now have a better

appreciation of each other and the policies of our respective countries. Everywhere I was received with great courtesy and friendliness. This reflects, I feel, the genuine desire of the people of China and their leaders to establish friendly and fruitful relations with our country and our people as well as their respect for us. We have made a sound beginning to a new phase of our relations, based not on vague fears and suspicions but on better and deeper understanding and goodwill.

The Joint Communiqué which Premier Chou En-lai and I signed in Peking at the end of my visit there, embodies the various agreements we have reached as well as the general principles that will guide Sino-Malaysian relations in the future. I assume you have been able to study the Communiqué issued in Peking on 31st May. Its provisions are simple and straightforward but I would now like to amplify on them a little.

The Communiqué covers two broad areas. The first deals with the principles of Sino-Malaysian relations. The second deals with Sino-Malaysian arrangements on the question of nationality of people of Chinese origin resident in Malaysia.

The principles of Sino-Malaysian international relations are covered in the Communiqué by operative paragraphs one to four. They deal first of all with mutual recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. They refer to our mutual adherence to five principles of peaceful coexistence. They specifically draw attention to our mutual opposition to foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion as well as the creation of hegemonies

and spheres of influence in any part of the world. They deal furthermore with the right of a country to a social system chosen and decided by its own people without any foreign interference. Additionally the PRC recognises the Government of Malaysia and respects the independence and integrity of Malaysia, while in turn Malaysia recognises the Government of the PRC as the sole legal Government of China, and acknowledges that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

The above principles have far reaching implications for our internal as well as external affairs. Chairman Mao and Premier Chou and other leaders of China have categorically assured they regard the remnant terrorists in our country as our internal problem, which it is for us to deal with as we think best. The PRC has unequivocally stated that the social system in any country is for the people of that country alone to choose and decide. Our social system has been freely chosen by our people based on our national ideology, the Rukunegara which it is for all of us loyal Malaysians to uphold. The struggle of the terrorists to impose by force another system which has been rejected by our people is hopeless and futile. The PRC recognises Malaysia and its independence and sovereignty. The PRC rejects foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. The terrorists cannot claim that they are fighting for freedom. They are in fact fighting against freedom, against development, against our People's welfare by continuing their mindless terrorism.

I feel, as regards our external relations, that the above

principles provide a sound basis for international relations between States. You are, of course, familiar with our neutralisation policy. Our relations with China will contribute towards realising that objective, as without China's participation and support, no neutrality system in Southeast Asia can work. In this regard, let me add that we will, of course, work in friendship not only with China but also other major powers with interest in this part of the world such as the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan. The principles of interstate behaviour that we and the PRC have formally subscribed to, parallel and complement our own efforts to establish friendship with all countries and to bring peace on a lasting basis to Southeast Asia.

One effect of our relations with the PRC, is the redefined relations that we will have with Taiwan. Our Consulate in Taiwan has been closed, as has the Taiwan Consulate-General and other agencies in Kuala Lumpur. People to people relations with Taiwan will however continue. There is no barrier to Malaysians travelling to Taiwan to visit, to conduct private business, to trade and so on. MAS will continue to operate its services to Taipei, as this falls within the category of people to people relations.

I would now like to turn to the second area of our agreement with the PRC which touches on the citizenship issue. The PRC recognises that as a multi-racial country we have a set of special circumstances to deal with. We are attempting to forge one united nation from our diverse racial groups. The PRC is sympathetic to our efforts towards this end and has indicated unequivocal support

for it. The PRC is illustrating this support by agreeing to several far-reaching and perhaps historic commitments with regard to Overseas Chinese. The PRC believes that the destiny of the Overseas Chinese lies nowhere else than in and with the countries and the peoples that they have lived with for so long, that they should integrate themselves in the countries of their residence, that they should form an integral part of the local society and not consider themselves as separate from it. The PRC and Malaysia both do not recognise dual nationality. People of Chinese origin who have taken up Malaysian nationality are automatically not Chinese nationals. It will therefore be absolutely clear that there would be no future in Malaysia for fence sitters, for people whose loyalties are divided.

As regards those people of Chinese origin who have not acquired Malaysian or a third country nationality and who are permanently resident in Malaysia, it is intended to discuss their problem after the establishment of diplomatic relations. If they desire to become nationals of PRC, Malaysia will recognise them as such, and they should possess documents to identify their nationality and regularise their stay in Malaysia. To minimise hardship and inconvenience and in accordance with our present law, we affirm our present position that permanent residents who have not acquired Malaysian nationality may continue to stay in Malaysia as in the past.

We can be justifiably proud of what we have achieved by this visit to the People's Republic of China. The prestige of Malaysia has never been higher than it is today. The success of

our foreign policy is internationally recognised. Every major power in the world can without equivocation support our policy for friendship because it is directed against no one, our policy of non-alignment because it is fair and objective, our strong commitment to regionalism because it is constructive, and our pursuit of regional neutrality because it would build peace. The favourable results of the visit have not been confined only to our international relations. Our domestic situation will also benefit. We are all Malaysians and our future and those of our children and our children's children, lies here in Malaysia. As Malaysians, we should view our new relationship with the PRC as a logical development of our foreign policy. The PRC mission should be regarded as no more than one other foreign policy. The PRC mission should be regarded as no more than one other foreign mission functioning in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia is engaged in an exciting adventure to build a united country on the basis of the equality, dignity and welfare of all its people. All of us have a role to play in this. So let us unequivocally dedicate ourselves to our own future.

Source : Foreign Affairs Malaysia, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Government Printing Office, 1974) Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1974) p. 55-58.

APPENDIX 36: LIST OF ASSASSINATIONS AND INCIDENTS OF SABOTAGE
 PERPETRATED BY THE CPM CENTRAL, CPM (MARXIST-
 LENINIST) AND THE CPM (REVOLUTIONARY FACTION)
 SINCE 1973 IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA

CPM Central: Assassinations

1. On 12 July 1973, SB(M) Inspector Chin Chin Kooi was assassinated by communist terrorist Lee Swee Ming at his home in Serdang, Kedah.

2. On 22 October 1973, SB(M) Detective Sergeant Chong Kit Onn was assassinated in a coffee shop in Sungei Siput Town, Perak, where subject was having his dinner.

3. On 3 January 1974, SB(M) Detective Lee See Kaw was shot at his home in Malim Nawar in Perak.

4. On 20 April 1974, SB(M) Detective Sergeant Major Lee Yoon Chin was killed at his home at Limbongan, Malacca, while on his way to work.

5. On 24 April 1974, SB(M) Detective Ang Soon Guan was shot at 6 $\frac{1}{4}$ m.s. Ipoh/Chemor Road while on his way home on his motor-cycle. He died on 26 April 1974.

6. On 17 April 1975, SB(M) Detective Foo Kek Wei was shot by four youths in Paloh, Johore, while returning from his rounds.

7. On 17 May 1975, SB(M) Detective Constable Leong Ming Kwong was gunned down in Langkap Police Station, Ipoh, Perak, shortly after leaving a rubber dealer's shop.

8. On 12 June 1975, SB(M) Loh Kam Fook, the Deputy

Superintendent of Batu Gajah Detention Camp, was assassinated outside a departmental store in Batu Gajah, Perak.

9. On 20 June 1975, SB(M) Detective Ong Teng Chin was shot in Ipoh while on his way home.

10. On 21 November 1975, SB(M) Detective Corporal Loh Kam Fong was gunned down in Ujong Pasir, Malacca, while driving home after work.

CPM Central: Incidents of Sabotage

1. On 22 June 1973, a hand grenade exploded in a train, packed with Malaysian soldiers, at Batu Gajah Station, Perak. It was perpetrated by communist terrorists to avenge the deaths of their two comrades killed in Sungei Siput South on 14 April 1973. The explosion killed two passengers (one of whom was a soldier) and injured eleven others, who were mainly army personnel and their wives.

2. On 12 May 1974, a hand grenade was lobbed into the Ayer Itam Police Station in Johore. The explosion damaged the rear portion of the station.

3. On 14 May 1974, a home-made bomb exploded at a railway bridge south of Kluang Town, Johore.

4. On 16 May 1974, a bomb damaged a railway sleeper about 6 miles south of Kluang Town, Johore.

5. On 23 and 24 May 1974, about 100 communist terrorists sabotaged with explosives a total of 66 road-building bulldozers and tractors scattered along a 6-mile pilot track on the East-West Highway, about 20 miles east of Grik, Perak. Only the engine

compartments of the machines were destroyed, thereby rendering them unserviceable. The damage was estimated to be \$10-12 million.

6. On 11 August 1974, communist terrorists partially damaged a crane used in the construction of the Temenggor Dam, about $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of Grik, Perak.

7. On 19 August 1974, communist terrorists sabotaged a bulldozer in a logging camp at Kampong Sungei Kuak, in the Kroh area of Perak.

8. On 18 October 1974, communist terrorists blew up three bulldozers with 15-20 pounds of plastic explosives in an area about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles east of Padang Senai, Kedah. The total cost of damage was estimated to be about \$150,000.

9. On 29 April 1975, MNLF elements set fire to eight police posts in Kuala Lumpur, three of which were badly damaged.

10. On 26 August 1975, a bomb explosion badly damaged the National Monument in Lake Garden, Kuala Lumpur.

11. On 15 October 1975, a goods train was damaged by 30 pounds of plastic explosives about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Kemubu, Ulu Kelantan. Eleven wagons were derailed and damage was estimated to be about \$800,000.

CPM (Marxist-Leninist): Assassinations

1. On 18 January 1973, SB(M) DSP Wong Lim Hong was shot dead at Jalan Imbi, Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, while he was returning to his office after lunch. In the absence of motive for the killing, it is believed that he was assassinated by the CPM elements.

2. On 7 June 1974, the Malaysian IGP (Inspector-General of Police), Tan Sri Abdul Rahman Hashim, was assassinated in Kuala

Lumpur while on his way to work. His driver was shot in the neck. Radio Hanoi has claimed that he was gunned down by the guerillas.

3. On 18 May 1975, SB(M) Detective Sergeant Tong Weng Poh was shot in Jalan Alor, Kuala Lumpur, while having supper with his family in a restaurant. He was killed on the spot.

4. On 27 July 1975, Lim Hee Way, a Police Constable of Signal Branch, Negri Sembilan, was shot in Bukit Rasah, Seremban, Negri Sembilan, while driving home with his family.

5. On 13 November 1975, Datuk Koo Chong Kong, the Chief Police Officer of Perak, was shot in Ipoh, Perak, while on his way home for lunch. He died the following day (14 November 1975). His driver, Police Constable Yeong Peng Cheong, was also shot and he died instantly on 13 November 1975.

CPM (Marxist-Leninist): Incidents of Sabotage

1. On 31 March 1975, six incidents of rocket attacks occurred at the following places:

- a) No. 8 Police Field Force camp at Simpang Rengam, Johore;
- b) RMAF Base at Kuala Lumpur (twice);
- c) Seginting Military Camp at Port Dickson, Negri Sembilan;
- d) Sabatang Karah Military Camp at Port Dickson, Negri Sembilan; and
- e) 13th Territorial Army Camp at Batu Uban, Penang.

Note: At each of these places, three rockets were fired from home-made launching pads through a time device. Seven of the rockets exploded but damage caused was

negligible. During the second attack of the RMAF Base at Kuala Lumpur, the three rockets fired almost completely wrecked a Carribeau aircraft.

2. On 3 September 1975, a grenade attack was made on the Police Field Force Bridge Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, fifty-two of the PFF members were injured and two were killed.

3. On 24 September 1975, two incidents of rocket attacks also occurred as follows:

- a) One rocket was fired at the Baling Information Office, Kedah. Damage was negligible;
- b) Four rockets were fired into the 7th Malaysian Ranger's Camp in Sungei Pattani, Kedah. Damage was also negligible.

CPM (Revolutionary Faction): Sabotage

1. On 17 February 1975, at Rimba Mas, Perlis, a goods train with thirty-two empty coaches from Seberang Prai, en route to Padang Besar, Perlis, was damaged. There were three explosions which resulted in the derailment of five empty coaches and damage to the diesel engine and 100 yards of the rail line.

Recovery of Grenades, Detonators, Ammunition, Revolvers and Pistols Discovered in Singapore since 1973

1. On 17 June 1974, a leading figure of the MNLF in Singapore was arrested in Singapore. Recovered from his house were the following :

- a) a .32 Llama Automatic pistol loaded with 8 live

rounds in the magazine and one round in the chamber;

- b) an unmarked hand grenade;
- c) 33 rounds of .32 ammunition;
- d) a SAF electric detonator, No. 8;
- e) 2 sticks of gelignite (manufactured in Glasgow); and
- f) a home-made hand grenade casing.

2. On 19 June 1974, recovered from the house of another MNLF cadre in Singapore were the following :

- a) 6 sticks of gelignite;
- b) 15 detonators; and
- c) 5 sticks of hollow iron pipes (meant to be used as improvised bombs).

3. On 11 July 1974, a MNLF cadre was arrested in Singapore. He led a party to Malacca on 18 July 1974, to recover some firearms. Subsequently, the following were recovered:

- a) a Colt Automatic .32;
- b) 2 Llama Special .38;
- c) 48 rounds of 9 mm ammunition;
- d) 88 rounds of .39 ammunition;
- e) 4 sticks of gelignite;
- f) 4 detonators;
- g) 4 Llama Magazines; and
- h) 3 Colt magazines.

Note: One of the revolvers was used by the MNLF cadre to assassinate a SB(M) detective in Malacca on 20 April 1974.

4. On 7 and 8 July 1975, a long-standing member of the CPM,

after his arrest, led a police party to his house in Singapore where the following items, concealed in earthen jars and buried were recovered:

- a) 189 hand grenades;
- b) 210 detonators;
- c) a .38 revolver;
- d) a .25 Colt Automatic pistol; and
- e) 75 rounds of ammunition.

Note: The .38 revolver was one of the two revolvers stolen from the police constables in Singapore by CPM elements in August 1950 and later used for the assassination of a Chinese High School student at Cairnhill on 17 April 1955.

5. On 30 July 1975, another 109 hand grenades in two earthen jars were found buried in the compound of another CPM member's house in Singapore.

6. On 26 February 1976, two detonators, one home-made grenade, a timing device and two sets of wired batteries were recovered from the house of a leading member of the Malayan People's Liberation League (MPLL) in Singapore. The explosives were intended for setting booby traps at Queensway, to commemorate the 1st anniversary, on 1 August 1975, of the CPM (M-L).

Source : Adapted from C.V. Devan Nair, Socialism That Works: The Singapore Way (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1976) pp. 221-224.

APPENDIX 37: COMMUNIST TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (CTO) OF THE MALAYAN
COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP)

	Military Units	Support and Subversive Units
MCP (P) — the original or proper party	5th/6th/8th Assault Units from 12th Regiment 10th Independent Combat Platoon from the 10th Regiment ASAL group of Chinese, dealing with the Orang Asli (Aborigines), from 5th Regiment Operational Area: east of the Sungei (River) Patani <div style="display: inline-block; vertical-align: middle; margin-left: 10px;"> Known as the Malayan National Liberation </div>	Malayan National Liberation Front (MNLF) Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL)
MCP (ML) — the Marxist-Leninist splinter group	Small units from the Second District of the 12th and 10th Regiments, barely identifiable Operational area: west of the Sungei Patani	Malayan People's Liberation League (MNLL)
MCP (RF) — the second, Revolutionary Faction splinter group	No known regular formations Operational area: the Sadao area of southern Thailand north of Betong	Malayan Peoples' Liberation Front (MNLF)

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 97, No.35, September 2, 1977, p. 42.

APPENDIX 38: COMPOSITION OF COMMUNIST TERRORISTS (CTs)

By Nationality		By Race
Malaysians		
Chinese	732	1,416 Chinese
Malays	107	616 Malays (of whom 509 are Thai Muslims)
Indians		22 Others
Chinese	36	
Muslims		
Aborigines		
Thai	1,177	
Japanese	2	
	<hr/> 2,054	<hr/> 2,054

The Japanese are believed to be World War II hold-outs.

All 2,054 CTs are registered (known by name): the total estimated number of CTs is 3,000, of whom about 250 have infiltrated back from the Betong salient of Thailand into the Malaysian states of Kedah, Perak, Kelantan and Sabang.

Source: Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 35, September 2, 1977, p. 42.

APPENDIX 39: IMPORTANT PARTY DOCUMENTS

THESES OF THE SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ON THE REVOLUTIONARY
MOVEMENT IN THE COLONIES¹

The immediate tasks of the Communist Parties of the imperialist countries in the colonial question bear a threefold character. In the first place, the establishment of regular connections between the Communist Parties and the revolutionary trade union organizations of the imperialist centres, on the one hand, and the corresponding revolutionary organizations of the colonies on the other hand. The connections hitherto established between the Communist Parties of the imperialist centres and the revolutionary organizations of the corresponding colonial countries, with the exception of a few cases, cannot be regarded as adequate. This fact can only in part be explained by objective difficulties. It is necessary to recognize that so far not all the parties in the Communist International have fully understood the decisive significance of the establishment of close, regular and constant relations with the revolutionary movements in the colonies for the purpose of affording these movements active support and immediate practical help. Only in so far as the Communist Parties of the imperialist countries render in fact practical assistance to the revolutionary movement in the colonies, in so far as their help actually facilitates the struggle of the corresponding

¹G. Safarov, Marx and The East (New York, Workers Library Publishers, 1934), pp. 45-48.

colonial countries against imperialism can their position in the colonial question be recognized as a genuinely Bolshevik one. In this lies the criterion of the revolutionary activity in general.

The second series of tasks consists in genuine support of the struggle of the colonial peoples against imperialism through the organization of mass demonstrations and other effective activities of the proletariat. In this sphere, the activity of the Communist Parties of the big capitalist countries has also been insufficient. The preparation and organization of such demonstrations of solidarity must undoubtedly become one of the basic elements of Communist agitation among the mass of the workers of the capitalist countries. The Communists must expose the true spoliatory character of the capitalist colonial regime by all the agitational means at its disposal (press, public demonstrations, parliamentary platform); they must mercilessly tear aside the network of lies with the help of which the colonial system is represented as an affair of civilization and general progress. A special task in this sphere is the struggle against missionary organizations, which act as one of the most effective levers for imperialist expansion and for enslavement of the colonial peoples.

The Communists must mobilize the wide masses of workers and peasants in the capitalist countries on the basis of the demand for granting, unconditionally and without reservation, complete State independence and sovereignty to the colonial peoples. The fight against the bloody suppression of colonial risings, against

armed intervention of the imperialists against the national revolutions, against the growth of the military aggressiveness of imperialism, with its new armed seizures of territory, demands from the international proletariat systematic, organized and self-sacrificing struggle. It is necessary to take into account the lessons to be drawn from the fact that not a single section of the Communist International in the capitalist countries has succeeded to an adequate degree in mobilizing the masses for active support of the Chinese revolution against the unceasing attacks of world imperialism. The preparations for world war, the attack of the imperialists against the peoples of "their" colonies, with a view to their "pacification", places the task of active support for the colonial revolution in the centre of attention and struggle for the proletariat of the capitalist countries.

Striving for the immediate recall of the armed forces of imperialism from the oppressed countries, the Communist Parties must work unceasingly for the organization of mass action in order to prevent the transport of troops and munitions to the colonies.

The struggle against the colonial policy of social-democracy must be looked upon by the Communist Party as an organic constituent part of its struggle against imperialism. The Second International, by the position it adopted on the colonial question at its last Congress in Brussels, has finally given sanction to what has already always been the practical activity of the different socialist parties of the imperialist countries during the post-war years. The colonial policy of social-democracy is a policy of

active support of imperialism in the exploitation and oppression of the colonial people. It has officially adopted the point of view which lies at the basis of the organization of the 'League of Nations', according to which the ruling classes of the developed capitalist countries have the 'right' to rule over the majority of the people of the globe and to subject these peoples to a cruel regime of exploitation and enslavement. In order to deceive a portion of the working class and to secure its cooperation in the maintenance of the colonial regime of plunder, social-democracy, in the most shameful and repulsive manner, defends the exploits of imperialism in the colonies. It disguises the real content of the capitalist colonial system, it wilfully ignores the connection between colonial policy and the danger of a new imperialist war, which is threatening the proletariat and toiling masses of the whole world. Where-ever the indignation of the colonial peoples finds vent in the emancipatory struggle against imperialism, social-democracy, notwithstanding its lying phrases, in practice always stands on the side of the imperialist executioners of the revolution. During the last few years, the socialist parties of all the capitalist countries have been voting for the credits which the governments of these countries demand for the carrying on of war against the colonial peoples struggling for their freedom (Morocco, Syria, Indonesia), they themselves take a direct part in the business of colonial exploitation (French socialists act as governors in the colonies at the appointment of imperialist governments, the socialist cooperatives of Belgium participate in colonial enterprises for the exploitation of the Negro population of the Congo), and they approve of the most cruel measures

for the suppression of colonial uprisings (defence by the leaders of the British Labour Party of intervention in China, the activity of the Dutch Socialist Party in defence of the suppression of the insurrection in Indonesia). The social-democrat theory, alleging that the capitalist colonial regime can be reformed and converted into a 'good colonial regime', is a mask behind which the social-democrats attempt to conceal their true social-imperialist character. The Communists must tear this mask from them and demonstrate to the toiling masses of the imperialist countries that the socialist parties are the collaborators and direct accomplices of imperialist colonial policy, that they have in this sphere betrayed in the most flagrant fashion their own socialist programme and that they have become an agency of imperialist plunder in the imperialist countries and in the colonies.

The Communists must pay the greatest attention to the attempt of the social-democrats, made with the aid of the capitalist governments, to extend their influence in the colonies and to establish there their own sections and organizations. These attempts correspond to the policy of that portion of the imperialist colonizers which makes it its aim to reinforce its position in the colonies by the buying up of definite strata of the native population. The specific conditions obtaining in some colonies may lend a certain success to these attempts and lead to the temporary development of a reformist movement in these countries under the influence of the social-democracy of the capitalist countries. The tasks of the Communists must be to wage a decisive struggle against such attempts,

to expose the colonial policy of the socialists before the native masses and in this way to direct against the social democratic leaders - servants of imperialism - the same well-deserved hatred which the oppressed colonial peoples bear against the imperialists.

In all these spheres, the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries can only achieve success if they also carry on an intensive propaganda in their own ranks in order to explain the Communist attitude to the colonial question, in order to eradicate completely every vestige of social-democratic ideology in this question and to resist any possible deviation from the correct Leninist line.

CONSTITUTION OF THE MALAYAN

COMMUNIST PARTY²

Article One: Name

The Malayan Communist Party is an affiliate of the Communist International - designated as the Malayan Communist Party.

Article Two: Qualifications for Party Membership

I. Those entering the party organization must recognize the platform and constitution of the Communist International and the party, and must also pay dues, to be assessed equally from all party members.

² Issued by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party, 6 March 1934. Translated from: Ma-lai-ya kung-ch'an-tang chang-cheng yu-tieh ti chi-lu (The Constitution and Iron Discipline of the Malayan Communist Party), pp. 1-18.

II. New members must enter the party through one of the following procedures:

a. Workers, peasants, and soldiers must be nominated by one party member, be processed through a party cell and undergo a two-month probationary period.

b. Skilled workers, tradesmen, the intelligentsia, students and government workers must be nominated by two party members, be processed through a party cell, and undergo a probationary period of three months.

c. Petty bourgeoisie must be nominated by two party members, be processed through the highest local (state or municipal) party organ and undergo a four-month probationary period.

d. Former party members must undergo the supervision of two party members for a period of one year, be processed through the Central Committee and undergo a probationary period as decided upon by the Central Committee.

Addenda

1. Individuals nominated are the responsibility of the nominator. However, in the event the nominator proves unreliable, he should be disciplined - even to a point of being expelled from the party.

2. During the period of probation, new party members who have not yet attained regular party status should be assigned certain duties by their cell so that their progress can be watched and so that they can fully comprehend their obligation to the party.

3. Probationary members are not entitled to vote or representation.

4. Under certain circumstances, party committees at each echelon have the authority to accept or process new party members.

5. The probationary period for new party members shall expand or contract according to their behaviour. The decision on this, however, must be agreed upon by the state(local) or municipal committee.

e. Organizational changes: Reorganization of political organs or bodies, either those being admitted to or already in the Malayan Communist Party, is subject to the sanction of the Central Committee.

f. Party members who move: Party members who move from the jurisdictional area of one organ to another, or who move their homes from one region to another, should apply to the Central Committee for future work assignment.

g. The Problem of Expulsion of Party Members: The expulsion of Party members should be a matter taken under consideration by the entire membership of the branch, this to be acted upon by a senior party echelon. While awaiting action from higher echelons, the member subject to expulsion should not be allowed to continue in any party activities. Those not in agreement with the decision for expulsion, should submit their case to the supreme party organ. Party committees on all levels have the authority to expel directly

any member engaging in anti-party activities. Nevertheless, all decisions for expulsion of a party member should be transmitted down through each party organ.

Article Three: The Principles of Party Organization and Its Organizational System

The organizational principles of the various branches of the Malayan Communist Party and the Communist International are basically the principles of democratic centralism. These are as follows:

I. Lower and higher party echelons are to be **elected by** a representative assembly of party members and by the National Congress.

II. Each party echelon should report its own decisions concerning the election of its own members.

III. Lower echelons must accept the decisions of senior party echelons, adhere to the iron discipline of the party, and execute the orders of the Communist International and the party leadership organs.

IV. Under conditions of secrecy, where a certain type of work is necessary, the senior leadership organ can direct a junior leadership organ, with the sanction of the senior leadership organ, to accept new party members entering the party organization.

V. The Party, according to the principle of a regional

division in its regulation of the organization of a region, as regards the organization of groups within said region, shall make no distinction between races and nationalities in party membership. All members entering state or municipal party organs shall be known as members of the Malayan Communist Party.

VI. Each echelon within the party organization has the authority to make independent decisions on all local issues, this within the jurisdictional bounds of the Communist International and the (Malayan Communist) Party.

VII. The highest organ of each party unit is the Party Congress, the Representative Assembly and the Plenary Congress.

VIII. The Party Representative Congress or the All-Malayan National Congress elects the Executive Committees of each party organ. During the period neither congress is in session, the executive committees of individual organizations are charged with the supervision of routine activities.

IX. All newly created party organizations must be subjected to the approval of higher party organizations.

X. The organizational system of the party is as follows:

a. Factories, mines, plantations, steamships, railroads, schools, shops, streets, small towns, military units and villages shall have a party cell, a Cell Representative Committee, a Cell Executive Committee and groups (i.e. sub-divisions of cells).

b. Rural and urban areas shall have a District Party

Congress or a District Representative Assembly and a District Committee.

c. Within the jurisdictional boundaries of States and cities there shall be a State or Municipal Representative Committee and a District Committee.

d. Within the jurisdiction of Special Districts, there shall be a Special District Representative Assembly and a Special District Committee. The decision on the organization of a Special District must come from the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party.

e. Within the jurisdiction of all Malaya, there shall be an All-Malayan Congress and a Central Committee.

XI. In order to assist in the direction of the scope of work of each party organ, the Central Committee can send special representatives from the Central Executive Bureau or the Central Committee to a number of provincial or municipal areas in accordance with the needs of existing conditions. Special representatives of the Central Executive Bureau or of the Central Committee are the direct representatives of the Central Committee and are responsible only to the Central Committee.

XII. In order to deal with the handling of special party duties, such groups as an Organizational Department, Propaganda Department, Workers Work Committee, Women's Committee, Youth Work Committee, and a Soldiers Work Committee, etc., should be set up by local party organs and committees. These should function under their own leadership. However, in carrying out their own and the

local committee's decisions, all lower organs are responsible to the Central Committee.

Addenda

In order to simplify policy, however, the highest organs set up on the state level, such as local committees, shall process the reports of all lower organs.

Article Four: Cells

I. The basic organization of the party is the party cell. Party members who work in factories, shops, mines, on railroads, on highways, in villages, and in the army, etc., should unite in a cell. If there are three or more party members in an area, they can then set up a party cell. However, they should apply to the local committee or district committee for permission to do so.

II. Special Cell Organizations: When one or two party members work in a particular business, they can join up with the party cell organized in the nearest or neighbouring business. No matter what kind of business a party member is engaged in - but especially if he is a factory worker, a handicraft worker or a member of the intelligentsia - he should use his own neighbourhood as a model and organize street cells or, for example, if he lives in a village, he can organize cells in accordance with the small industries operating there.

III. Cell Functions. The duties of the cell are as follows:

a. To utilize the strength of party organization to increase

positively the politico-economic struggle of the workers and peasants, to use the concept of revolutionary class struggle to agitate for the demands of the workers and peasants, and to organize the revolutionary force of the masses towards a total revolutionary struggle of the proletariat of all Malaya.

b. To collect dues from and educate new party members, to distribute party publications to party and non-party workers and peasants, and to carry on cultural and political education among the masses.

c. Cell Executive Committee: Depending on the number of members in the cell, three, five or seven members should be elected to the Cell Executive Committee. This committee is charged with the conduct of daily affairs, carrying out cell work, delegating work to individual party members within the cell, etc. Each Cell Executive Committee should elect a secretary to see to it that the decisions of the Party Congress, the cell and the senior party organs are carried out, etc.

Article Five: District Organization

I. District Representative Congress: Within the jurisdiction of the district, the senior party organ is the All-Party Congress or the Representative Congress, made up of delegates from each cell. The District Party Congress or Representative Congress, shall accept or sanction the reports of district committees. They shall elect district committees and be attended by the representatives of local committees or municipal representative congresses.

II. The District Committee: The District Committee shall direct party affairs within the district during the period the All-Party Congress or Representative Congress is not in session. The District Committee should meet secretly every month or so to conduct routine business. A Daily Affairs Committee should be elected from the membership of the District Committee and should meet weekly. This can be altered under special circumstances.

Article Six: Local (State) or Municipal Organization

I. State or Municipal Representative Congress: Within the jurisdiction of each state or municipality, the highest organ should be the State or Municipal Representative Congress. It should meet twice yearly. The wishes of the State or Municipal Representative Congress shall be made known to the All-Malayan Congress by elected representatives of those organizations.

II. Local or Municipal Committee: The Local or Municipal Committee is to be elected by a State or Municipal Representative Congress. In the period when the Representative Congress is not in session, the Local or Municipal Committee shall be the highest organ within the state or municipality. Such committees shall meet once every few months or every half year. A Daily Affairs Committee shall be elected to carry on routine work and a secretary should be elected to supervise routine activities. The election of the secretary is subject to the approval of the highest party organ.

III. The Organization of the State and Municipal Committee. The State and Municipal Committee should carry out the decisions of the State and Municipal Representative Congress and the Central

Committee. Such committees are to be organized with a propaganda, woman's work, and peasant movement section, etc. The State or Municipal Committee should supervise the distribution of all published party directives, administer all party duties within the jurisdiction of the province or municipality, act as the senior party organ when the State or Municipal Representative Congress is not in session and carry out the tasks outlined by senior party organs.

IV. The State Committee: Wherever a Municipal Committee has not been established, the work of all party organizations within the municipality shall be supervised by the State Committee. Organs functioning within the sub-divisions of a given municipality shall be under the overall direction of the Municipal Committee.

V. Municipal Committee: Municipal Committees have jurisdiction over all areas within the municipality and also over cells of all villages or areas within the immediate vicinity of the municipality. All areas in which a Municipal Committee is set up, and where there is no Special District Committee, shall come under the jurisdiction of State Committees or the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party.

VI. The Special District Committee: In areas where a Special District Committee is set up, it shall do its party work in accordance with the regulations laid down by the all-State and municipal organizations. Special Districts shall establish a direct liaison with the Central Committee and shall function according to the regulations of the State and Municipal Committee.

Article Seven: The All-Malayan Party Conference

I. An All-Malayan Party Conference shall be convened once a year. One delegate shall be elected from each one thousand party members, as decided upon by the Central Committee.

II. The majority decisions of the All-Malayan Party Conference are subject to the review of the Central Committee and are then to be promulgated as orders.

III. The All-Malayan Party Conference is to be convened immediately prior to the Congress of the Communist International. It should elect representatives to attend the World Representative Congress of the Communist International, subject to the confirmation of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

Article Eight: The All-Malayan Party Congress

I. The All-Malayan Party Congress is the highest organ of the party. According to standard procedure, it is convened on the authority of either the Communist International or the Central Committee. The All-Malayan Party Congress, however, can be convened on orders from the Central Committee, by direction of the Communist International, by direction of the preceding congress or by the Central Committee in the event a majority of the party members so desire. However, the convening of a provisional congress of the All-Malayan Congress must be agreed upon by the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The All-Malayan Party Congress can make decisions only when its delegates represent more than one half

the total party membership. The date for convening the All-Malayan Party Congress must be decided upon by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, by the Central Committee or by the preceding session of the All-Malayan Party Congress.

II. The All-Malayan Party Congress has the authority to:

- a. Receive and examine the reports of the Central Committee.
- b. Make decisions on problems related to party law.
- c. Arrive at majority decisions related to all problems of political policy, organization, etc.
- d. Elect the members of the Central Committee, investigate the actions of the Central Committee, etc.

III. Representatives to the All-Malayan Party Congress should be elected from the Provincial, Municipal and Special District Representative Congress. However, under circumstances of secrecy, a representative of the Communist International can select the representatives from the State, Municipal and Special District Committees. On orders from the Executive Committee of the Communist International, an All-Malayan Provisional Party Congress can function in lieu of an All-Malayan Representative Party Congress.

Article Nine: The Central Committee

I. The numerical size of the Central Committee is to be decided upon by all the All-Malayan Congress.

II. When the All-Malayan Congress is not in session, the Central Committee is the supreme party organ. It represents the

party in its relationships with other political parties, sets up organs within the party, directs all party political and organizational work, supervises the activities of all subordinate party organs, promulgates reports according to existing conditions, has the authority to appoint special Chinese representatives in the various state and municipal organs of the party, can establish a Central Executive Bureau to carry out the publication and dissemination of party doctrine, manage party finances, policies and make special appraisals, etc., of current conditions.

III. The Central Committee will convene a Plenary Session once every three months.

IV. A Political Bureau will be elected from the membership of the Central Committee and is charged with directing the political work of the Central Committee when the Central Committee is not in session. A Routine Affairs Committee is to be elected to carry on routine day-by-day work.

V. The Central Committee will set up a department according to each type of work, such as a Propaganda Department, an Agitation Department, an Organization Department, A Workman's Mobilization Committee, a Women's Movement Committee, a Peasant Movement Committee, a mobilization committee for each of the national minorities, etc. The duties of each department and each committee shall be defined and carried out under the direction of the Central Committee. The Central Committee shall designate a chairman for each of the departments and committees. The chairman shall have the authority to act

on behalf of the Central Committee itself.

VI. The Central Committee shall consider as standard the economic and political articles and shall determine the party organization in the various areas, and their spheres of activity shall be in accordance with the administrative areas of all Malaya and of the separate districts.

Article Ten: The Investigative Committee

In order to review the economic and political records of each party organ and the course of the work of each party organization, the All-Malayan Party Congress and the Provincial and Municipal Congresses shall have the authority to elect a Central Investigative Committee.

Article Eleven: Party Discipline

I. Obedience to party discipline is the highest duty of a party member and each party organ.

The decisions of the Communist International and the Malayan Communist Party, the All-Malayan Congress, the Central Committee and each senior echelon must be carried out with dispatch and completeness. Before decisions within the party become final, however, individual criticism is allowed.

II. Failure to carry out the decisions of a senior party organ and errors within the party organization are subject to party discipline. The procedure for carrying out party discipline is as follows: A provincial committee shall be designated, which has the authority to abrogate the party organ in question or, in the case

of an individual, to expel or punish the offender.

When a breach of party discipline is uncovered, it should be investigated by the Party Congress or senior party organ. Before this, each party echelon should set up a special committee to carry on an inquiry in order to correct the breach of party discipline. The decisions of these special committees, after review by senior party echelons, should be carried out

Article Twelve: Party Economics

I. Party expenses are met by dues assessed from party members.

II. Dues for party expenses are to be collected from party members under the supervision of the Central Committee as follows:

a. Comrades employed in industry who earn \$5.00 should pay ten cents monthly; those whose wages are \$10.00 should pay fifty cents in dues; those whose wages are \$15.00 should pay one dollar; those whose wages are \$20.00 should pay two dollars; those whose wages are \$25.00 should pay three dollars; and those whose wages are \$30.00 should pay four dollars. Individuals earning \$50.00 and more a month should contribute dues as determined by their own personal circumstances.

b. Unemployed workers, the completely impoverished, the ill and party members in special difficulty are exempted from paying party dues.

c. Failure to pay party dues for three consecutive months is sufficient grounds for expulsion from the party. Notice of this should be made before the party congress.

d. Under extenuating circumstances, the party can undertake the solicitation of special contributions.

Article Thirteen: Party Organizations³

I. In non-party organizations - factories, villages, social groups, cultural organizations, etc. ... where there are three or more party members, a Party Organization can be set up.

The function of such a Party Organization is to strengthen the influence of the party in the non-party group, to carry out the political policies of the party and to supervise the work of party members in non-party organizations.

Such Party Organizations should elect a Daily Affairs Committee and a secretary to carry out routine work. The Party Organization has independent authority to handle problems of an internal nature and all daily issues.

In the event the Party Committee and the Party Organization have a disagreement, the Party Committee should discuss the important problems and arrive at a decision with the representatives of the Party Organization. Such decisions then must be followed to the letter by the Party Organization

IRON DISCIPLINE OF THE PARTY⁴

³The characters for "party organization" are tang-t'uan.

⁴Decisions of the Standing Committee, Central Committee, Malayan Communist Party, 13 June 1940. Ma-lai-ya kung-ch'an-tang chang-cheng yu-tieh ti chi-lu, pp. 19-26.

I. Important Points of Discipline

A. Obedience

1. Before decisions are agreed upon in a meeting, everyone is entitled to voice his own opinion; but once decisions are made final, the minority must obey the majority. If such decisions are not settled then there cannot be a unified concept, purpose within the organization will not be uniform and our mutual struggle against the enemy will certainly face disaster.

2. Lower organs must determinedly execute the decisions and orders of higher organs. At the same time, higher organs have the authority to dissolve or reorganize lower organs. This insures a uniformity of method within the party, and protects against inner-party factionalism. Without this we cannot call for solidarity and uniformity of action.

3. Party members must obey the Party Congress and the decisions of the Central Executive Committee. If the individual is not at one with the Party - everyone acting independently - then we cannot assemble the many into a single mutual action.

4. If a member or lower party organ does not wish to accept the decisions of a senior party organ, the issue may be submitted to a higher organ for final decision. Until the decision is given, however, the original order must be carried out. It should be kept in mind that obedience is all-important here.

B. Sacrifice

1. The privilege of self-sacrifice is fundamental both in work and practice. This privilege is the highest glory a Communist Party member can attain.

2. In the struggle, each Party member must bravely stand at the forefront of the masses, directing and leading the masses, no matter how great the enemy oppression may be. Members of the Communist Party, acting as the model vanguard of the people, can lead them forward to victory in the revolution.

3. The struggle of the proletariat must continue, regardless of enemy brutality or force. No sacrifice of blood is too great in the service of the proletariat. According to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, each Bolshevik must embody the spirit of self-sacrifice, defeating the enemy with whatever means are possible.

C. Attendance at Meetings

1. Meetings called by the Executive Committee or senior party echelon must be attended.

2. While the meeting is in session, all requests to leave must be made to the chairman. Attendance at meetings is an important affair. At such meetings party policies and duties are explained, educational instruction and training are given, etc. Those who absent themselves from party meetings should be disciplined. Absence from three such meetings is sufficient grounds for expulsion from the party.

3. When a member is absent from a meeting, he must first go

to the secretary of that particular organization and explain fully his reasons for being absent.

D. Paying Dues

1. Paying Party dues is the duty of a party member. Without such dues, the party would not be able to function. At the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Malayan Communist Party, held in April 1939, it was resolved that any member who did not pay his dues for three months was to be expelled. If a Party member can live for one day, then he can pay dues for one day. Self-interest and selfishness are anti-Communist manifestations.

E. Joining Organizations

1. Whenever a party member joins a non-political group, he should report this to the Executive Committee of his cell and await its sanction. Those elected to an organization should report their election to the party and await final party action on this matter.

2. Whenever a party member joins a political group he should first report this to the party and await the decision of the State Committee, Municipal Committee or the Central Committee. Before joining such an organization, he should apply to the State or Central Committee for permission to do so.

3. Party members should accept party direction as to joining or leaving such organizations.

F. Moving

Whenever a party member moves, he should report this to the local party organization and await its decision. On occasions, he can apply to the party organization in the new region for permission to transfer into it. Because the party is a revolutionary combat force, the area held by each party member is of the greatest importance and if an individual moves on his own initiative, the party will lose track of him and consequently lose part of its own potency. Such an individual would be a great loss to the party, to the proletariat, and to the masses. Therefore, he should obey the rules and accept the party's decision on this matter as final.

II. The Discipline of Party Life

A. The minority obeys the majority - junior echelons obey senior echelons - party privileges apply equally to all.

B. Individual duty should be subordinated to the duties of the whole group. Everyone working together can most effectively carry out the decisions of the committees. The position of the individual must always be subordinated to the will of the party.

C. The functions, feelings, action, beliefs and speech of a party member are all of concern to the party.

D. In work, the party member must always obey orders. When the decision is not yet fully agreed upon, the party member is free to voice his own opinion, but once a majority vote is taken, he must carry out such decisions faithfully.

III. Party Discipline in Thought

Party organizations or individuals, no matter whether they be agitating or leading a struggle or be performing a routine task, if they uncover the tendency of a comrade which is injurious to party affairs, must never compromise or keep such a discovery a secret. The moment he becomes aware of this, he should begin a determined thought struggle towards that element - whether it be a party organ or individual member. Those who oppose the principles as stated above should be disciplined.

Comrades, we know the enemy is continually attacking the party and the revolution. Not only is he stepping up his suppression of the national revolutionary struggle, but he has also hired spies, sending these running dogs out to penetrate our organization, anxiously scheming to cripple our party from within. For example, there is the enemy's recent all-out night and day training of hundreds of so-called political spies.

By this we can see that the enemy does not take the problem lightly. Therefore, the party must maintain a unified spirit to overcome this vulnerability. If the Party of the Bolsheviki does not determinedly carry out an iron discipline, relegating Bolshevism to the status of an empty word, then the party will find no place of salvation under the continual external and internal assaults of the enemy.

IV. Carrying Out Discipline

In this manner, in recent times, many important party organs have been destroyed and cadres lost. There are many comrades who

look down upon party discipline and foolishly betray secrets of the party organization.

The Central Committee urgently entreats all party comrades: You should commit to memory all the details of party discipline, examine closely the fundamental concepts of each principle and struggle to see to it that all comrades come to the self-realization of the need to adhere to discipline. At the same time, each and every comrade in the party should turn himself into a party disciplinarian, advancing party discipline and struggle so that if you should happen to discover a party comrade disregarding party discipline, then you should begin a relentless struggle towards that person without regard to personal ties. There is absolutely no room for individual feelings in this matter. In the struggle against deviation, where a comrade has made his first mistake, you should call him (or them) together and employ the method of persuasion and education in winning him over. If, in the course of time, this individual reverts to his old ways or does not change, then in obedience to party rules, you should point this out to the party so that this individual can be punished and then write a communiqué, to be circulated to all party comrades for general discussion.

The Central Committee wishes especially to impress upon the comrades of local committees, municipal committees and even cells that you are the backbone of the party and you must, therefore, set an example to the whole party in carrying out party discipline. Today, you should instantly begin an examination movement of the whole party as to the activities of the party, discipline, the three

points, and the duties of party members. We must draw up a plan to improve the preparation of new party members on these principles.

Addenda

THE NEW DISCIPLINE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

A. On the Problem of Party Discipline

Arising from the establishment of the Political Committee, the Military Affairs Committee, and the Mobilization Committee in the Central Committee, we must explain the necessity of continually holding firm on the political independence of the party and strengthening the leadership of the struggle on all fronts. The party cannot forget that its duty is to gradually work to strengthen the party itself, to preserve the party, to expand the party, to mobilize the masses and to defend the masses.

Each committee has its own independent notice from the Central Committee as to its duty in obediently carrying out the following three motions:

1. Party discipline must be given added importance - so also secrecy. Comrades should have absolute obedience, gradually strengthen party activities, and maintain party discipline - thereby adding to the spirit of the party.
2. When the orders of the Central Committee are promulgated, lower echelons cannot alter them in the slightest. In the event lower organizational echelons differ, the orders must be carried out first and then, after this, such differences

can be submitted to the Central Committee for examination.

3. Responsible organs should investigate fully the cause of all transgressions of all comrades receiving party discipline. Errors and failure to execute orders call for expulsion from the party. Going over to the enemy is punishable by death. This is necessary because such activities constitute a 'Fifth Column' in our midst.

The above motions insure the success of Party policy, guarantee the solidarity of the party elements and give it the strength of steel. The Central Committee itself has already become the strongest Bolshevik model of the entire party and its decisions must be carried out. The entire party has the authority to call together a meeting to discuss or criticize the party line and the Central Committee will obey its command. Any echelon which discovers that the Central Committee is not correctly following the party line has the authority to call a meeting to submit its opinions to the Central Committee, and, if desirable, the Central Committee will call a party congress to give final judgment. The Central Committee should then act according to whatever decisions are agreed upon by the Congress. The Central Committee should obey this rule which is completely in accordance with the policy of democratic centralism.

Whenever party activities disintegrate, an impartial positive struggle should be made to rectify the situation. Just as impartially, any incorrect behaviour such as disobedience should be uncovered and smashed. In destroying such evils as disobedience, the dissolution of social ties and absolute impartiality are of first importance.

B. On the Party and Aspects of the Life of the Masses

Interwoven with the life of the masses, the party should maintain full spirit in authoritatively conducting itself, and should be continually on the watch against suspicious attempts at sabotage. In action, the party should become a model. It should develop fully the spirit of obedience, strive to elevate its positive qualities, take full cognizance of important tasks, and assist the struggling masses in the realization of their duty in the protection of the policy and line of the party. In the event certain comrades manifest their inadequate spirit, they should then be openly criticized so as to correct this condition.

Communist party members should strive to improve their own ability in the process. Old party members should especially strive to improve the good and banish the bad aspects of their character.

Further, determined spirit and absolute obedience are the essentials in our timeworn efforts on behalf of national liberation. The party should improve its own attitude and standing. Things which cannot be managed should be corrected. Party decisions should be firmly carried out. Everyone must have the spirit of obedience and duty and all must do their utmost to expose, criticize, and rectify errors.

Finally, we must be fully determined to expose ourselves to the greatest hardship of the struggle, to carry out whatever is assigned to us in the party's determined fight, to fear no sacrifice - no matter how great, never to forget our iron position, to hold fast

to the party's actions, to preserve the party organization and to guarantee the right of independent political criticism.

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE MALAYAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR⁵

I. The Characteristics of the Struggle

In its present stage, the Malayan revolution takes on the characteristics of a new democratic revolution waged against the British Imperialists (including all their running dogs and lackeys, principally that group of feudalistic running dogs headed by the Sultans). The objectives of the struggle are: to overthrow the British Imperialists, eliminate all their political, economic and military influence in Malaya, wipe out the last vestiges of feudalism (including economically, the system of feudalistic exploitation and ideologically, education in feudal culture), replacing these with the formation of a Malayan Peoples' Republic and a reconstructed and expanded new democratic economy and culture. The spirit of the revolution is the proletariat which, racially speaking is comprised of Indian and Chinese labourers and also the peasant masses which, racially speaking, are composed principally of Malay farmers; and secondarily, of urban petty bourgeoisie, especially the lower stratum (i.e. junior business executives, junior civil servants, the intelligentsia comprising principally the broad mass

⁵Translation of: Ma-lai-ya kung-ch'an-tang (The Malayan Communist Party), Ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng ti chan-lueh wen-ti (Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War). First issued in December 1948. Published by the Assault Press (place not stated), 5 November 1950, 61 p.

of elementary school teachers, handicraft workers, peddlers, drivers, etc.). When considered en masse, the national bourgeoisie also forms an integral part of this spirit, but its revolutionary nature is fixed and narrow. Moreover, under certain circumstances (usually at a time when Imperialist suppressive power is at its zenith while revolutionary strength is at a minimum) it is prone to become indecisive and waver - even to the extent of betraying the revolution. The leadership of the revolution rests with the proletariat. In the actual direction of the struggle by the labouring class, the course of its vanguard - the Communist Party - is taken merely as a token form.

This then is to say that the Malayan revolution is, in its present stage, under the leadership of the proletariat, whose base is the combined strength of the workers and peasants: this is an anti-Imperialist anti-feudalistic national revolution, carried out by the broad masses of the people of various races and classes. It has a national character because it opposes the rule of alien Imperialism, demands the right of self-determination and the realization of national liberation. It has a democratic character because it opposes internal feudalism and demands a popular democratic government, economy and culture. It has a popular character because its revolutionary spirit rests in the broad masses of people of many races and classes (principally the broad masses of workers and peasants and the lowest echelon of petty bourgeoisie) and also because it sets out to protect the rights of the broad masses of people of various races and classes (especially the broad masses of

workers and peasants and the lower echelon of petty bourgeoisie).

In its present stage of development, the Malayan revolution is, in brief, anti-imperialist and anti-feudalistic. It is principally anti-imperialistic in as much as Malaya is a colony governed by British Imperialists, and is secondarily anti-feudalistic because the feudal elements in Malaya have neither the right to rule nor any actual political status or economic power. In other words, economically and politically, the feudal elements constitute no real independent threat, but are merely tools used by the Imperialists in ruling Malaya. But while we shape our anti-Imperialist anti-feudal struggle along difficult lines, it must be kept in mind that the two are closely bound together as the Imperialists utilize feudalism to strengthen their own colonial rule while the feudalistic elements rely upon the imperialists to defend their particular sphere of influence.

The Malayan Revolutionary War, in its present stage, is expanding - especially as it is carried out under the leadership of the proletariat and broadened by the masses of various races and classes of people. Therefore, this war is a national democratic popular struggle against colonial Imperialist power and its feudal lackeys. It can be said that this is a popular war against British Imperialism.

II. The Special Features of the War

The Malayan Anti-British national revolutionary war possesses the following special features:

First, Malaya is a colony under the direct rule of British Imperialism. Though the area is small, communications facilities are modern. There are a number of towns, both large and small, yet the population is sparsely distributed. The proletariat of Malaya is a product of British Imperialism which has actively turned Malaya into a centre for the extraction of raw materials (i.e. rubber and tin). The proletariat, including members of their families, makes up approximately 30 per cent. of the total population of Malaya. In viewing colonies and semi-colonies as a whole, this is a relatively large class. Racially, it is made up largely of Indian and Chinese workers. Under the greedy, brutal, cunning, and dangerous governing policy of the British Imperialists, there are still in excess of two million (including one-third of the total population) impoverished suffering peasants without land to till. Racially, these are almost exclusively Malays. Malaya is a colony under the total capitalistic monopolization of British Imperialism. As such, industry suffers and it is impossible for national capital to be concentrated to a high degree. The high proportion of petty bourgeoisie concentrated in various small towns (especially the lower stratum) is a direct result of this condition.

The British Imperialists are old hands at colonial rule. Theirs is a history of 100 years' invasion of and domination over Malaya. They have a stable, thorough system of government and possess an up-to-date regular army, complemented by a large police and secret service organization. The armed might of the British Imperialists in Malaya (including all possible future reinforcing

of such might) cannot be considered overwhelming when compared to other nations, but it is superior both in numbers and armament to that of the Liberation Army. They consequently have the ability to muster this armed power to attack and suppress the people. In addition, they can still draw upon sufficient reserves to replenish their arms and material, possess modern means of transport and telecommunications, control all routes of railway communications and control the large and small towns throughout Malaya.

The feudal elements among the people of Malaya have sold themselves out to and become dependent upon the British Imperialists for whom they serve as a tool in strengthening the hold of British Imperialism on the masses. Malaya's economy is principally a colonial economy devoted to the production of raw materials for industry and dominated by the monopolistic capital of the British Imperialists. Industrial development consequently suffers while commercial enterprise assumes a compradore character. As a result, the national bourgeoisie is bound to suffer from serious shortcomings and is especially vulnerable to vacillation and compromise.

Following the close of World War II, the British Imperialists redoubled their plunder of Malaya's raw materials. These they exchanged for American dollars in order to relieve the economic crisis in their homeland and to increase the profits of their monopolistic capitalists. British dependence on the raw materials of Malaya in the post-war era has been greater than at any other time. Because of this, British post-war policy in governing Malaya has been one of outright plunder, more maniacal, extreme and exploratory than in

any other period. In order to consolidate their colonial rule and protect their plundering interests, the British Imperialists have resorted to the waging of a colonial war aimed at slaughtering the people. They are, consequently, destined to become even more extremist, employing political, economic, and military violence in their continued all-out assault upon the masses.

This is the first special feature, one which indicates that the Malayan revolutionary struggle faces extremely complex social conditions and an enemy - the Imperialists - who are both brutal in the extreme and well versed in experiences. In sum, although the British Imperialists are already in a decadent state and are confronted with a multitude of difficulties at home and abroad, yet when compared with the strength of the revolution, they hold a superior position. This is because their military power (numerically, technically and in armament), their economics, material, transportation and telecommunications are still sufficient in breadth and scope to cope with the revolution. In addition, they are certain to employ every means, adopting the most resourceful and brutal tactics, in their attempt at speedy annihilation of the forces of the revolution. Altering this position of superior and inferior strength and of weakness between the enemy and ourselves is not to be accomplished in one day. Such a feature also indicates that by nature the anti-British national revolutionary war will be protracted, uphill and violent.

The second special characteristic is that the Malayan anti-British national revolutionary war has begun at a time when the

Imperialist bloc, led by the American Imperialists, is rapidly advancing towards a decadent stage, while the anti-Imperialist democrats' camp, headed by the Soviet Union, has become a global influence in behalf of peace and democracy. The reactionary influence of the Imperialist camp is overshadowed by revolutions flaring up on a wide front in small and weak nations of Asia, especially now that the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people, who make up one-fifth of all mankind, is rapidly being brought to a successful conclusion, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. This is an international situation which is extremely favourable to the Malayan Revolutionary War.

In the three years since the close of the war, the homeland of the British Imperialists has been plagued by serious economic crises, which are certain to worsen daily. Aside from suffering under the illusion of American aid (while the American Imperialists themselves are sitting on top of a huge volcano of economic crisis), the principal means resorted to are wholesale plunder and brutal suppression of the colonial peoples, particularly the peoples of Malaya, endeavouring in this way to relieve the crisis in their own land. Three evils resultant from this criminal policy of the British Imperialists are sure to rebound on themselves:

a. Because the British homeland is incapable of prosecuting a protracted colonial war aimed at slaughtering the people of Malaya they are destined to become more maddened in their plunder of the races and classes of Malaya. Aside from their never-ending attempted exploitation of Malaya's resources to relieve the crisis in their

homeland, the British Imperialists also intend to solve the problem of the daily mounting war expenses in Malaya by transferring the burden to the masses. This is certain to increase hardship in the livelihood of the people, hasten the disintegration of the Malayan economy, as well as cause the struggle to drag on. The conflict between the British Imperialists and the people (including the national bourgeoisie) is certain to become more critical by the day and such a conflict is an inevitability.

b. To gorge themselves with economic plunder the British Imperialists are certain to intensify their political bondage and oppression of the peoples of various races and classes under the guise of military expediency. It is no longer possible to proclaim to one and all the deceptions of so-called 'democracy' and 'government by law'. This kind of Fascist rule, augmented by the daily increase of economic exploitation, is bound to drive them during the prosecution of the war, gradually into isolated pockets. Under such conditions, it is possible to drive a wedge between them and the national bourgeoisie.

c. The British Imperialists will experience great difficulty in transferring more troops to Malaya. They are certain to recruit a large force of soldiers and police in Malaya, relying upon Malaya itself for their principal source of military manpower. Because of the poor living standards characteristic of the broad masses of the lower stratum of the people in Malaya and the fact that a segment of them remain politically backward, the British Imperialists can be expected to exploit the backward, impoverished suffering Malays,

employing their principal tactics of racial alienation in their anti-Communist manoeuvres and manpower recruiting schemes. But such soldiers and police will prove unreliable, especially at a time when the influence of the Communist Party is expanding, when the active character of the broad masses of the population is growing, and the revolutionary struggle is moving more violently and rapidly towards a new stage of development. As a result, the essential differences between the British Imperialists and the soldiers and police will become more and more obvious and acute (a case in point is Chiang Kai-shek's troops allied with China's reactionary clique). This is because each and every soldier and policeman is himself an integral part of the very land the British Imperialists seek to destroy and because there is a basic urge in all of them for national liberation, for a people's democracy and for the betterment of living conditions.

From the point of view of the people, Malaya has already experienced some twenty years of revolutionary history, the most significant phases of which were the armed struggle during the resistance to the Japanese and the trade union movement carried on in the three years immediately following the war. Although Malaya is small in size, it still has jungles which reach from north to south, and possesses geographical conditions favourable to guerrilla warfare. The fact that the rubber and tin centres, on which the British Imperialists depend to obtain American dollars, are scattered in remote areas adjacent to the jungles and rural districts both makes it easy for the Liberation Army to slice off the economic

strength of the enemy and, at the same time, puts the Liberation Army in a favourable position to annihilate the foe, seize his stocks of arms and ammunition and expand itself.

This is the second special feature, one which points up the advantageous phase of the national revolutionary war — the means whereby the Liberation Army is able, in the course of the struggle, to preserve and expand itself and is given the opportunity of securing a final victory. This special feature is of great importance.

The third special characteristic is as follows: The anti-British national revolutionary war broke out three years following the war of resistance against Japan. During this time, the trade union movement courageously forged ahead despite the cunning and brutal oppression of the British Imperialists. But the peasantry (particularly the Malay peasantry) had only just begun to participate in the struggle but had not yet been able to effect a sufficiently broad mobilization to coordinate their action with the trade union movement. The lower stratum of urban petty bourgeoisie became panicky under the pressure of their living conditions and, although they manifested some degree of dissatisfaction with the British Imperialists, yet they continued to entertain false hopes that the British Imperialists would improve their lot. As a result, they failed to be resolute and rise to the struggle. In the face of British Imperialist threats, the national bourgeoisie compromised their position and even plotted with the British in an attack upon the masses.

The Liberation Army was bred from guerrilla troops. Its organization is simple, its troops strength small, and its equipment, methods, and strategy are in need of improvement. In addition, it is confronted with the problem of replenishing its stores of provisions and arms. Great effort over a suitably protracted period is needed for it to develop into a regular army. We still have no base, no rear area, no people's governing authority, nor any outside aid. That Malaya is a colonial area, underdeveloped and unskilled industrially, adds to these disadvantages.

This third special characteristic is indicative of our own subjective weakness. While this can be remedied in the course of the struggle — and we are determined that it will be remedied — still it will require a long, long time. A comparison of the above with the first special feature points up clearly the fact that the anti-British national revolutionary war will be protracted, tortuous and violent. Consequently it requires that the guiding principles of our Party's politico-military strategy and combat methods must be correct; it also demands that all components of the Party and Army increase their will to fight and heighten their spirit of sacrifice, and that every effort must be made, throughout the course of the war, to learn and progress. Any thought or action which tends to underestimate the enemy and advocates hasty adventurous action must be thoroughly purged.

The fourth special feature is the course of the Communist Party as indicated in the Party Platform by which the Party acts on behalf of the various races and classes, stands for a policy of an

anti-British national united front, demands the betterment of the living conditions of the proletariat and the protection of their interests and advocates an aggressive policy of "To the tillers belongs the soil!"

This special characteristic points up the fact that although there are a number of difficulties and shortcomings inherent in the anti-British national revolutionary war, it is possible for the Liberation Army to develop and achieve victory. On the one hand, the Liberation Army is being led by the Communist Party, true to the doctrines and spirit of Marxism-Leninism, and is thus able to learn during the course of the struggle, to take advantage of the lessons of the revolutionary wars in other lands throughout the world — especially the rich experiences of the people's revolutionary struggle in China — for the purpose of directing the war. On the other hand, because the Party platform is representative of the broad masses of the people (especially the workers and peasants), protecting their interests, the Liberation Army can count on the aid of the people (especially the workers and peasants) and so has acquired incalculable strength. Finally, the warriors of the Liberation Army are all products of the trade union movement and other anti-imperialist struggles. They take part in the struggle for the sake of their own good. In addition, they have merged their own interests with those of the entire nation and populace and have become self-enlightened, gallant soldiers in national liberation, constantly striving to advance. It is because of this that the Liberation Army is powerful — despite its smallness and weakness.

Not only is it able to defend itself and annihilate the enemy in the struggle, but it is also able to expand itself. This special characteristic is the natural consequence of the second special feature. The combination of this with the second will strengthen our confidence in victory.

III. The Guiding Principles of Combat Strategy and Combat Tactics

The guiding principles of combat strategy and tactics in the Malayan anti-British national revolutionary war follow from the foregoing four special features. The second and fourth special features evidence the possibility that the Liberation Army both can expand and gain victory over the foe. The first and third special features indicate that the Liberation Army will experience difficulty in expanding quickly and scoring a rapid victory. Moreover, if matters are not satisfactorily handled, the possibility of defeat looms large. These constitute the two facets of the Malayan Revolutionary War. They are co-existent. It follows that even under favourable conditions there exist difficulties. This is a basic dictum governing the Malayan Revolutionary War. Many other laws follow from such a basic dictum.

Undue emphasis on the first and third special features will result in conservatism and pessimism and may even give rise to excessive fear in the face of the threatening enemy. Conversely, emphasis on the second and fourth points will introduce the possibility that the enemy will be underrated, and give rise to impetuosity and adventurism, even as far as to the insistence on adopting the

strategy of a war of quick decision. The belittling or stressing of either of these facts is harmful and may result in defeat in the struggle.

In sum, it can be said that the enemy now occupies a position of relative superiority while the Liberation Army is in a relatively inferior position. In other words, this means that the enemy is strong and we are weak. However, if during the course of the struggle we can properly evaluate the special characteristics of the war and the fundamental laws which govern it, and if our acts be based upon such special features and laws, thereby enabling us to solve other concrete problems, avoid basic mistakes and strive to the utmost, then the factors unfavourable to the enemy and favourable to us will increase correspondingly as the war continues. Then, when an advanced point is reached, a fundamental change will occur between the strong and the weak, the superior and the inferior — between the enemy and ourselves.

If this is true, we may ask what are the essentials of the strategy and tactics in the anti-British national revolutionary war?

Comrade Mao Tse-tung wrote the following concerning the guiding principles of strategy and tactics in China's revolutionary war:

It is very clear that our correct strategic direction lies in the opposition to adventurism during the offensive operations, to conservatism (or simple defense) while on the defensive, and to flight while withdrawing our forces. We are against 'guerrillaism' in the Red Army, yet we must admit its guerrilla

nature. We are opposed to protracted campaigns and a strategy of quick decision, while we believe in a strategy of a protracted war and campaigns of quick decision. As we are opposed to fixed operational fronts and positional warfare, we believe in unfixed operational fronts and a war of manoeuvre. We are against simply routing the enemy and believe in a war of annihilation. We are against splitting our strategic command and for a unified strategic command. We are against holding huge rear areas and for a small rear area. We are opposed to absolute centralized command and for a relatively centralized command. We are against a pure military viewpoint and for the Red Army as being the organizer and propagandizer of the Soviets. We are against banditry and believe in strict political discipline. We are against warlordism and believe in a democratic way of life with certain limits (in consistency with the nature of a military organization) and authoritative military discipline. We are against a cadre policy based upon incorrect sectarianism and believe in a cadre policy based upon correctness. We are against isolationism and believe in winning over all possible allies. Finally we are against the Red Army's stagnation at its old level and believe in a struggle for its development and advancement into a new stage.⁶

All the above principles apply to the revolutionary war in Malaya. We should study them and arrive at a correct solution to the many concrete problems of strategy and tactics in the Malayan Revolutionary War.

IV. Concrete Strategic Problems

The Malayan anti-British national war of liberation faces

⁶Translator's note: Passage quoted here from Mao Tse-tung's Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War (First published in Yen-an, China, in 1936).

a host of concrete problems in strategy. There are at present eight problems which deserve our particular attention:

1. The first concerns the general strategic plan for the Malayan Revolutionary War. In view of the previously mentioned special characteristics of the struggle, it is obvious that the enemy's strength is relatively great and that he occupies a position of relative superiority. Our Army, on the other hand, is relatively weak and it occupies a relatively inferior position.

Taking advantage of his relatively greater strength and superior position, he adopts the strategy of offensive warfare, thereby attempting continually to harass our forces, wear them down and, finally, annihilate them. At the same time, the foe is fully aware of his own inability to wage a protracted war. Consequently, he employs a strategic line aimed at a war of quick decision, suffering from the delusion that our army can be eliminated in a brief space of time. Experiences in the past half-year's struggle serve to emphasize the fact that our Army is weak, occupies a defensive position and employs a strategy of defense. Our Army's objective, then, is self-preservation, attrition of the enemy and, also, continued striving for expansion. We must, therefore, refrain from hasty action and adventurism. We will attack only when we are confident and will not attack when we do not feel so. We want to strike hard to gain a victory in every action and to ensure the annihilation of the enemy and the capture of his arms. In this way we will train our forces, expand them and so improve their quality that the superior position and strength of the enemy and our position of weakness and inferiority

are reversed. It follows that our Army is adopting a policy of a protracted war. Armed strength in a colonial revolution must develop gradually in a drawn-out struggle. We counsel no fears for such a long-term struggle; on the contrary, we subjectively welcome the strategy of a protracted war. Speaking of the line of combat (referring here to combat areas or battlefronts), our Army finds itself completely encircled by enemy bases in towns, his public roads, and his railroad communications. Making full use of his superior military power, the enemy always attacks along exterior lines in a policy of encirclement. While it is the strategy of the enemy to fight on exterior lines, our Army pursues a strategy of fighting along interior lines.⁷

In sum, the enemy's strategic doctrine aims at a quick, decisive offensive war fought along exterior lines, while our strategic doctrine is to wage a protracted defensive war along interior lines. Of course, in the final stages of the struggle, when the basic change between the enemy's and our position has been brought about then our strategic doctrine will be that of the counter-offensive.

2. The second concrete problem of strategy in the anti-British national revolutionary war is one which points up the fact that the concrete strategic doctrine is nothing but the combat doctrine of operations and individual engagements. The concrete strategic line

⁷Translation note: In military terminology, a force operates along exterior lines when it holds the principal communications and land in a given area and, although stronger, is relatively dispersed. A force operating along interior lines, on the other hand, is usually encircled by the enemy, holds less space, but is relatively centralized and can concentrate its forces on a given point more rapidly than the enemy.

in the Malayan revolutionary war consists in:

- a. Tactical offensive operations and engagements in a strategy of defense.
- b. Operations and engagements of quick decision in a strategy of protracted war.
- c. Operations and engagements fought along exterior lines in a strategy of interior lines.

First, let us discuss offensive operations and engagements in a strategy of defense.

Our Army's defensive strategy is not a passive one, but both active and aggressive in nature. To hold continuously to the defensive and to refrain from aggressive action is no real defense at all. Not only is it impossible for such a defense to eliminate the enemy and expand ourselves, but it may eventually threaten even our very existence for only in the effective annihilation of the foe can we ensure our own self-protection. The attack is the sole tactic to be employed in annihilating the enemy and preserving ourselves. Passive defense is futile. Although the enemy has demonstrated his military superiority, he still evidences a number of shortcomings and weaknesses which we can exploit. For example, the foe controls all facilities of communications and transportation and can easily utilize these to call up reinforcements, maintain close contact and transport troops. Yet, inherent within these very advantages are exploitable defects. For example, the troops of the enemy are continually on the move along his many roads, providing our forces ample opportunity for ambush, harassing him continually. Again,

although the enemy boasts some mechanized units, for the purpose of waging his strategic offensive operations he still must devote considerable energy to defense, protecting his production centres and his strong points located in the large and small towns. The widespread activities and elusiveness of our guerrilla units throughout Malaya have caused the enemy to leave one big loophole in his strategic planning, i.e. he has of necessity employed an equally widespread defense of his production centres and strong points. Our Army must make capital out of this weakness, seizing the initiative in offensively striking at his various production centres and bases in individual actions. Yet, for example, the enemy continues his encirclement operations of our own bases. In launching a counter-encirclement on the enemy our Army must capitalize on every opportunity and every favourable position (i.e. good terrain) and take the initiative in ambushing the enemy, annihilating part of his force, seizing his arms and smashing his schemes of encirclement. These are, of course, but a few methods of countering the foe.

If we consider offensive warfare to be the strategic doctrine for the entire war, we would be committing a fundamental error. This would call for us to employ our entire small force in engaging the enemy, resulting in our own attrition in seeking a war of quick decision. It would also mean that we only seek to advance and never consider retreat; that we do not judge the possibilities of victory in each particular action, but rather fail to estimate our ability to seize weapons or decide whether this particular action be advantageous to the course of the entire war. To accept battle without due deliberation will result only in the total attrition of our own strength (in the form of unit strength, personnel, arms ammunition,

and so forth), and as the enemy has the ability to replenish his strength while we have not, defeat becomes a strong possibility. When this happens our struggle becomes nothing but a military adventure.

Let us now examine the operations and engagements of quick decision in a strategy of protracted war.

The necessity for engaging in quick decisive tactical operations in a protracted war is all too obvious. As the enemy advantageously holds the line of transportation and communications, he can draw upon reinforcements quickly once a battle is on. If we fail to deal with the enemy quickly and decisively, our Army faces defeat upon the arrival of his reinforcements. In addition, as our Army has insufficient ammunition, it is absolutely impossible to engage the enemy in a drawn-out action. Quick victory in a war of decision will never be achieved by wishing. It must be contingent on complete preparation, taking advantage of the most opportune moment, the concentration of superior military force, superior combat tactics, securing an advantageous position (i.e. favourable terrain) and assaulting the enemy either when he is on the move or garrisoned in weak positions. Battles of quick decision cannot be equivocated with impetuosity, for this would result in opportunities lost and would develop into adventurism and hasty action.

If we believe that individual operations of quick decision are the same as a strategy of war of quick decision (i.e. hoping to wrest a quick decisive victory in the anti-British national

revolutionary war), we make the same mistake. The result would be the exhaustion of our own force and the risk of facing a decision which would end in our own defeat.

Finally, we should discuss individual operations conducted along exterior lines in a strategy of interior lines.

When the enemy attacks a particular unit in our Army he is sure to muster a superior force in order to spread out and encircle our Army. In this way, the enemy operates along exterior lines, we along interior lines; the enemy is strong while we are weak. If we were to employ our whole force in an all-out struggle against the enemy, we would face probable defeat. We would face a similar fate if we should deploy our forces along separate routes and await the enemy there. There is only one way to wrest victory: our Army must concentrate its entire strength against the weakest part of the enemy force, ambush or encircle it and completely annihilate it. Related to concrete strategy this particular operation actually affords us the opportunity of operating along exterior lines; here we become the strong and the enemy the weak — our forces are many while the enemy's are few.

We would also be committing a fundamental mistake if we considered individual operations conducted along exterior lines to be the same as a strategy of exterior lines. That is to say that to spread out our own strength and encircle and assault the enemy everywhere will only result in the diminishing of our own strength in direct proportion to the degree of over-extension. When this happens it will not be we who are surrounding the enemy but rather

we who are besieged and, one by one, annihilated by the enemy.

The above three problems of basic strategic doctrine are closely inter-related. We need to wage aggressive, quick and decisive individual operations, concentrating superior force and pursuing a policy of tactical operations conducted along exterior lines (i.e. encircling or raiding the foe). Only the combination of these three will secure for us the final victory. Although at first the strategy of a protracted, defensive war conducted along interior lines appears to be in conflict with quick, decisive tactical operations conducted along exterior lines, yet they actually complement each other, constituting the two facets of an entity; and as such they cannot be mechanically separated.

3. Is our third problem one of a war of attrition or of annihilation? The correct answer to this problem is that it is one of annihilation and not of attrition. This is related to the problem of the course of the aim of the struggle. The aim of our Army in fighting a battle is not merely to preserve itself and eliminate the enemy but, more important, to seize arms and expand our own forces. In order to capture weapons it is necessary completely to neutralize enemy resistance (i.e. the killing, wounding or capture of the entire enemy force). Further, as our Army is short of ammunition and sources of reserve ammunition are difficult to come by, we cannot afford to waste what we have. Because of this we must resort to a war of annihilation, the object being to replenish our own arms and ammunition by capture. It is logical therefore that merely to rout the enemy and wound a few, failing to capture his weapons, cannot be considered a true victory.

4. The fourth problem deals with the type of war waged: is it to be positional warfare, a war of manoeuvre or guerrilla warfare? The correct answer is to wage guerrilla warfare now and a war of manoeuvre in the future, but to refrain from embarking upon positional warfare. This relates to the problem of the type or method of war. What is guerrilla warfare? In brief, it is a kind of attack (ambushing in the form of a surprise attack, encirclement, or assault from the rear); it embodies aggressive action and surprise of the foe. This type of combat is suited to a small guerrilla unit, simply organized, comparatively poorly equipped, with elementary combat techniques and relatively little centralization. Its advantages lie in its flexibility, lightning elusiveness, while its disadvantage is as follows: to rely solely upon guerrilla units and guerrilla warfare means that to set up and defend bases will be an impossibility. Without such bases the guerrillas will have neither a rear area nor a people's governing authority, making a protracted, difficult and brutal war an impossibility. If we depend upon guerrillas and guerrilla warfare alone, it will be impossible to realize our revolutionary tasks, to drive the British out of Malaya and to establish a Malayan People's Republic. What is a war of manoeuvre? A war of manoeuvre means that regular forces engage in individual, quick decisive actions along exterior lines. At the same time, a mobile defense is utilized whenever practicable. At times, when they serve a particular purpose, a positional attack or defense can also be employed.

It is fully possible to develop from a guerrilla unit into

a regular force and from guerrilla warfare to a war of manoeuvre. But it requires that our Army proceed gradually and methodically during the struggle, the most important requisites being the waging of offensive tactical actions in an over-all defensive war, quick decisive operations in a protracted war and exterior line attacks within interior line warfare and a war of annihilation aimed at seizing arms, in order to develop and better our own position as a prerequisite to engaging in a war of manoeuvre.

In addition to the capture of enemy arms in order to expand our own forces and intensifying the training of our own forces in a trial by combat, the problem of advancing to a war of manoeuvre and into a regular force necessitates the paying of close attention to the raising of the quality of the units. In connection with this problem Comrade Mao Tse-tung writes:

Qualitative improvement requires changes for the better in political, organizational, equipment, technical, tactical, and disciplinary aspects, gradually approximating to the standard set by regular armies and eliminating the guerrilla style of work. Politically, commanders and fighters should be made to realize the importance of the transformation from guerrilla detachments to regular army, encouraged to strive together for this objective and afford guarantees for such achievement by political work. Organizationally, there should be gradually established necessary institutions for military and political work for a regular army corps, provided with adequate political and military personnel and methods of work, and regular systems of supply and health. In the matter of equipment, arms should be increased, both in quality and in category, and additional necessary instruments and materials for communication acquired. Tactically and technically guerrilla technique and tactics

should be elevated to those required for a regular army corps. In the matter of discipline, there should be an advance to the stage of uniformity and strict enforcement of orders and prohibitions and the elimination of licentious and sporadic conduct. Achievement in these aspects cannot be expected overnight and must require strongest efforts. But such efforts must be exerted, and only thus can be created the major force of an army corps for a guerrilla base which will then deal more powerful blows against the enemy in a war of manoeuvre. The achievement of such an objective will be facilitated in the regions where there are detachments or cadres dispatched from a regular army; therefore, all regular armies must be conscious of the obligation to aid the advancement of guerrilla units.⁸

Positional warfare has less value in the current Malayan Revolutionary War. Our Army annihilates the enemy by manoeuvre. If positional warfare is treated as a subsidiary of guerrilla warfare or of a war of manoeuvre, however, then it may have application at certain times. For example, the selection of a favourable position to carry out an ambush, the utilization of favourable terrain for rear-guard action, and so forth.

5. The fifth problem is one of initiative, cunning and planning. Initiative embodies action in the attack and in the withdrawal. Cunning involves cunning in the concentration and dispersal of combat strength and in altering the direction of that strength. Both guerrilla warfare and a war of manoeuvre require initiative and cunning. Once initiative and cunning are not applied,

⁸ Translation note: Passage from Mao Tse-tung's Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla Warfare (Yenan, 1938).

offensive individual actions, quick decisive exterior line operations, rapid concentration of a superior force to seize enemy arms — all become impossible. It is also impossible to withdraw quickly from an unfavourable enemy assault and to alter our course, or to annihilate one enemy force here, then change direction eliminating another foe there. Therefore, the institution of initiative and cunning in our forces is an extremely vital and pressing problem, one which all comrades are required to solve.

6. The sixth problem is one of seizing the initiative in war. In all operations both sides, the enemy and ourselves, attempt to gain points of vantage, favourable battle positions, good combat areas and even to seize the initiative in battle, because the initiative embodies freedom of action. When the power of initiative is lost, a force becomes passive and loses its freedom, facing the risk of annihilation and defeat.

We do not say that, because the enemy is strong while we are weak, it is not possible for us to seize the initiative in war; nor because our Army holds the strategic defensive and strategic interior lines, that it is impossible to gain the initiative in war; nor that by guerrilla warfare are we unable to seize the power of initiative in war. On the contrary, striving for initiative is an important and serious problem in guerrilla warfare. If there is no initiative, there is no way of determining the correct strategic course. It is also impossible to wage offensive actions in a defensive war without initiative, cunning and methodological plans. It is also not possible to wage a quick decisive campaign in a

protracted war nor an exterior line action in a war conducted along interior lines.

Passivity comes easy in a defensive war — the power of initiative, hard. But it is possible to advance from a passive to an active position in defensive warfare. For example, a thoroughly-planned strategic retreat appears on the surface to be one which has been forced by pressure, but in actuality it really is to preserve combat strength, awaiting a favourable moment to annihilate the enemy, lure him deep into our territory and launch a counter-attack against him. Therefore, although it means that we appear to lose the initiative, yet in actuality it means that we gain the initiative.

Initiative is not something ready-made. It requires subjective effort by our Army to achieve it. The power of initiative is acquired through the proper realization of the circumstances between the enemy and ourselves and the proper political and military preparation. Equipped with these we can then exploit the weaknesses of the enemy, at the same time rectifying our own shortcomings. We can arrive at a correct strategic doctrine, carry out individual operations of quick decision along exterior lines, concentrate superior strength in the annihilation of the enemy, seize his arms and ensure final victory. In the course of future victorious campaigns and battles we will strive to wrest the power of initiative in the war.

If we forego the above and seek merely to gain the power of initiative through careless haphazard action we would be committing a fundamental mistake. Such action, conversely, would end in the

total loss of the power of initiative. It would be a manifestation of adventurism. If we believe that we should strive only to wrest the power of initiative in individual campaigns and battles and not in the entire war, subjectively abandoning all efforts to strive for initiative in the whole war, our action would eventually lose its active, methodological aggressive character and we would be forced into a position of passive defense. Then our forces would be unable to operate with either initiative or cunning in individual campaigns and actions. This would be a manifestation of 'conservatism'.

7. The seventh problem is concerned with the massing of superior force. If we wish to strive for the power of initiative, the preservation and concentration of the largest and most powerful force is of first importance. According to the doctrines of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the concentration of combat strength is important because it reverses the positions between the enemy and ourselves in the course of individual campaigns and actions; that is to say:

- a. To reverse the circumstances of the enemy's advance and our retreat into our advance and his retreat.
- b. To reverse the circumstances of the enemy's attack and our defense to our attack and the enemy's defense.
- c. To reverse enemy operations conducted along exterior lines and our interior line operations, to enemy operations conducted along interior lines and ours of exterior lines.

This also means that, in a strategy of defense, our Army must wage offensive action in individual campaigns and battles. Basically it is necessary to concentrate a superior force before it

is possible for our Army to change from a position of weakness to one of strength, to move from a disadvantageous position to one of an advantageous nature, to refrain from passivity and become active, and to alter our present position from one of inferiority to one of superiority.

There may be some comrades who understand the necessity for the concentration of combat strength. However, the practical means of carrying it out are frequently subjected to and misled by the confusion of existing conditions, resulting in a loss of the power of discretion, the dispersion of combat strength and the loss of cunning in combat. The lack of a sound strategic doctrine leads to this.

There may well be other comrades who understand the necessity for the concentration of troop strength but believe that it has disadvantages as well as advantages. The disadvantages lie possibly in the difficulty of maintaining a large force and also in the obvious vulnerability of such a force to enemy attack. Because of this no positive action has been taken to concentrate this combat strength. While we concede the possible difficulty in maintaining such a large concentrated force, it is one which is not totally unresolvable. First, it requires detailed planning and preparation. Secondly, it must be determined by the relative chances for gaining victory in battle. If victory is certain, the problem of maintenance is of less import. We need only to enhance the prestige of the Liberation Army with the masses to secure greater support from them.

8. The problem of bases. A base is a rear area in guerrilla war. It is used for the purpose of carrying out the aims of guerrilla strategy, of preserving and expanding ourselves, of annihilating and driving out the enemy. The necessity and importance of establishing guerrilla bases arise out of the protracted and violent nature of the conflict. Without bases, it is impossible to wage a protracted, difficult and relentless revolutionary struggle.

In order to establish a base, it is first necessary to inflict continual violent blows on the enemy through a series of guerrilla actions. Following this it is necessary to foster, set up and consolidate popular anti-Imperialist organizations. Finally, it is necessary to establish people's armed self-defense organs and a people's governing authority. Only then can a base be considered established. To destroy the enemy's attack it is first necessary to have a regular force — a vital determining factor. It follows that the establishment of a base cannot be realized overnight, but must be the result of a long-term struggle.

Of necessity, the base must be unstable and fluid in the early period, hard-pressed by the enemy and so forced to be constantly on the move. It can then gradually develop into a more stable, less changeable one, finally becoming a permanent base. The problem of establishing a base (including the formation of regular forces and the realization of a war of manoeuvre) cannot be solved, therefore, without a plan and gradual method; it requires the mobilization of the strength of the entire Party and the entire Army, striving objectively, methodically and gradually for its

realization.

Generally speaking, our Army is at present still without a base. Although a number of rural districts are now under our Army's control, it has not yet succeeded in beating off enemy attacks on such rural areas. What our Army has been able to do has been to 'retreat when the enemy advances and to advance when the enemy withdraws'. We are frequently forced to "move off elsewhere" on our own account. This is because the rural districts in Malaya are both cut off and surrounded by a close network of public roads and railroads, enabling the enemy to launch a sudden attack at any time and place, thereby making such areas unstable and changeable. Under such subjective and objective conditions, we can only attempt to be closely coordinated and cunning in our manoeuvring, taking full advantage of the cover afforded us by the hills and jungles. Because of this, it is yet too early to discuss the establishment of a popular governing authority and people's armed self-defense units in such rural districts (for they now serve little purpose and are open to attack). Even in the consolidation of popular anti-Imperialist organizations and fostering of mass participation in and support of the armed struggle, there are restrictions. Therefore, such rural areas cannot be called bases. We can, at best, only call them "temporary bases".

There are many such bases located throughout Malaya. Our future considerations must deal with the problem of a basic strategy in the formation of these bases in the various provinces. For the present, however, we will let this matter lie dormant. Yet it is

clear that we need to preserve our 'temporary bases' in the various provinces. These temporary bases remain a necessity for the continued effective independent action of small guerrilla units and we consequently must exert every effort to maintain them. Temporary bases, of course, should never be considered fixed and immobile. In the case of larger guerrilla forces engaged in independent actions, it is necessary for them to adopt combat techniques wherein they will manoeuvre throughout the length and breadth of the country, frequently taking the initiative, altering their course and area of operations. In this way the enemy will find no target to encircle and annihilate, facilitating the actions of larger guerrilla forces and enabling us effectively to preserve our strength. Further, such mobile techniques will permit our guerrilla forces continually to extend their areas of activity, securing additional opportunities and possibilities for waging offensive campaigns in a defensive war.

V. Laws Governing the Development of War

A correct appreciation of the laws governing the development of war will make possible, on the one hand, the proper direction of the struggle, giving impetus to the expansion of the war; and, on the other hand, will increase the fighting spirit of the entire Party and Army, strengthen their confidence in victory and ensure continual courage no matter how difficult the conditions nor how many reverses we face.

Generally speaking, a revolutionary war waged in a colonial

or semi-colonial region is divided into two stages; the first is the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage consists of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic withdrawal. This distinction follows from the strategic policies of the enemy and of ourselves. In general, the first stage is a difficult and prolonged one. This is because during this stage we must not only preserve ourselves and annihilate the enemy, but must also expand, until a fundamental change occurs wherein the comparative strength between the enemy and ourselves is reversed. The Malayan anti-British national revolutionary war makes no fundamental departure from such laws of development.

China's war of resistance against the Japanese consisted of three stages: The first was the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage was the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for a strategic counter-offensive. The third stage was the enemy's strategic withdrawal and our strategic counter-offensive. The principal reason for this was the vastness of the Chinese mainland, her tremendous population and her inexhaustible resources; China was gradually advancing from weakness to strength. Japan, on the other hand, was a small but powerful Imperialist state. Because she lacked sufficient military force and faced a resolute Chinese resistance, Japan was forced to limit her strategic offensive. When that point was reached, she ceased her strategic offensive and shifted the policy of holding her areas of occupation. China, on the other hand, was an industrially backward nation and therefore unable immediately to implement the strategic counter-offensive, forced instead to make detailed preparations.

The fundamental conditions of the Malayan revolutionary struggle and China's war of resistance to Japan are dissimilar. Ours is a war between the people of a small, sparsely-populated colony governed by direct British rule. Unless our Army's strength excels that of the enemy and we are on the path of a strategic counter-offensive, compelling the foe into a strategic withdrawal, the enemy will never cease his strategic offensive, nor will he find it necessary to adopt a strategy of conservation at a certain fixed point.

It is impossible fully to consider the fundamental development of the two states of the Malayan anti-British national revolutionary war because the course of the struggle promises to be extremely diverse and fluid. But it is both possible and necessary to evaluate some of the more salient features of this development. Only then shall we be able to direct the war. All these problems are directly related to the basic strategic doctrines of our Army. These principles have already been fully enumerated in the preceding chapters. We do not propose to discuss the problems of a fundamental plan here. The effect of the various favourable international factors on the development of the Malayan revolutionary war and its ultimate victory will be great. These favourable factors lie principally in the expansion of the strength of world peace and the democratic camp led by the Soviet Union, in the decline of the Imperialist camp and in the rising tide of the armed revolutionary struggle for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the Orient, more particularly

in the victory scored by the people's revolutionary war in China. These, however, are merely assisting factors and not the principal determining ones. The most important determinant is the effort of the peoples of Malaya themselves.⁹

SUPPLEMENTARY VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL
POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE (MCP) ON
'STRATEGIC PROBLEMS OF THE MALAYAN
REVOLUTIONARY WAR',¹⁰

I. Supplementary Comments on the Disadvantageous Features of the Characteristics of the War

The Malayan anti-British national war of liberation is being waged under unusual circumstances. Therefore, it has a number of special characteristics of its own — these being the characteristics of war. Failure to take cognizance of or to fully comprehend these features will result in a lack of complete mastery over the laws of the development of this war and lead necessarily to a failure correctly to direct the war.

A study of Mao Tse-tung's military concepts as well as full cognizance of the laws of development of the characteristics of the

⁹Translator's note: Some editions of this work have an additional section entitled, 'Current Military Principles'. This is generally a restatement of much of what has gone before and is not included here.

¹⁰Translation of: Chung-yang cheng-chih-chu (Central Political Bureau), Chung-yang cheng-chih-chu tui ma-lai-ya ko-ming chan-cheng chan-lueh wen-ti ti pu-ch'ung kuan-chien (Supplementary Views of the Central Political Bureau on 'Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War'). (First issued 12 November 1949, Assault Press, N.P. 15 December 1950), 85 pp.

war are imperatives in the course of the struggle. In other words, by capitalizing upon the combat experiences of thousands of comrades, we shall be in a position to improve our knowledge of the laws of development of the characteristics of war and gradually learn and apply the military concepts of Mao Tse-tung. These will eventually form the basic military theory of the Malayan Revolutionary War. Our Party's military doctrines will then advance in the course of the war.

Last year, when the anti-British national revolutionary war was but six months old (December 1948), our Party made a complete examination and analysis of the special features of this war in Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War. Now, after a year's experiences in war, we are in an excellent position to verify the correctness of that analysis, but to note that it suffered from a lack of detail. Because it was valid, our year-long strategic direction has also been basically valid, the war is progressing satisfactorily, and our revolutionary strength is growing. But, because it lacked detail, we failed correctly to deal with certain independent problems of the nature of war, resulting in a bad approach to certain conditions. Last year, we lacked experience in war and were unable to give a full analysis of the characteristics of the war. A year of combat experience has improved our awareness of the characteristics of the war and we therefore submit the following supplementary views on the characteristics of this war:

First: Malaya is a small narrow land with highly-developed communications such as highways and railroads. Except for a few

regions in the north and east, any part of Malaya can be reached from the centre of the peninsula ... Kuala Lumpur ... is no more than one day distant. This is a marked asset for the enemy forces in changing their position and securing reinforcements.

Second: There are many towns and cities both large and small in Malaya. Enemy production centres located in the hinterland regions are also numerous. (Note: the word hinterland regions, as used in this document, refers to squatter camps, rubber estates, mining areas, coconut, oil palm, pineapples, and betel-nut plantations as well.) Such areas all furnish us with bases, but at the same time they are the object of enemy protective measures. In such a region, i.e. small in size but with many bases, we will have bases in every nook and corner.

Third: In view of the fact that all hinterland regions in Malaya are criss-crossed by a network of roads and railroads and are surrounded by many military installations in both the towns and in the production centres, the locale of our activities must be adjacent to the roads and railroads and in the neighbourhood of the enemy's military bases. Under such circumstances, the enemy is in a position to attack our hinterland bases at any moment and also to conduct regular raids, patrols and ambushes on such bases. (Such enemy operations are as frequent as once a day or even many times a day when they have lost their senses.) At present, our Army is still not in a position to control (or even partially to control) certain parts of the roads and railroad lines. Nor are we able to destroy completely (or to destroy to such an extent as to compel

the enemy to abandon such bases) certain small towns, production centres or bases. Nor are we in a position to annihilate the enemy's patrols in the hinterland regions. (But if we make an all-out attempt at present we are able to destroy an enemy patrol to a certain extent. Admittedly, however, we are unable to destroy a large enemy patrol within the immediate future.) Therefore our hinterland bases remain in a most precarious position. Speaking frankly, there is practically no such thing as an isolated spot in Malaya. Hence, in such a small region, with highly-developed communication lines and scattered squatter camps, our Min Yuen activities will be seriously endangered. Under such conditions, we must maintain a strong force of relentless and daring Min Yuen cadres who are prepared to work under difficult conditions for the sake of maintaining, expanding and consolidating Min Yuen bases. Only by so doing can the Min Yuen support the Army which, in return, will carry out widespread operations in coordination with the Min Yuen.

Fourth: There is an unbreakable chain of jungle ranges throughout Malaya. This appears to be the best hide-out for our Army. However, because there are no masses or residents in these jungles (with the possible exception of a scattering of sakais) on whom we can rely for supplies of food and information, it is necessary for us not to penetrate the jungle regions too deeply, but rather to establish ourselves in jungle regions located close to populated regions. That is why our Army is often extremely susceptible to enemy raids. Under these conditions, heavy concentration of our forces will put us in a disadvantageous position for withdrawal in the

face of a large-scale enemy assault. Because of this, we must utilize the tactics of 'Relative Dispersion', to be adopted by all units in our Army. The aim of these tactics is to enable our Army to concentrate and to disperse swiftly and smoothly.

Fifth: After a protracted period of British rule, the Malaya of today is both agriculturally and industrially backward. All hinterland regions must rely upon the large towns for food and material, including even the daily necessities of life and daily rations of foodstuffs. At present, the uncertainty of these hinterland regions and the tightened control over towns and cities by the military and secret-service agencies of the enemy are becoming a problem, restricting our forces' ability to get supplies. We must build up our strength to such an extent as to become a direct threat to the enemy's bases in the small towns and villages, so that the enemy will be forced to withdraw from these small towns and villages and concentrate his forces in the larger centres, before we are in a position to solve the problem of obtaining a regular flow of supplies for a larger unit of our forces. This again underlines the need for our Army to adopt 'Relative Dispersion Tactics'. The chief aim of any concentration of our forces must be to organize an operation of much larger magnitude. Such concentrated forces will be quickly dispersed after a major operation.

Sixth: Malaya is a colony ruled directly by the British imperialists for almost a century. The British have already created a totalitarian, complete, penetrating system of administration, from the Federal Government down to small towns and Malay kampongs.

Malay feudal chieftains, from State Sultans down to Ketuas of kampongs, are to all intents and purposes, lackeys paid and employed by the British imperialists. Hence, in Malaya we have nothing like feudal provincialism to exploit. Nor is there any weak link in the enemy's administrative system for us to probe. With all these factors as stated above (i.e. small territory, highly-developed communication lines and widespread administrative centres) our hope of wiping out the enemy's rule in a certain region and thereby setting up a permanent base still faces many objective difficulties and obstacles.

Seventh: The present military strength of the enemy in Malaya is estimated to be approximately one hundred thousand men. Over half of these are Special Constables and regular policemen. The efficiency of British and Indian troops is little better than that of any reactionary nation, and much worse than that of Japanese troops. Outwardly, its air arm has been extremely active in conducting its mad operations. But according to our reports, only one of our comrades was killed and another wounded (some time between August and September of this year) as a result of one and a half years of enemy air action. This is the best its so-called powerful air force could do! Nevertheless, as a whole, the enemy's troops are able to maintain their present strategic offensive position and will continue to maintain such a position in the immediate future. This is due to the following factors: First, enemy troops are undoubtedly superior in number, and to a certain extent such superiority will continue to grow (though in this

process the enemy will certainly encounter difficulties). Second, the enemy's forces are much better off in armament, especially in ammunition. They put the greatest reliance upon overwhelming fire power in both defensive and offensive operations. Third, the enemy is in a most advantageous position for bringing up supplies and reinforcements by reason of his widespread military bases, communication lines and telecommunication facilities. Finally, the enemy is undoubtedly stronger than we in terms of supplies. However, through our correct strategy and tactics, his superiority has failed to check the existence and expansion of our Army. As a matter of course, the enemy's superiority will be gradually weakened and changed by our Army in combat. But it will take us a long, long time to effect a complete change in his strategic superiority.

At present, our Army is only a guerrilla force. Our lack of experience and low standard both in methods and tactics have not, however, been our chief shortcomings. Our handicap lies in the fact that our armed forces were formed without some revolutionary members of the regular army to form its backbone. This is different from the revolutionary forces of other nations. None of our troops received sufficient training before the outbreak of the Emergency. Our military commanders are not graduates of any military academy. None the less, all these defects have not affected our Army seriously. According to the aim of our present operation (i.e. seizure of arms, killing of the enemy, sabotage and harassing raids) as well as the form of our operations (i.e. ambushes, raids on patrols, attacks on small bases, and so forth), such defects are immaterial to us.

Moreover, the fighting standard of our Army is being improved in the course of the war as evidenced by the accomplishments achieved during the anti-Japanese period as well as in the last one and a half years. These are vital facts which must be correctly realized. It is only with such a realization that our comrades will find confidence in the bright future of improvements amongst themselves, the growth and expansion of the forces of liberation, and the final victory in this struggle. We come to the question: what is the main difficulty facing our Army? Our problem is the question of firearms and, in particular, supplies of ammunition (i.e. bullets, grenades and explosives). We must know that the only source of firearms and ammunition for our Army is the battlefield, and that this demands sacrifice on our part; that is to say, in this war, not only must we expend a minimum of ammunition in defensive and offensive operations, but we must also do our best to seize arms from the enemy to replenish and expand our depleted stocks. Generally speaking, our policy is to use less but to seize more from the enemy. We are now in no position to compete with the enemy in fire power. Furthermore, our Army is in possession of only light arms at present. We must make every attempt to improve our techniques and tactics in order to offset the enemy's superiority in fire power. This also means that we can build up our strength only through a gradual, protracted, bitter and planned struggle. Any foolish thoughts of short-cuts must be dismissed. All colonial and semi-colonial revolutionary wars have such common hardships.

II. Supplements to the Advantageous Aspects of the Characteristics of This War

The above supplementary views on the disadvantageous factors of this war are expressed for the sole purpose of assisting our comrades in a fuller comprehension of the difficult and protracted nature of this war and in order to dispel certain incorrect 'left bias' and hot-headed speculations. However, we shall fail to conduct and direct this war correctly if we are conscious only of the disadvantages of this war without taking a further step to study thoroughly all factors in our favour.

The following are supplementary views on the advantageous factors:

1. The source of the strength of our Party comes from the tremendous strength of the masses. Facts in the past year have proved that organized masses (with the majority of labourers and peasants), irrespective of any race, have had full political confidence in our Party and armed forces. They place implicit faith in the leadership of our Party and regard our Party and Army as a most strong and reliable Party and Army of the people. The policy and principle of our Party have been strongly supported by them. This is undoubtedly the fruit born from the struggle of our Party in the past twenty years in which many of our comrades have sacrificed their lives and shed their lifeblood. During the ten years prior to the Japanese invasion of South-East Asia, the trade union movement, under the leadership of our Party, added many glorious pages to the history of the struggle of labour (such as the 1935 incident when a few thousand workers in Batu Arang, Selangor, staged a heroic strike

climaxing with the occupation of the whole coal mine for a brief period). From 1939 to 1940, the labouring masses established widespread contact with our Party's trade-union movement, developing widely in all states throughout Malaya. During the Japanese Occupation, our Party maintained close contact with a large number of Chinese labourers and peasants in squatter camps. Our Party's organizations in Chinese squatter camps and small towns and villages penetrated into every part of Malaya. The influence of our Party and our Malayan Anti-Japanese Army has been broad and penetrative. In the later stages of the Japanese Occupation, mass organizations were also set up in Malay kampongs throughout Malaya. Owing to the then incorrect course followed by our Party, we abandoned a major part of our peasant organizations during the period of peace immediately following the Japanese surrender. However this loss was replenished by our huge successes in the field of trade-union activities. In the course of our struggle for better living standards and democratic rights, our Party has succeeded in establishing close liaison with the workers of various races throughout all Malaya.

Towards the beginning of 1948, the reputation of our Party loomed large in the picture of both the Malayan youth movement and the Malayan peasant movement. All these accomplishments serve to prove that the full confidence placed in our Party by the masses is no mere coincidence. This faith is built upon the foundation of close contact between our Party and the huge masses of workers and peasants, nurtured during many long years of struggle. Such confidence, based upon their own personal experiences, will forever

remain firm and reliable. This is the chief reason for the development of our bases in many of the squatter camps immediately after the outbreak of the Emergency. This also accounts for the chief cause of the total support of our Party by the masses in the face of fantastic attacks by the enemy.

2. The strength of the masses is continually developing. Although its development often takes a complicated and uneven course — its direction is forward. In this anti-British war, the position of squatters is most difficult and precarious. They are constantly subjected to the threats and dangers of being killed, arrested, forced to relocate their homes, assaulted, insulted and raped. In spite of these adversities, they stand firm and united side by side with our Party and Army. They support us with money, food-stuffs, material supplies, etc. thus enabling our Party and Army to exist and expand in the face of fantastic attacks made by the foe. The position of the masses became more serious daily with the increased attacks made by the enemy during the last year. However, the masses did not desert us. Instead, they clung to us even more closely. Male and female youngsters were joining us one after the other. They became our most determined supporters. The enemy's atrocities did not cause them to retreat from the struggle; on the contrary, it only served to increase their hatred and awareness of the cruelty of the foe. This is a basic proof that the strength of the masses is ever developing.

3. The progress of the masses in the course of their struggle depends to a great extent on the resolute firm leadership of the

Party, through the leadership of the Min Yuen cadres. Such leadership is especially required after all-out raids made by the enemy. The development of the strength of the masses never takes a spontaneous course. It requires constant promotion of our Min Yuen activities, such as organization, indoctrination and mobilization. It requires that tension and ill-feeling be reduced, as well as attacks launched by our Army with which to stir up the spirit of the masses. Our experience gained from the struggle during the past year has made us full conscious of this truth. This indicates that the foundation of such progress is firm and reliable. Therefore, in the course of the struggle, the contact between our Party and the masses will become closer as time goes on and likewise the mass organizations will become stronger.

4. The progress of the masses depends upon our subjective endeavouring to accomplish the above. Here we must add that our subjective endeavour must function in coordination with objective reality and should never depend upon subjective aspiration and empty ideas. Objective reality regulates the law of the progress of the masses (i.e. its complete course of progress). Any subjective demand which tends to over-estimate reality is a mere whimsical thought which breeds disappointment. According to our experience, gained during the past year of conflict, it is evident that we have further improved in consciousness towards the objective reality of mass movements in squatter areas. The principal realities are as follows:

- a. That the masses have full confidence in our Party and Army, and that they have already formed a correct opinion

of the quality of the British bandits. This is due to the fact that Malaya has a revolutionary experience of more than twenty years, especially her experience gained from the anti-Japanese war and the post-war widespread trade union movement. This is the progressive aspect of the masses.

b. That the masses, with their experiences gained from three years and eight months of anti-Japanese struggle as well as from the present anti-British struggle, will be in a position to face the test of armed struggle and will continue to make progress in the course of this war under the leadership of our Party.

c. Generally speaking, at present the masses are still lacking in the determination to sacrifice their jobs, homes, families and personal safety. They are also lacking in confidence in their own strength. They have not fully realized that their own strength and unity and determination are an unconquerable force. Instead, they pin their hopes for victory in the successes of our Party and Army as well as the successes of foreign revolutionary forces. This is the retrogressive aspect of the masses. Such backward ideas have their origins in the people's society and class backgrounds. It can be overcome only in the throes of conflict. The course of progress of the masses takes a form of gradual improvement in the course of realistic struggle. In short, the stronger the leadership of our Party, the more acute will this struggle become and, likewise, the greater the progress made by the masses.

d. At present, we are being conditioned by the environment of a guerrilla struggle. The mobilization of strength will be invariably restricted. Particularly, our mobilization and indoctrination activities directed towards the masses residing in the enemy's production centres will be greatly hampered.

5. On the whole, it is a certainty that this revolutionary war will continue to exist and develop with the support of the masses in the light of their present rate of progress. Facts in the past year indicate that the longer this war drags on the more fantastic will be the attacks launched by the enemy. As a result, the masses will make more progress and become more consolidated in their organizations. All we have to do is to strengthen the Party's hold on them through more efficient Min Yuen mobilization. We should set up more new bases while consolidating our original ones. We should maintain close liaison with the masses during an enemy attack. Under such circumstances, the strength of the masses will invariably grow as this war continues. It had to be like this before and it will continue to be like this as the war goes on. The British Imperialists can destroy a certain squatter camp but they are in no position to destroy all squatter areas; especially and certainly they can never hope to destroy all the rubber plantations. The British domination of Malay depends chiefly on ruthless exploitation of the masses. The more areas they destroy, the less exploitation will they be able to accomplish. The greater the hatred of the people, the more our revolutionary strength increases. Their policy of ruthlessly killing the people and forcing their relocation is nothing but a desperate and suicidal gambit. The decisive factor

of whether or not the strength of the masses will grow in this war derives from our subjective endeavours and not from the attempts of the British imperialists. Facts in the past year have proved this to be a correct assumption.

6. The position of the Liberation Army is difficult — but its strength is formidable and lasting. This truth has been proved by the events of the past year. First of all, the war criminal, MacDonald, bragged that our Army would be annihilated within three months. Then came the butcher, Boucher, who also claimed that he would wipe out our armed forces within 15 months of October 1948. Today they are forced to admit that the chance of ending this war is very remote. Even Gray, Commissioner of Police, said in reply to reporters that any prediction of the conclusion of this war would be preposterous. All these admissions the enemy was forced to make after the lessons he learned from our formidable army in the past one and a half years. The intrigue in the enemy's move in offering surrender terms, as well as its policy of forced relocation of the civil populace, will also serve to prove that they have come to the realization that our Liberation Army can never be suppressed by military force.

7. At present, our Liberation Army is but a guerrilla force. Therefore, it has to adopt the tactics of surprise attacks, featuring the ambush as its form of operations. Also it must adopt swift and mobile manoeuvre, especially in the face of fantastic attacks made by the enemy. Thus far, these are our good points.

It is only with such good points that we have been able to train and expand our Army with arms seized from the enemy and have also been able to inflict casualties on the enemy with a minimum expenditure of our ammunition. This has made it very difficult for the enemy to locate or to wipe out our Army. We have difficulties in obtaining ammunition. But we possess the assets of existing on and expanding our own resources. Generally, we have only light fire arms. Our standard in tactics and techniques is considered poor. Nevertheless, this has not affected us in our view of the present type of operations (i.e. surprise attacks featuring ambushes), and the object (i.e. seizure of arms from the enemy) of our operation. Moreover, our fighting standard has been improving rapidly. There will be a day when our fighting standard will rise to such a degree that we shall be in a position to seize heavy arms from the enemy, thereby enabling our Army to switch over to a better form of operations. Although we shall not be able to fulfill our revolutionary mission in Malaya solely by means of guerrilla warfare, yet we are confident that we shall continue to exist and develop. We will develop from guerrilla warfare into a war of manoeuvre until finally a basic change of strength between the enemy and our armed forces comes about. Generally speaking, our Army has been doing quite well with its ambush tactics. The enemy admits that this form of operation is proving difficult to counteract. A few of our units have even attempted outflanking tactics on a limited scale, combined with surprise raids on small enemy bases for the purpose of seizing arms. It is evident that our Army has made strong improvements both in regard to tactics and methods when compared to our operations of a year ago.

If we continue to strive to make the most of our experiences in combat, to better our training, and to organize attacks on a larger scale, we will improve our ambush tactics, seize even more enemy arms, better our outflanking techniques, and improve our tactics in raiding garrison forces stationed in the smaller enemy bases. We will then be in a position to overcome our shortcomings (such as the enemy's employment of highly-developed communication lines and a multitude of small bases), turning the enemy's strong points into his liabilities. We shall also be able to seize more arms and to compel the enemy to disperse his forces to an even greater extent. In the past year, we have inflicted serious casualties upon the foe. According to as yet incomplete reports, a ten-to-one ratio exists between enemy casualties and those suffered by our own forces. If we can inflict even greater losses on the enemy, at the same time expending a minimum of ammunition, his morale can be expected to suffer correspondingly. No figures as to the ratio of loss of arms between the enemy and ourselves exists, but it is safe to assume that his losses greatly exceed ours. This is but added proof that our Liberation Army will continue to exist and develop.

8. The great strength of our Liberation Army comes chiefly from the high political consciousness of its members. This is a singular advantage which can never be realized by the enemy and which is of great value to our Army. All officers and men in our Army hold complete faith in the Party and in the mission of the Army. Their hearts are filled with hatred for the foe. This is because both the officers and men of our Army were born and bred from the labourers' and peasants' struggle and from the people's

democratic movement. Without such a high political standard we could never carry on this bitter life-and-death struggle. It is not unusual that we have had deserters in the course of the war. This is because some comrades have been too careless in recommending and recruiting new members for the armed forces, or possible because a few of the deserters were actually enemy spies who had originally infiltrated our ranks. Therefore, desertion and mutiny of this type have not harmed the quality of the Liberation Army. On the contrary, it actually enables the Liberation Army to become even more powerful, reliable and purified.

9. An additional important feature is the widespread and deep-rooted Party, Liberation Army and Min Yuen organizations ranging throughout the length and breadth of Malaya. Our activities cover every district and state in Malaya. The enemy hopes to concentrate his mechanized elements in strategic operations against our forces. However, such widespread activities compel him to disperse his units in protecting production centres located in the large and small towns. This has undoubtedly weakened his employment of mechanized forces and diminished the momentum of his strategic offensive operations, although the enemy still maintains an offensive position. In addition, our widespread activities have given the enemy trouble in the selection of targets for concentrated attack. Against this background, our Army remains in a position to expand to an even greater degree.

10. Victory in this struggle depends on the strong and experienced leadership of the Malayan Communist Party. Our Party

can claim over twenty years' experience in Party organization and Min Yuen development, including the leadership in the anti-Japanese War, and, of course, the leadership in the past one-and-a-half years' anti-British war. A few of our comrades look down upon our past struggles, regarding these as useless and of dubious value. Such an attitude is wrong. The history of our Party in the past twenty years, especially in the last ten years, is rich in experience, awaiting our utilization. It should be pointed out that our Party has had more than five years of experience in guerrilla warfare, especially the guerrilla war now being waged under peculiar circumstances in Malaya. A majority of our Party's leaders and members can boast participation in the anti-Japanese war, undergoing at that time the test of a ruthless struggle. Our highranking officers have all exhibited confidence and courage in such difficult periods as the initial stage of the Japanese Occupation, the brutal attacks launched by the Japanese and the serious condition resulting from the 'Comrade Wright Incident'. In all these they continued to lead comrades of all states in building up the armed forces, expanding the Party, and developing the Min Yuen organizations. The present leaders in the Central Committee are all heroes of three years and eight months of the anti-Japanese war in which they fought without an army, with few weapons, and without an early Min Yuen organization. But by the close of the war they had succeeded in laying a strong and virile foundation for struggle including a military, Party and Min Yuen base. We should therefore have complete confidence in the experience and leadership of our Party.

11. Malaya has dense, lengthy jungle ranges extending from south to north. The jungle is disadvantageous because it is devoid of masses. However, it can also prove advantageous for our Army in providing cover for its movements and regions for safe bivouac. The jungle also renders the larger enemy weapons and bombing useless. It is more difficult for the enemy to launch a concentrated attack upon us; at the same time, it permits our Army to manoeuvre about swiftly. Although there are no people in the jungles, it is true that many squatter camps are adjacent to the jungle regions. This is why our Army makes use of the jungle for camps to work from in organizing Min Yuen activities and mobilizing the masses in nearby squatter areas, eventually turning these into temporary bases or rear areas for our Army. In other words, extensive Min Yuen and Party organizations, coupled with a topography of long jungle ranges, have proved to be most advantageous to our Army in establishing temporary bases as well as in conducting guerrilla operations throughout the various districts and States in Malaya. The shortcomings of these temporary bases are evident in their vulnerability and in their impermanent nature. However, they have proved a great boon to our Army in the period before permanent and consolidated bases could be established. In spite of their difficult and uncertain position, temporary bases have proved, during both the anti-Japanese war and the past one-and-a-half year's struggle against the English, to be adequate to support the growth of guerrilla warfare.

12. In the past year, a number of advantageous international

factors have been rapidly developing. These factors accrue chiefly from the firm leadership exhibited by the Soviet Union in the peace-loving democratic camp of the world. The near-completion of Russia's post-war five year plan which will bring further advancement towards the goal of Communism, the rapid advancement in the field of economic reconstruction towards Socialism made by all the new democratic countries of Eastern Europe with the support of the USSR; the unmasking of the American, British, and their stooge, Tito's spy ring in Eastern Europe; the growth of the World Peace Movement, fostered principally by the toiling masses of the world; the serious set-back of the Imperialists in their plot for waging war; and on the Asian side, the tremendous victory of the peoples of China; the liberation of 90 per cent. of her own soil by the Vietnam Democratic Republic; the establishment of a base for resolute armed struggle by the masses in Burma; and the growth of guerrilla forces both in the Philippines and in Indonesia.

Basically, as with the revolutionary war in China, the present struggle in Malaya promises to be a long and bitter one. However, current world conditions are entirely different from those in 1928 when the Red Army was created in China. Twenty years ago, the strength of world peace and democracy was at low ebb, whereas today it is definitely on the rise. Twenty years ago, we had only one friend with political power and military might. Today, we have at our side many friends, such as the Soviet Union, China, all the new democratic nations, the people in the colonies and semi-colonies, the democratic elements and working class in

Imperialist nations, among whom a few can claim strong political power, while others are well equipped with arms to wage a life-and-death struggle against the Imperialists. We are in no way isolated. Our struggle has been the chief concern of our allies throughout the world. The Soviet Union supports us both in her propaganda and publications. Our successes in this struggle were cited by the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youths, the World Students' Federation, the World Federation of Women's Unions, and the Communist Youth League in Britain. The WFTU, the Asian and Australian Trade Unions' Conference and the Asian Women's Representative Conference also voiced support for us. In his address at the World Federation of Trade Unions' Conference, Liu Shao-ch'i, Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, pointed out that the armed struggle waged by the people in colonial and semi-colonial areas was the chief form of the current struggle, Liu has served to strengthen even more the determination of the Malayan peoples in their present struggle.

13. The close of last year witnessed a clearer picture of the increasing decline and isolation of British power. The following are a few simple self-evident facts: The finances of the Federation Government were exhausted at the beginning of 1949. Excluding expenditures for British and Indian troops, the enemy has had to spend \$300,000 daily and more than \$100,000,000 yearly. In a brief year and a half, the enemy was forced to shift the burden of resettlement of the squatters from the Government to the Malayan Chinese Association, an organization of Chinese traitors who again con-

veniently transfer their burden to the common masses (by means of operating lotteries). The people's livelihood becomes more difficult and the number of unemployed increases following the devaluation of the British pound, which caused an even higher cost of living but held down wages. The above facts point up the economic plight of the foe.

On the political side, the prestige of the enemy is now at an all-time low because of its repeated extension of the period of the Emergency, thus plunging all Malaya into an unending war. The true face of the enemy is now evident in the eyes of the people who are now totally disillusioned. As a result of the momentous victory in China, the enemy has increased his political assaults against the Overseas Chinese. The enemy's true colours will soon become apparent to the naked eyes of the people residing in the larger urban areas. The Chinese bourgeoisie and the reactionary cliques are beginning to waver following the huge successes in China.

On the military side, the enemy is confronted with many difficulties in obtaining reinforcements for Malaya because of his commitments in Hong Kong, Africa, Palestine (where he concentrates on instigating clashes amongst the native peoples), West Germany and Greece in Eastern Europe (where his aim is to practice anti-Russian, Anti-Communist, anti-popular, and anti-democratic policies of Imperialism).

Note: Sections three to six in this study deal more particularly with purely military topics and are of only

secondary interest here. They have, therefore, not been translated. The interested reader is referred to the original source noted in the bibliography.

VII. Studies in Over-all Strategic Problems

The Party's analysis of over-all strategic problems, which appeared in Chapter IV of the work, Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War, having weathered one year's severe, cruel experience in practical combat, has verified some of the problems as being completely valid (i.e. general strategic principles, over-all strategic principles, frontal battles, a war of manoeuvre or guerrilla warfare, and so forth). The analysis of a few other problems, however, needs to be examined more closely in order to forestall the growth of bias in the actual execution of these methods. Some even need to be amended.

What are those features that need explanation or rectification:

1. In 'Problems of Battles of Annihilation and Battles of Attrition', we advocated battles of annihilation and not battles of attrition. As battles of attrition bring us no spoils, we are very much against their use. In general, our aims in this war should be annihilation rather than attrition — maximum gains with a minimum of losses. Each platoon and each company should strive to achieve this goal; each battalion and each regiment should follow suit. All individual units should endeavour to obtain a maximum of gain with

a minimum of losses in each operation. If we did not follow this method, then we should soon be cut off from our sources of ammunition, face a shortage of arms, and eventually be forced to cease fighting altogether. Of course, any attempt to realize such ends at all costs in each separate battle, is unwise. This would not permit us to employ other means of sabotage and annihilation operations. This is why the statement, 'Routing the enemy by inflicting heavy casualties on him, but failing to seize his arms, is in effect a defeat', is a biased statement. Because we must adapt the general strategic aims of our operations to local conditions, we must pay closest attention to the ramifications and effects of our actions. Strengthening 'the seizure of arms' is, of course, a proper goal, and should be the chief aim of all our soldiers. But to make 'the seizure of arms' our one and only aim, neglecting all others, is a cardinal error.

2. Our analysis of 'initiative, cunning and planning' is fundamentally correct. But the explanation of decentralization is inadequate. At present every one of our units is acting separately and independently, but this is not absolute decentralization, it is only a kind of relative dispersal. Therefore, all those normally systematically dispersed units should reassemble to a certain degree to obtain larger successes and to deal bigger blows against the foe. This is the correct course. But when we are finished with such operations at the time when the enemy starts his large-scale counter-offensives, we then find ourselves lacking suitable ground for retreat and our main force should then be ingeniously redispersed,

to avoid furnishing a massed target for the foe. At present, it is difficult to bring off successive major operations. After we find the completion of each large-scale operation, if conditions do not warrant another immediate operation, our main force should be dispersed and ordered to carry on minor operations. When times and conditions permit, we should again mass and embark upon another major operations. As soon as this is completed, we should again disperse. In this manner, we should continually rotate our actions. Only through this system can we make fullest use of our capabilities.

3. The documentary analysis concerning 'seizing the initiative in combat' is rather biased. According to the conditions of the Malayan Revolutionary War, in order to seize the power or initiative, apart from concentrating and massing superior strength in campaigns, we should also keep in mind the need for action while dispersed, assaulting continuously in many minor operations. These two methods appear inconsistent and yet they are interrelated. If repeatedly employed, these two combine to gain us a kind of initiative in continual and successive victories. It is an error to neglect either of these methods.

4. We should now discuss the massing of superior force. In the earlier analysis, it was not made clear that it is a concentration of highly efficient and well-trained troops which is equal in importance to tactics employed. It was also not clearly explained that until we can create permanent bases in the Malayan Revolutionary War, the tactics of relative dispersal are of first importance. This type of dispersal is not absolute, it is relative. It is considered

relative because we disperse our forces only after adjusting the concentrated movements of each individual dispersed unit in accordance with certain patterns and scales. Furthermore, each individual dispersed fighting unit should, at certain periods, preserve that pattern and not scatter in a disorderly way or without plan. Finally, due consideration should be given to redispersal. Throughout the whole period prior to the establishment of permanent bases, each dispersed independent active unit is capable of expanding its own region, daily increasing the scope and area of its activities. Speaking in general, the tactics of relative dispersal should be employed throughout all Malaya, differing only slightly because of problems in numerical strength or local conditions. Basically, however, it is still relative dispersal. The lessons of the past year have taught us the error of such statements as: 'If an all-out assault upon the enemy is ineffective, it will have the result of wasting our own strength and permitting the enemy to eliminate us individually', and 'such attacks only result in our defeat and separate annihilation by the foe'.

5. The analysis of the problems of bases also needs clarification. First the sentence, 'no bases means that we cannot possibly carry on a protracted, hazardous and cruel revolutionary war', deserves note. While it is precise and in general a valid assumption, it is and remains a broad interpretation. We might better say through experience that temporary bases can also accomplish this purpose. However, without permanent bases, we recognize the

impossibility of driving the British imperialists from Malaya. Because the nation-wide temporary bases are capable of partly shouldering the responsibilities of permanent bases, we must continue to resort to guerrilla warfare, and are not yet able to bring the revolution to a successful conclusion. At the beginning of our civil war, vast numbers of temporary bases were already in operation throughout Malaya. But before they could be considered permanent in nature, they would have to undergo a certain period for development. Second, regarding the question of a popular political power and a people's government, the outlook of our original statement is a bit too academic. Although the materialization of a people's government takes place only at the completion of the establishment of permanent bases, the gradual realization of a popular governing authority is also possible through Min Yuen organizations which gradually conduct their activities along the lines of a governing body. Third, regarding the question of a people's armed self-defense organization, i.e. our partisan forces, our original statements tended to magnify the difficulties and distorted the possible employment of these forces which, prior to the establishment of bases, are admittedly restricted but not altogether without their uses. Regarding the question of arming these partisans, it should be realized that they also can gain the protection afforded by the jungle, which will serve to make up for a deficiency in armament. Finally, we should discuss the question of temporary bases. It was not previously made clear that in addition to maintaining the existing temporary bases, every State should strive to create more and more such bases. Then our armed forces would have

more bases to operate from and would have more people to employ in their support. Thus our operations could expand more quickly, spread more widely and function more universally.

A year ago, the Party's analysis of the overall strategic problems was insufficient and, in some parts, in error. This was because the Party failed to take full cognizance of certain special points. At that time, the Party's recognition of combat peculiarities was basically sound. Therefore, the Party's ruling on all-important and basic guiding principles at the time was also sound, as was the fundamental spirit of the whole document. But because of a lack of combat experience, the document was then incomplete. Hence, some of the more salient special features which were biased or incorrect have been pointed out.

VIII. Intensify Study of the Party's Resolutions in Actual Practice

Through the actual practice of warfare our Party's military doctrines are continually developing. Before the struggle began, or in the earliest stages of hostilities, it was absolutely impossible for us to have a ready-made and complete set of theories on both strategy and tactics, or to have found it unnecessary to make any modifications and alterations through the process of actual combat. Such behaviour would have been basically counter to the theories of Marxism-Leninism. In the earlier periods of the struggle our ideas and theories were simple and crude and on many individual problems we held incorrect or biased opinions. Now we should strive to achieve progress by continually improving upon our concepts.

There is one final vital point. The reason we have discovered our errors today is because we have carried out the Party's resolutions faithfully all throughout this past year. Only by faithfully executing the Party's resolutions could we study and improve upon our revolutionary course. Without such faithful service to the Party, we should not have been able to recognize the real truth nor to tell the difference between right and wrong. Therefore, each member, each comrade, especially those holding official status, should continually and repeatedly study the substance and spirit of all documents, acquainting themselves thoroughly with the contents and fundamentals of all Party doctrines.

PARTY DIRECTIVE OF 1 OCTOBER 1951¹¹

I. Past Errors

Serious errors have been committed in the past by state organizations, and many working methods have been diametrically opposed to accepted principles. Party members are reminded that their primary duty is to expand and consolidate the organization of the masses, which is to take precedence over the purely military

¹¹ Directive issued by the Political Bureau of the Malayan Communist Party on 1 October 1951. This translation is adapted from that which appeared in the London Times, 1 December 1952, p. 5. Limited modifications have been made for reasons of greater clarity. The original Directive was captured from a Communist courier who was taking it to Singapore. It was reportedly fifty-seven typewritten pages (in translation) and covering such points as penetration of labour unions 'on a guerrilla basis'. The entire text has not been made available by the authorities.

objective of destroying the enemy. This is to be attained by creating a united front of all communities and classes by acquiring the support of the bourgeoisie and capitalists and avoiding violent tactics which have antagonized peasants and workers. Attempts are to be made to penetrate into the police, Home Guard, the Malay Regiment, and the civil service.

To win the masses the party must (i) stop seizing identity and ration cards; (ii) stop burning new villages and cookie lines; (iii) stop attacking post offices, reservoirs, power stations, and other public services; (iv) refrain from derailing civilian trains with high explosives; (v) stop throwing grenades and take great care, when shooting running dogs found mixing with the masses, to prevent stray shots from hurting the masses; and (vi) stop burning religious buildings, sanitary trucks, Red Cross vehicles, and ambulances.

II. Explaining Motives

Rubber trees, tin mines, and factories must not be destroyed because of the resentment of the workers who lose their employment, but, to improve their living conditions and warn capitalists to attend to their grievances, limited destruction can be carried out with the permission or at the request of the workers. The motive must be carefully explained to them and alternative employment found.

The task of controlling the masses is delegated to the Min Yuen over which control can be exercised by enforcing any resolution that has been carried by a majority. Stricter discipline is to be

imposed, and members must understand their responsibility for consolidating the organization and protecting its working principles, secrecy, and security. Those who fail must be punished but there is to be no killing or thrashing; only advice, criticism, fines, and education. If the masses do not accept the Party's opinions, its standpoint must be re-orientated and Party leaders should examine the relationship between the Min Yuen and the masses and use their discretion in applying fundamental principles to avoid difficulties. Understanding of the condition of the masses should be an important item for every party meeting.

To involve the masses in revolution, the party must exploit lawful disputes and demand concessions from the Government and the capitalists.

III. Lawful Means

These activities must not appear to be designed to create dissension or to overthrow the Government, and they should be carried out in accordance with government regulations, though they will occasionally digress from them. At other times the party is to be more compromising to gain the sympathy of the middle and upper classes. The Malayan Chinese Association should be used to present the party's demands to the Government and negotiate and settle its problems.

Many government measures that the Communist Party evidently finds embarrassing are to be exploited rather than attacked. No

new villages are to be destroyed, but reasonable and acceptable conditions to protect the interests of resettled Chinese squatters are to be put forward, and whenever possible their demands are to be fulfilled by lawful means. The formation of the Home Guard units is to be delayed, obstructed, disabled, or exploited. Stubborn reactionaries are to be killed, but others are to be persuaded to help the party or remain neutral.

If the masses are conscribed, propaganda must point out that they have been enlisted to fight in China and Burma as well as Malaya, and others should avoid conscription by escaping to China or India. Should they decide to join the Communist bands, they must first save food; otherwise a sudden rush of recruits will create an insoluble food shortage.

IV. Food, Not Terror

The self-protection corps, in which the young recruit serves before graduating to armed units, is to infiltrate new villages and collect food instead of committing acts of terrorism. Stricter security is to be enforced, and cell leaders are to restrict their activities and attendances at party meetings to avoid suspicion.

Political activity and education are to be increased in large towns. The international and Malayan situations must be analyzed to strengthen confidence in the revolution, and morale must be raised by instilling class hatred against the British and the capitalist system. Grievance meetings, at which people will describe

their sufferings, are to be encouraged, and the widespread belief that the Chinese peasant is worse off than the Malay must be corrected. More 'know more characters'¹² classes are to be held, and the military and civilian reader published by the press of the Malayan Race's Liberation Army will be used.

Yellow trade unions¹³ are to be penetrated and their leaders and members may be assassinated if the masses can be made to recognize their treachery to the class struggle. Where there is access to estate-workers, secret cells are to be set up to control so-called yellow unions.

V. Warning Attacks

To unite the bourgeoisie of all races, small and middle capitalists are to be urged to join the movement or to give material support. If they do not pay subscriptions to party funds, neighbouring estates can be attacked as a warning. Big capitalists in areas dominated by the party are to be ordered to improve working conditions, and they can be eliminated if it is considered necessary. Wage cuts are to be opposed if the price of rubber falls, and if estates close down demands must be made that their control be transferred to the workers.

¹²Reference is made to the Communist Party's drive against illiteracy in its ranks.

¹³Yellow or non-Communist unions, as against Red or Left-dominated trade unions.

A table of subscriptions to the party to be paid by a big and small planters of all communities has been prepared. Estates of less than twenty acres are to pay 50 cents an acre when rubber is selling at between \$30 (Malayan currency) and \$60 a picul,¹⁴ and estates of more than five hundred acres are to pay \$9 an acre when rubber is selling at more than \$90 a picul. A similar scale has been laid down for tin mines, but ample protection is to be given only to owners of small concerns.

Enemy personnel who surrender in battle are not to be killed, except traitors, British and Gurkha troops, senior civil servants, and police officers. Corpses will not be burned, stripped, or dismembered, and good teeth will not be extracted. Asian officers are not to be assassinated, unless they are police or resettlement officers, and Home Guards and auxiliary policemen are to be paid for weapons seized. IOU chits can be used. British officers and managers of production centres can be killed, but not British health officers and engineers.

VI. Changing Conditions

Members of the Kuomintang and the Malayan Chinese Association are liable to assassination, but not members of the United Malay Nationalist Organization and the Independence of Malaya Party,

¹⁴A picul is a measure of weight which, by tradition, a man can carry on his back. In Malaya, it is 133 1/3 pounds.

because many Malays still believe that these bodies protect their interests. Police and civil servants are to be urged to join the Nin Yuen or to provide information. For this task propaganda is considered to be especially important, and the greatest attention is to be given to publicity and its distribution.

While military action is recognized as necessary for the morale of the Malayan Race's Liberation Army, priority is to be given to reorganizations to meet changing conditions. Whether a band should continue to fight or should withdraw for retraining and redeployment should depend on local conditions.

Source: Gene, Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle In Malaya. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: University of Malaya Press, 1971, pp. 147-224.

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